
Final Report – Volume 1

Prepared by Triple Line & GICSRD

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Evaluation of FCDO support to improve resilience in the Caribbean through a range of programmes and wider initiatives

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Cover: The aftermath of Hurricane Maria in Dominica. Photo by Anadolu Ajansı

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List of abbreviations

BII	British International Investment
CACP	Caribbean Anti-Corruption Programme
CANTA	Caribbean Association of National Training Agencies
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CARTAC	Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre
CBD	Caribbean Development Bank
CCCCC	Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre
CCR	Central Crisis Reserve
CDT	Caribbean Development Team
CEDP	Caribbean Economic Development Programme
CIMH	Caribbean Institute for Meteorology and Hydrology
CMP	Centrally Managed Programmes
CSME	Caribbean Single Market and Economy
CSJP3	Citizen Security and Justice Programme
DFID	Department for International Development
DTVETC	Department of Technical and Vocational Education and Training Council
ECDPG	Eastern Caribbean Development Partners Group
EE	Energy Efficiency
EF	Evaluation Framework
EMG	Evaluation Management Group
EQs	Evaluation Questions
ESIAs	Environmental and Social Impact Assessments
FA	Financial Assistance
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FID	Financial Investigations Division
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
GESI	Gender Equality and Social Inclusion

GICSRD	Global Institute for Climate Smart and Resilient Development
GNI	Gross National Income
GNTA	Grenada National Training Agency
GoCD	Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica
GoJ	Government of Jamaica
HDI	Human Development Index
ICF	International Climate Fund
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDS	International Development Strategy
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
IISD	International Institute for Sustainable Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDECOM	Independent Commission of Investigations
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
JCF	Jamaican Constabulary Force
JCs	Judgement Criteria
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
MDA	Ministries Departments and Agencies
MDBs	Multi-lateral Development Banks
MICs	Middle-Income Countries
MNS	Ministry of National Security (Jamaica)
MOCA	Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency
MoH	Ministries of Health (Belize)
MVI	Multi-dimensional Vulnerability Index
NIMOS	National Institute for Environment and Development
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
OCG	Office of the Contractor General

ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee
OECS	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
PAHO	Pan American Health Organisation
PCR	Project Completion review
PEA	Poverty and Equity Analysis
PFM	Public Financial Management
PPP	Public-Private Partnerships
RE	Renewable Energy
RESI	Resilient and Sustainable Islands Initiative
RPD	Resident Prosecution Division
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SDSN	Sustainable Development Solutions Network
SEEC	Sustainable Energy for the Eastern Caribbean
SEQs	Sub-Evaluation Questions
SIDS	Small Island Development States
SKYE	Skills for Youth Employment
SRO	Senior Responsible Officer
SSDA	Sector Skills Development Agency
SVG	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
TA	Technical Assistance
ToC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UK	United Kingdom
UKCIF	UK Caribbean Infrastructure Fund
UN	United Nations
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UWI	University of the West Indies
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

1 Executive Summary

1.1 Purpose and Method

The primary purpose of this evaluation is learning.

- Learning is based on a detailed review, including interviewing over 90 people and reviewing 7 country case studies,¹ of the United Kingdom Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) Caribbean Development Team (CDT) programming over the period 2015 – 2023, covering a diverse portfolio of 15 programmes.
- The evidence and lessons learned will be used by the FCDO CDT to inform the development of the next phase of FCDO’s resilience strategy and programming for the Caribbean.

This Report is focused on one **Overarching Evaluation Question**: *To what extent is the approach taken by the Caribbean Development Team to improve the resilience of the Caribbean region – to climate shifts, natural disasters, economic and other shocks – relevant and strategically targeted to deliver the UK objective of strengthening resilience?*

This question focuses on ODA-eligible countries. To answer this overarching question, the evaluation uses DAC criteria – Relevance, Coherence, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability.

There are a few points to note regarding the evaluation:



- The 15 programmes of the CDT portfolio were not designed as an integrated package focused on strengthening resilience. Notwithstanding this, the evaluation “imposes” a resilience lens to the portfolio to assess their contribution to building resilience.
- The evaluation focuses on the 18 million inhabitants of 15 full members of CARICOM. Seven of these countries are English-speaking Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligible countries² with a total population of approximately 4.4 million, of which nearly two-thirds reside in Jamaica.
- All the countries looked at are classified as Small Island Development States (SIDS) by the United Nations (UN). However, not all of them are islands: Belize, Guyana and Suriname are in the Central American or South American mainland.

¹ As part of the evaluation, case studies were conducted in 4 ODA eligible countries: Belize, Dominica, Jamaica, Guyana. Evidence was complemented by case studies conducted in 3 non-ODA eligible countries: Barbados, Suriname and The Bahamas.

² Belize, Dominica, Guyana, Grenada, Jamaica, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines.

1.2 FCDO CDT Portfolio Overview: Infrastructure is the priority


- A highly diversified portfolio covering multiple components of resilience. There is a strong infrastructure focus with over 80 percent of the UKP500mn+ programme spend earmarked to this thematic area. The UK Caribbean Infrastructure Fund – UKCIF, is the portfolio’s flagship programme accounting for about 70 percent of expenditure.
- Jamaica is the single largest recipient of FCDO expenditure. However, many programmes are channelled through multilateral regional institutions and cover more than one country.



Total portfolio expenditure 2015-2023: ~£512M

	Infrastructure development and upgrading	Economic development	Governance	Climate and disaster
Thematic Area as per Caribbean Resilience Framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic resilience Fiscal resilience Workforce resilience Blue economy and biodiversity resilience 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social and democratic resilience 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate and disaster resilience
CDT programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UKCIF Improving Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy in the Eastern Caribbean SMART Hospitals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Caribbean Economic Development Programme – CEDP Youth Skills for Economic Growth in the Eastern Caribbean – SkYE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UK Jamaica Violence Prevention Partnership Serious Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Programme Caribbean Anti-Corruption Programme – CACP Citizen Security and Justice Programme 3 – CSJP3 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthening Disaster Recovery & Resilience – R&R CREAD & Support to CREAD Caribbean Humanitarian Assistance Emergency Assistance for Erika Humanitarian Support to Belize Following Lisa


UKAID yearly average expenditure for the period FY2019-2024 in GBP, ODA countries




ODA country ranking per level of expenditure

1. Jamaica
2. Dominica
3. Guyana
4. Belize
5. SVG
6. St Lucia
7. Grenada

No. of projects in-country from CDT portfolio, ODA countries



No. of countries covered by programme in the CDT portfolio



1.3 Caribbean Resilience Framework (CRF): Establishing a Point of Departure

The point of departure of the evaluation was developing a “normative” analytical framework that seeks to operationalise what resilience means in practice; it is a framework that can be built on and further refined. The CRF was based on a rapid review of the literature related to resilience in the Caribbean region and SIDS and then “tested” through interviews with a mix of stakeholders across the region. This is an initial step to assist with the evaluation framework design. The Caribbean Resilience Framework acts as an entry point to assess the thematic programming of FCDO CDT’s interventions in the region and bring the fragmented but extensive range of resilience programming under one umbrella.

Resilience can be defined as the overall ability of a country – including the ability of its institutions, systems, businesses and population – to survive, adapt and thrive no matter what kinds of chronic stresses or acute shocks it experiences

1. Economic resilience

What is the economic vulnerability challenge? Caribbean countries are characterised by a high dependence on tourism and a lack of economic diversification. This results in high economic vulnerability, particularly when external shocks hit.

How would economic resilience look like? Economic resilience means that economic structures in Caribbean countries enter a new phase in development as they are increasingly diversified and support vibrant private sectors while they keep capitalising on revenues generated by tourism.

2. Fiscal resilience

What is the fiscal vulnerability challenge? High levels of debt frequently represent a high proportion of GDP in Caribbean countries. This limits their ability to sustain growth and their room to act when shocks hit. External shocks can also lead to borrowing and higher levels of debt, thereby perpetuating a negative systemic cycle. High inflation levels have recently caused food insecurity challenges.

How would fiscal resilience look like? Fiscal resilience means that with improvements in financial management and macro-economic stability, Caribbean countries can better sustain long-term growth and have more room to act when shocks hit.

3. Workforce resilience

What is the workforce vulnerability challenge? Caribbean countries have limited human capacity to effectively respond to all the requirements of a functioning government. Although populations in Caribbean countries are young and benefit from high levels of education, the private sector is limited and there is a mismatch between skills and economic sectors, which hinders on sustainable growth. Brain drain further impacts on workforce strengths.

How would workforce resilience look like? Workforce resilience means that with efficiency gains and capacity building in human capital, Caribbean countries can better perform their government functions. It also means that Caribbean countries build from high levels of education to support the development of a highly-skilled and vibrant private sector in a way that minimises brain drain.

4. Social and democratic resilience

What is the social and democratic resilience challenge? There are persistent high levels of inequality despite relatively low poverty levels. Violence and organised crime are widespread, which undermine social cohesion, particularly among the youth. Pervasive high levels of corruption hinder on the rule of law and the strength of institutions. High levels of child malnutrition and stunting pose long-term human and social challenges in some countries.

How would social and democratic resilience look like? Social and democratic vulnerability means that improved social cohesion and health structures create more powerful and empowered communities that are able to prosper and better respond when shocks hit. It also means that stronger accountability fosters transparency and effectiveness to sustain growth and social cohesion and enable government systems to better respond when shocks occur.

8. Environmental resilience

What is the environmental resilience challenge? Caribbean countries establish frameworks and implement actions that effectively allow them to protect ecosystems while sustainably use resources in the ocean and coastal areas. Forestry management and blue economy efforts go hand-in-hand with tourism promotion.

How would environmental resilience look like? Environmental resilience means that environmental protection frameworks are put in place and mitigate climate and disaster vulnerability, effectively look after biodiversity as well as support the development of the blue economy.

7. Climate and disaster resilience

What is the climate and disaster vulnerability challenge? Caribbean countries are some of the most exposed countries in the world to the effects of climate change and natural disasters. Although the emphasis is to be placed on the reduction of climate and disaster vulnerability, effective emergency response systems are needed to cope with emergencies. Caribbean countries should be able to bounce back in an inclusive way that brings benefits for all. Given the relatively small contribution of the Caribbean to climate emissions, adaptation (and not mitigation) emerges as the salient priority.

How would climate and disaster resilience look like? Climate and disaster resilience means that Caribbean countries are able to progressively reduce their vulnerability to climate shocks. It also means that Caribbean countries have the adequate emergency response systems in place to effectively work when shocks hit and swiftly and inclusively bounce back while enabling a transition to the recovery phase.

6. Infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience


What is the infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience challenge? Poor quality infrastructure acts as a barrier to sustained growth, and more than half of the Caribbean population live in urban areas, which are concentrated in the vulnerable low-lying coastal zone. Despite some exceptions, Caribbean countries are heavily reliant on fossil fuel imports and few have significantly invested in renewable energy infrastructure.

How would infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience look like? Infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience means that the built environment and infrastructure support economic growth, sustain shocks and allow Caribbean countries to effectively bounce back when disasters occur. It also means that Caribbean countries also build economic resilience by reducing energy dependency and promoting a shift to renewable energy.

5. Regional integration resilience

What is the regional integration vulnerability challenge? Caribbean SIDS face significant intra-regional connectivity challenges which hinder on growth and resilience. While organisations promoting regional integration have emerged and Caribbean integration and coordination bodies (CDEMA, CCCCC) have driven action in climate and disaster management, economic integration has been slow to take off.

How would regional integration resilience look like? Regional integration resilience means that Caribbean regional organisations drive success in resilience-building. The effectiveness of their activity can inspire other organisations guiding action in SIDS.



1.4 Heterogeneity, Capacity Constrained, and High Vulnerability to Risk

There is a high degree of *heterogeneity* across the Caribbean Region

- One driver of the Caribbean’s heterogeneity arises from the countries being at quite different levels of development as measured by standard socio-economic parameters. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita ranges from over USD 32,000 in the Bahamas to around USD 6,000 in Jamaica, with Haiti’s less than USD 2,000. The Bahamas and Trinidad & Tobago have very high Human Development Indexes (HDIs). Most CARICOM countries have high HDIs, with Belize rated as medium and Haiti as low. St Kitts & Nevis, Guyana, Barbados, and Antigua and Barbuda all have similar per capita GDP to Trinidad and Tobago.
- The significant variations in levels of development are important in determining the capacity of the respective states to secure and sustain resilience.

Risk, Exposure, Vulnerability and Impact

- Disasters in the Caribbean occur 10 times more frequently than the global average and the economic impact associated with disasters is about 20 times higher (IMF, 2022). In particular, the impacts of climate change emerge as an existential challenge for the long-term prosperity of Caribbean SIDS. Their perpetual exposure to climate and natural hazards results in systemic disaster risk due to the impact on infrastructure (many infrastructural assets are vulnerable to climate impacts) and economic structures strongly based on tourism.
- The lack of economic diversification (over-reliance on tourism) limits the room to act when shocks hit, thereby compounding vulnerability. Infrastructure investment backlogs (roads, ports, water, energy and wastewater) further constrain economic growth. Vulnerability is increasing in that the relatively small size of most CARICOM countries inhibits response and recovery, invariably requiring external assistance.
- The entire Caribbean Region is highly exposed to climate risks and shocks – an estimated 3% of annual GDP is lost on average to climate-related disasters.

Response, Resilience and Institutional Capacities


- Although all countries evaluated are politically stable, many are also tempered, to various degrees, by widespread violence, persistent inequality, strong perceptions of corruption and accountability challenges. This democratic and social environment in turn impacts the prospect of achieving long-term resilience efforts supported by social cohesion and institutional effectiveness.
- Governance deficits impair the effectiveness of many Caribbean national responses to climate and economic shocks and stresses.
- Institutional capacities are generally in need of technical and financial strengthening to improve capacity for disaster risk management, including planning, budgeting, risk avoidance and response.
- In the infrastructure sector, there are significant capacity deficits to plan, finance, build and maintain critical infrastructure throughout the asset lifecycle.

1.5 FCDO Programming and Resilience Strengthening

Overall, FCDO CDTs programming has performed well in terms of contributing towards greater resilience in the Caribbean Region. FCDO is generally considered a relevant and flexible development partner among its programme delivery peers. The “resilience approach” taken by CDT is relevant to the UK objective of strengthening resilience in the Caribbean. CDT programming in the period 2015-2023 has addressed core challenges that the region faces in resilience building. This has been done following a multi-disciplinary lens and an effort has been made in programming to break silos across thematic areas – thus attempting to address systemic interlinkages that pose structural challenges in building resilience at a regional scale.

The FCDO portfolio performance against the DAC criteria used for this evaluation is summarised in the following figure. The principal message is that slower than planned execution of the very large UKCIF

means that effectiveness, impact, and sustainability are not yet fully realised. The interviews provide comfort that as UKCIF reaches full maturity, effectiveness, impact and sustainability will be significantly achieved.



2 Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations

EQ1: Relevance & Coherence. To what extent is FCDO's programming in the Caribbean both relevant and coherent in terms of building resilience?

The “resilience approach” and themes informing CDT programming are *relevant to the UK objective of strengthening resilience in the Caribbean and align well with regional and national priorities across the portfolio*. CDT programming in the period 2015-23 addressed many of the core challenges that the region faces in resilience building through a multi-disciplinary approach across multiple thematic areas. Overall, the projects were positively received by the stakeholders interviewed and ownership was generally high among implementing partners. Effective partnerships were formed with the CDB, EU, Inter- American Development Bank, IMF, World Bank, and bilateral agencies (notably Global Affairs Canada). Relevant points to highlight include the following:

- The FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio has been able to respond to changing circumstances. The long-term programmes in physical infrastructure development and institutional capacity building have shown a degree of adaptability to changing contexts and needs. The portfolio has used event-driven assistance to address specific shocks following disasters, and to transition towards long-term resilience building.
- FCDO has successfully built on previous programme experience and has worked with donors to address Caribbean resilience challenges. The UK has addressed resilience challenges in ODA-eligible countries while assisting non-ODA countries through available channels (e.g. CARTAC). It has also allowed for specific bilateral efforts to materialise whenever relevant (e.g. programming with a particular focus on Jamaica or the CREAD experience in Dominica).
- EE/RE and SMART Hospitals infrastructure driven projects are a
- Iso positively addressing core resilience challenges that the Caribbean faces:
 - The EE/RE programme helped to enable a transition to renewable and clean energy while minimising dependence on fossil fuels – thereby improving economic resilience. This effort is particularly relevant since de-risking investment in renewable energy using

innovative financial mechanisms is likely to be a key innovation enabling a transition to cleaner energy sources.

- The SMART Hospitals initiative addressed the core challenge of upgrading health facilities and had a demonstration effect on how this could be successfully achieved. The SMART hospitals also placed significant emphasis on O&M sustainability improvements which is an underemphasised aspect of infrastructure management.
- CDT programming in the economic development space, such as CEDP and SkYE, addressed challenges related to fiscal and macro-economic stability, private sector constraints and skills development.
 - CEDP efforts in enhancing revenue collection allows Caribbean countries to improve their fiscal position, reduce dependency on income coming from tourism and provides greater space to act flexibly when shocks hit. Similarly, CEDP efforts to reform organisations regulating private sector competitiveness address the need to reduce barriers in the private sector operating environment – thereby supporting economic diversification and growth.
 - SkYE, on its side, addressed the shortage of certified relevant needs in the workforce, which emerge as a constraint on investment and growth at the regional scale. The programme attempted to improve the challenge of persistent inadequate skills for key growth sectors.
- The CDT portfolio addressed the need to advance DRM institutional and policy frameworks while fostering a shift to a proactive culture of resilience building. In addition to advancing DRM frameworks by adopting an inclusion perspective with the aim of leaving no one behind when shocks hit, the R&R programme worked to break silos across thematic areas. The programme looked at the importance of fiscal flexibility to manage shocks and worked to enhance PFM systems so that they are better able to plan for disaster preparedness. This addresses a key constraint and attempts to break a negative cycle that perpetuates a cycle of indebtedness when shocks hit.
- The CREAD experience in Dominica shows how to support transitioning from response and recovery to long-term resilience building. The Caribbean has developed response mechanisms to approach resilience building – the 5C Regional Framework and CDEMA's Caribbean Resilience Framework are illustrations of this. However, there is still a need to support the shift toward a proactive culture of prevention and risk avoidance.
- The CDT portfolio has shown flexibility and was able to adapt and design programming responding to natural shocks that took place from 2015 to 2023. The portfolio integrated relief efforts to address devastation resulting from Tropical Storm Erika (2015), Hurricane Maria (2017), La Soufriere Volcanic Eruption (2021), the 2021 Haiti earthquake and Tropical Storm Lisa (2022). While these experiences built on disaster response to enhance systems for long-term resilience building, more is needed to be done.
- The CDT portfolio also worked to address social cohesion and governance challenges caused by widespread violence, break linkages between organised crime and systemic corruption, and aimed to improve accountability mechanisms. While this programming was focused on Jamaica, transferable lessons for the wider Caribbean have been identified.

EQ2: Effectiveness. To what extent has programming been effective in delivering resilience outcomes?

On the effectiveness criterion, FCDO programming has not yet achieved the target outcomes and impacts across the portfolio:

- The CDT portfolio is contributing to resilience outcomes, but progress is slow and not yet complete. Major delays in the implementation of UKCIF and the RE/EE have impaired overall effectiveness of the portfolio given their scale (share of the portfolio). The delivery of physical assets and their *full functionality* is necessary to be effective and deliver the planned outcomes and impacts, and this has not been achieved in UKCIF and EE/ EE.

- The portfolio of programmes in disaster risk management and economic development have generally performed satisfactorily in improving resilience in their target areas and stakeholder constituencies.
 - Portfolio programmes on economic development, fiscal reform and workforce resilience display mixed results in terms of capacity building.
 - Portfolio programmes in climate and disaster management have shown a strong degree of effectiveness in strengthening of recovery and resilience-building systems and responses.
 - FCDO has successfully developed partnerships with regional organisations in the Caribbean (CDB, CARTAC, IDB, PAHO, CDEMA) as an effective means of extending the reach of its portfolio across multiple country contexts. This has enabled FCDO to operate in a diverse and complex region by leveraging specific partners' strengths (technical, geographic) and networks, whilst capitalising on existing bi-lateral partnerships where relevant (i.e. Jamaica).

EQ3: Impact & Sustainability. What is the evidence illustrating that FCDO programming has built resilience in a sustained and integrated manner? How can FCDO best continue to provide relevant support as Caribbean SIDS progress into graduating from ODA-eligibility?

- Evidence, Annual Reviews and KIIs, show that FCDO has combined technical assistance (TA) and financial assistance (FA) in several programme areas with positive outcomes, but the sustainability of this model is not fully substantiated.
- FCDO's portfolio has helped to establish new project preparation systems in the CDB for to enhance resilience, GESI and climate risk. The systems are being utilised and it is understood based on KIIs with CDB staff that they are being institutionalised more widely within the CDB.
- There has been a concerted effort to elevate O&M requirements into project design. The extent to which O&M plans are fully implemented and sustained is yet to be determined and should be a focus of further investigation where projects are operational.
- Pro-poor and inclusion objectives, mechanisms and support interventions need to be further mainstreamed across all programming given extensive income and social exclusion challenges.
- In the infrastructure space, a step change in mobilising more private finance and private infrastructure investors engaged remains a priority and needs new programming approaches and innovations. The RE/EE has taken a pathfinder role around use of a PPP model in geo-thermal in the Caribbean – this has been a protracted process with many learnings that can be captured and built into future PPP transaction design.

However, the CDT portfolio is best described as a collection of programmes, each relevant, that address various dimensions of resilience at regional or national level. *Collectively* they were not systematically mutually reinforcing towards the common goal of building systemic resilience in the region. More of the same is not advisable. A compelling narrative is needed that will bring coherence and transformational potential to the CDT programme in the region.

2.1 Lessons

Lesson 1. Partnerships with like-minded development partners to co-design and implement programmes contributes to enhanced coherence and effectiveness. Partnerships should be based on respective capacities and value – added to ensure complementarity of efforts.

FCDO benefits from strong working relationships with development partners, multilateral and bilateral donors, across the Caribbean. Based on the KIIs with the relevant partners successful programme examples include: the CSJP3 programme, implemented with IDB and Global Affairs Canada; the CREAD experience in Dominica, a joint effort with Global Affairs Canada and UNDP; and the SMART Hospitals Initiative, a combined effort with PAHO. The evidence from both documents and KIIs indicate the benefits of regional partnerships are that they contribute to:

- Achieving economies of scale;

- Collective and complementary efforts among development partners reduces risk of duplication and offers the potential of stronger transformational impact;
- Participating in regional conversations on resilience-building by exchanging ideas and programming approaches.

Lesson 2. FCDO has strongly emphasised inclusion of vulnerable groups as a core element in programme design, implementation and safeguarding measures (leaving no one behind).

CDT programming has proactively developed and sought to mainstream mechanisms to ensure the interests of marginalised and vulnerable groups are fully considered and institutionalised within implementing partner systems and procedures. This approach ensures a UK commitment to placing the needs of the most vulnerable at the core of development efforts, and fosters resilience-building initiatives that promote greater social cohesion by embedding inclusiveness.

Lesson 3. FCDO has used adaptive management to adjust UKCIF interventions to enable better use of grant funding and TA to support infrastructure investment. This is important as bottlenecks emerge during the implementation lifecycle. Adaptive management is critical to effective programme delivery and should be continued.

The UKCIF model shifted from a grant funding model to a grant and concessional loan financing model. TA was flexible and designed to ensure a progression from project preparation into implementation. This allowed projects to move more efficiently to delivery (as compared to the without UKCIF) and has been positively perceived by implementing partners. The EE/RE initiative combined TA and FA allowing governments in the Eastern Caribbean to de-risk investments in renewable energy. Looking ahead, intervention design should allow for flexible use of technical assistance and grant funding fit for purpose to the objectives targeted. FCDO staff accessibility and willingness to discuss programme progress more informally is seen as a positive way to ensure effectiveness and the achievement of the results sought.

Lesson 4. A strong emphasis on technical capability and independent advisory services builds confidence and trust. Development partners in the Caribbean recognise the UK for its commitment to address development challenges through technical excellence.

Development partners acknowledged the emphasis that the UK places in ensuring robust and appropriate technical solutions are implemented to address resilience building challenges.

Lesson 5: FCDO programme effectiveness is strengthened by building a culture of ownership, open communication and progress tracking among implementing parties.

The CREAD experience was notable in this regard. The document review and KIIs illustrate that FCDO staff were open when it came to discussing programme progress, formally and informally, and this was seen as a positive means of supporting effectiveness, allowing local level partners to influence delivery, and the achievement of the results. FCDO should continue to promote open communication to foster accountability and programme ownership.

Lesson 5. Upfront readiness and capacity assessments of implementing partners is mission critical to realistic project delivery effectiveness and achieving target outcomes.

The document and KII evidence related to UKCIF, the largest programme in the CDT portfolio, strongly illustrated that programme schedules and milestones were too ambitious. Lack of readiness impaired effective delivery and significantly extended timelines. A clear lesson from the UKCIF programme is the need for rigorous delivery partner readiness assessments prior to programme execution and then to ensure appropriate implementation support measures are in place to enable effective implementation.

- Readiness and capacity deficits were evident in both the financial intermediary, CDB, and in the partner government implementing agencies (with exceptions of Jamaica and Belize).
- Given the critical importance of country level implementing agencies, accounting for perhaps 80% of the delivery effort, country capacity assessments and targeted institutional strengthening could ease implementation delays and thereby strengthen effectiveness in delivery to the target timelines. Within the UKCIF, the use of the Project Execution Unit at the

Ministry of Infrastructure in Belize to deliver the two road investments on time and schedule is a notable example of good practice.

2.2 Recommendations

The recommendations are structured around three focus areas FCDO CDT requested guidance on for future programming:

1. The relative weighting given to regional and bilateral programming and related interventions;
2. The priority thematic areas to guide programming content;
3. The choice of partners to work with and make these partnerships more effective.

The recommendations are best viewed as packages of changes that should be take forward in parallel rather than sequenced priorities. Collectively, they are designed to improve the overall effectiveness, sustainability and VfM of CDTs regional programming. Based on discussions with FCDO CDT, the recommendations are exclusively aimed at FCDO CDT and the wider FCDO interests active in the Caribbean. The recommendations are not aimed at FCDOs development partners.

The three packages of interventions outlined below were tested with the CDT team and a wider stakeholder community. In all cases the evaluation team operated independently and used feedback from the stakeholder engagement sessions to inform the recommendations based on the merit of the case. Feedback from the stakeholders listed below was incorporated to develop the recommendations:

- CDT
- Extended FCDO stakeholders (SIDS Hub, Overseas Territories Department)
- Evaluation Management Group – EMG
- Wider stakeholder community: throughout our evaluation research process the Caribbean Resilience Framework, TOC and findings were “tested” and validated through either KIIs and / or document sharing. Global Affairs Canada was very engaged throughout much of the evaluation given their multiple partnerships with FCDO. WB, IADB, USAID and the EU were also engaged to test the direction of travel and resilience framework, and changes made as appropriate.

Further details on how consultations with FCDO, the wider stakeholder community and the EMG contributed to develop evaluation findings and recommendations are available on [Section](#) The role of the Evaluation Management Group and iterative evaluation design and Use and Influence Plan (Use and Dissemination Plan).

2.2.1 Focus Area: The relative balance between regional and bilateral programming

Recommendation 1. The FCDO CDT should develop a holistic resilience building strategy that provides a framework and roadmap for next generation programming – this is aimed at providing a stronger focus and streamlined set of programmes and partnerships.

- The strategy can further develop the Caribbean Resilience Framework and theory of change initiated as part of this review and then assess the most appropriate way forward in terms of regional and bilateral programming.
- The strategic approach can be “mission driven” that brings together a wide range of stakeholders from across the Caribbean (public, private and communities), leverage all FCDOs diplomatic relationships and clearly define objectives that enhance resilience. The intention is to breakdown silos – administrative and thematic – to as great an extent as possible.

Recommendation 2. Regional programming should be *the* relative priority.

- Regional programming is an effective modality to tackle *common* regional resilience challenges in a systematic manner across multiple country contexts.
- It is more cost effective as it can generate greater economies of scale in the delivery of technical inputs that can be shared across multiple jurisdictions and contexts.
- It is well suited to a context where multiple partner countries may not have sufficient technical capacity to engage through bilateral arrangements.
- It provides a pathway for sustaining and replicating portfolio initiatives and innovation more widely across the region.
- Regional programming leverages and strengthens regional organisations with a clear mandate to address Caribbean resilience challenges.
- It offers a more flexible modality that can directly support ODA-eligible countries as well as non-ODA eligible countries through regional mechanisms or organisations that work in both contexts (e.g. CARTAC). This can set the basis to provide continuous support as Caribbean countries graduate from ODA-eligibility.
- Regional programming offers an effective platform for knowledge management, lesson learning, dissemination and policy advocacy so that experiences are shared, countries learn from each other and experiences are easily transferred and contextualised.

Recommendation 3. Bilateral programming should be retained where there are compelling value-added arguments and strong local relationships to build on.

- The UK has an extensive diplomatic network in the Caribbean constituted by 7 representations. This could offer an effective platform to continue bilateral engagements (e.g. Jamaica, Dominica) or create new ones when relevant.
- Bilateral efforts complement regional programming as they allow the programme to address critical country level bottlenecks and deficits affecting green regional growth and climate resilience. Bilateral efforts are even more relevant if in areas where the UK can bring extensive technical expertise or in a country of particular significance for the UK (e.g. violence, governance and rule of law in Jamaica).
- Bilateral engagement offers an effective platform to provide flexible support when required, particularly following disasters and emergencies.
- The choice of regional as opposed to bilateral approaches depends on the types of interventions under consideration: in the case of working with local law enforcement agencies to secure shared objectives between the UK and the participating government, bilateral seems a better choice.

Recommendation 4. Setting regional priorities should be evidence based using best available resilience related data and mapped against the resilience framework outlined in this report.

There are two useful points of departure to guide regional programming.

First, FCDO CDT should use the recently published UN Multi-Dimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI) to guide regional programming and reach beyond the ODA / non-ODA dimension. The UN Multi-Dimensional Vulnerability Index recognises that a country's resilience has three components: (1) Structural economic resilience; (2) Structural environmental resilience and; (3) Structural social resilience. Important considerations are:

- MVI scores do not correlate with income. It is suggested that scores be used as a complement to Gross National Income (GNI) in understanding a country's requirement for concessional financing.
- Most Caribbean countries are in the most vulnerable half of MVI world rankings. Some SIDS are highly vulnerable despite high per capita GNI and neither increased GNI nor increased GDP changes MVI. For instance, St Lucia, like several other Caribbean SIDS is likely to graduate from ODA status in 3 to 4 years. It will still be vulnerable but may not be eligible for concessional help even after a disaster.

- The MVI could provide an entry point to frame vulnerability beyond the ODA / non-ODA fault line and provide common solutions spaces (modified to local circumstances). This may be particularly helpful in the cases of Caribbean countries which are soon to graduate from ODA eligibility.

Second, FCDO CDT could develop a set of maturity models and indicators building on the resilience framework developed as part of this report. Each jurisdiction could be assessed and rated across all or a subset of resilience components, and the respective countries and components prioritised. In terms of components, where there are common gaps across the region this can provide a basis for programme and intervention design with shared approaches enabling both ODA and non-ODA jurisdictions to participate or at least access common knowledge products.

Recommendation 5. Prioritisation of interventions should reflect contextual differences in resilience across countries in the region.

- Programming should reflect the subtleties of working in mainland territories in contrast to island states. For instance, a key consideration in the mainland coastal districts of Guyana, Belize and Suriname relates to sea level rise, drainage and flood risk management which requires substantial capital investment in drainage canals, retention dams, pumping stations and sluices to reduce loss and damages to critical economic and social infrastructure and agricultural land arising from flooding and sea water intrusion in all coastal districts.
- Evidence based prioritisation should be mainstreamed into project selection supported through UK interventions – this implies that where the UK is supporting resilience investments in risk reduction, economic benefits need to be clearly described and compared to alternatives.

2.2.2 Focus Area: Identifying priority thematic areas

The stakeholder consultations and extensive FCDO CDT feedback provide solid support for the thematic areas outlined below and the need for restructuring some of these to improve impact.

Recommendation 1. Infrastructure should remain a centre piece of programming, but new approaches are needed to accelerate investment and increase impact.

- There is a substantial gap in resilient infrastructure across the Caribbean. Countries have expressed the need for a continued investment in climate adaptive infrastructure. The UK can leverage existing knowledge and expertise in support of next generation programming.
- Investing in infrastructure can help to deliver transformative impacts in terms of enhanced climate resilience by:
 - Enhancing climate and disaster resilience by embedding climate / natural disaster risk considerations into infrastructure design (i.e. infrastructure is respondent to risks) and enable effective access when disasters hit.
 - Supporting economic growth through improved infrastructure services, especially connectivity and electricity.
 - Strengthening inclusion – social development and equity by placing the needs of women and vulnerable groups – at the core of infrastructure design and equitable accessibility is critical to maximise impact and sustainability.
- A continued investment in the infrastructure space will strengthen FCDO’s influence and visibility in the region and complement the programming of like-minded development partners and fit will with many Caribbean multilateral institutions and national governments.

Recommendation 2. Investing in complementary enabling environment and assets to improve infrastructure services performance and unlock productivity.

- Infrastructure investments could be more closely tied in with resilient spatial planning, i.e. conceptualising infrastructure development in a way that it supports spatial planning integrating resilience considerations and guiding the growth of settlements / asset creation

away from high-risk exposed areas. There is an opportunity to more closely link infrastructure investment, land use frameworks and spatial planning to promote resilience.

- Strengthening the institutions around infrastructure services delivery and operations should be an integral component of all programming.
- An important area to improve resilience is the need to increase human capital and diversify skills. Efforts to do this are hampered by problems in the education system, including migration of teachers to other countries and, in Jamaica, generally poor educational outcomes. This leads to increasingly marginalised young school graduates who may be vulnerable to gang and criminal influences. Regional approaches to increasing the effectiveness of primary and secondary education could assist in addressing the crime and violence problems in countries such as Jamaica, Trinidad and others in the region.

Recommendation 3. There is a need to develop new approaches to access green finance sources and use of other financial product innovations including:

- Promoting blended finance transactions as a modality for funding in the climate space to attract private investment to help achieve critical developmental objectives. Whilst the majority of investments to date have been in renewable energy, blended finance is becoming increasingly important in other sectors including basic socio-economic infrastructure including water, drainage, transport, healthcare.
- Consideration could be given to creating new funds designed with the Caribbean regional characteristics in mind and institutional options available, possible lines of investigation could include:
 - An Innovation Fund for Climate Resilience Solutions: Given the nascent stage of the sector, support to a fund structured to pool innovation capital from both concessional and commercial investors could be considered as part of the phase programming. The fund can be used to combine grants and concessional debt to support nascent innovators to test product-market fit and build markets for growing innovations around resilient inclusive growth enabling infrastructure.
 - Climate Smart Infrastructure Fund: support key stakeholders in establishing a concessional debt fund with catalytic funding from development partners for low-cost lending by financial intermediaries. This fund can be used to reduce the cost of capital and unlock scale transactions for building climate smart infrastructure and capacity building of key stakeholders.
 - In all cases building partnerships and delivery agreements with the institutions that have the right competencies to maximise finance leveraging and strong technical support for project preparation should guide programme design.
- Exploring opportunities for developing innovative green finance mechanisms and instruments such as green bonds and other products. This could also include credit guarantee mechanism targeting green investments.
- Strengthening FDI frameworks and regulations aligned to good practices around ownership, taxation, profit repatriation and addressing cost and risks of FDI linked to exchange risks and hedging restrictions working with Central Banks, Ministries of Finance, IMF and MDBs.

Recommendation 4. There should be a focus on the judicious and innovative use of TA to leverage additional resources to address resilience challenges across the region.

- Strategic thinking that takes an infrastructure asset lifecycle approach to design, implementation and operationalisation is strongly supported by the KII evidence, especially with UKCIF related stakeholders. Integrated end to end project support will focus on project pipeline preparation, selection and project development aligned to committed funding for capital investment, as well as follow on TA in contract management and lifecycle support.
- TA support for vital up-front planning and project preparation linked to innovative green financing structures, and then delivered through MDAs that have the capacity to efficiently procure, implement and operationalise the new assets is a good way forward.
- Complementary TA to address critical underlying constraints in governance and management of local implementing partners: for example, PFM (expenditure efficiency improvement in

resilient infrastructure); strengthening public procurement, PPP structuring and transaction support, lifecycle infrastructure management are all needed to improve programming performance.

2.2.3 Focus Area: Strengthening partnerships

The regional partners FCDO decides to work with should be selected through a systematic approach taking into consideration priorities as part of a regional programming approach to assess partner technical complementarity, geographic reach and levels of influence.

Recommendation 1. FCDO should continue to capitalise on established partnerships with organisations involved in regional resilience-building efforts.

- Continued partnering with the CDB should remain a part of the portfolio, albeit with further strengthening of systems and delivery capacity. The CDB is a much-needed regional organisation that is often closest to many jurisdictions across the whole of the Caribbean and thus warrants being a centre piece of infrastructure focused programming.³ The CDB needs significant capacity building to improve its efficiency and effectiveness; moving to next generation programming that involves CDB needs a robust readiness assessment to take on further mandates and operations.
- Complementary partnerships with other MDBs, such as the WB and IADB, provide more delivery options and enable capturing their respective strengths in different segments of the infrastructure lifecycle to enhance regional and sector coverage. The WB which has already expressed strong an interest in accessing FCDO TA to support its disaster risk management portfolio to address flooding in coastal districts of Guyana and Suriname.
- New forms of partnerships are needed where the FCDO can play an instrumental role in catalysing climate finance and working with the CDB, IADB, World Bank to support mitigation / adaptation to critical climate threats and other major risks.
- Established and ongoing partnerships that are deemed effective (such as IDB, PAHO, CDEMA, CARTAC) should be further developed where relevant.
- FCDO should continue to work with regional organisations (e.g. CDEMA, CARTAC) that do not follow the ODA / non-ODA as this is a proven effective mechanism to reach non-ODA countries and expand the UK's influence sphere.

Recommendation 2. Regional programming should embed strong and trusted relationships at the national level to enhance ownership, effectiveness and sustainability.

- Government stakeholders are critical relevant implementation partners whenever bilateral interventions are pursued (either directly or through multilateral challenges). Evidence across the portfolio strongly supports developing solid working relationships at national level to ensure relevance (which should be straightforward in demand driven approaches), to better understand local constraints and challenges, and to tailor support to ensure efficient and effective implementation of interventions. This elevates the role for FCDO across the region, especially where there is diplomatic representation, to build these relationships and provide evidence of UK commitment to national policy goals and increasing resilience.
- A binding constraint across the region is national / local level capacity and thus programmes need to reach these actors and be designed to maximise effectiveness and sustained change.
- Working closely at national level is especially important in sensitive areas such as policy reform and / or law enforcement (Jamaica's CACP and SOCAP interventions clearly depend on

▪ ³ CDB is a regional institution which is trusted and legitimate in the eyes of Caribbean countries. It also has extensive geographic spread covering the 8 ODA eligible countries and 7 non-ODA eligible countries targeted by the Caribbean Development Team. The UK is a CDB non-borrowing member country sitting on the Board of Governors. It can capitalise on its influence to encourage reform and new operational practices.

high degrees of trust and relationships build over time to effect cultural shifts and adopting new ways of doing things).

- Getting closer to implementation and working together is often much more effective in securing lasting change in capacities (as opposed to “injections” of training). Thus, being on the ground is important no matter what channels are selected.

Recommendation 3. FCDO should place a strong emphasis on how to leverage its resources to catalyse finance to maximise scale and impact.

- Resilience challenges in the Caribbean are immense and beyond any single actor to comprehensively address. Thus, FCDO should design its next generation programming to leverage its funding support (all instruments) to aggregate funding across multiple partners and / or crowd in new investment.
- Leveraging/ catalysing green finance: FCDO should continue to emphasise leveraging available green finance sources and mechanisms and use its influence to improve access to these sources by SIDS.
- There is a need for a more selective use of grants with stronger criteria focused on leverage and ensuring strong links between project preparation and follow on capital investment. TA and FA should work in lockstep to secure capital financing.
- Grants should be a small share of overall project financing requirements going forward and to as great an extent as possible be used to put together larger investment funds / packages.

Recommendation 4. FCDO needs to ensure lessons learned from programme experience feed into adaptive management systems, shared knowledge products, and are fully mainstreamed into next generation programming.

- During the research informing this evaluation it was noted that the ready availability of key programming data and documentation was not always at hand. UKCIF documentation was restricted / not available in part based on commercial sensitivities but this impeded effectiveness through learning and cross – sectional evidence analysis (on project structures, KPIs, implementation effectiveness, implementing partner capacity challenges, and other material parameters). Going forward, improving programme documentation availability beyond standard annual reviews and mid-term evaluations would be beneficial (with the appropriate NDAs in place).
- Capturing full infrastructure lifecycle performance data – through on-going longitudinal monitoring of operations and development impacts – would be highly beneficial to strengthen learning of what work and what needs improving. Of particular interest are the quality of O&M regimes in practice (as reflected in assets quality and service performance) and the extent to which users of assets created are benefiting (firms and households, and the distributional impacts on vulnerable groups and their equitable access to services).
- Related to the above, investment in shared knowledge products relevant to the Caribbean infrastructure and other sectors of interest should be furthered. There is plenty of scope to build on extensive programme experience to develop model agreements, contracts and various guidance notes (e.g. O&M, performance based contracts, PPPs, risk allocation, etc) related to project preparation and the whole infrastructure lifecycle.
- If maturity modes are used (as suggested above), then there is a need to ensure there is an appropriate monitoring system in place, ideally locally owned and managed, to track progress and share implementation experience across the resilience components and dimensions. This could be a FCDO CDT regional initiative as part of a wider mission orient programme.
- The FCDO CDT team should strengthen resilience programming evidence sharing and learning to support more effective adaptive management as well as bring the wider FCDO regional interests together around the agreed shared mission. As appropriate this can more systematically bring in regional implementing partners.

- A plan should be put in place up front on how future partnerships should work and the results-based monitoring system agreed as part of any Memorandum of Understanding.

3 Introduction

3.1 Evaluation purpose

In December 2023, the United Kingdom's (UK) Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) commissioned Triple Line to undertake the **Evaluation of FCDO Support to Improve Resilience in the Caribbean through a range of programmes and wider initiatives**. Triple Line is implementing the assignment with support from the Global Institute for Climate Smart and Resilient Development (GICSRD) at The University of the West Indies (UWI).

The evaluation period spans from January to June 2024. The Terms of Reference (TOR) of the evaluation (**Annex 1**) clearly set out the objectives of the assignment:

1. Build the evidence base in the areas of low evidence of what works to improve resilience in Caribbean countries (e.g. how different programmes and projects contribute to resilience or what a resilient country looks like).
2. Establish the extent to which the approach taken by FCDO to improve the resilience of the Caribbean region – to climate shifts, natural hazards, economic and other shocks – is relevant and strategically targeted to deliver the UK objective of strengthening resilience.
3. Assess the different approaches taken and levers used to deliver UK objectives to identify what is working well and where, and what is not.
4. Generate recommendations on what approaches should continue and highlight opportunities to maximise the effectiveness of all levers to enhance the UK's contribution, value added and impact in the region.

The evidence generated by the evaluation is meant to inform the development of the next phase of FCDO's resilience strategy for the Caribbean. FCDO has embarked on the planning process for the strategy and the evaluation has as an aim to complement two strategic documents that frame strategy development: the Caribbean Growth and Resilience Diagnostic and the Caribbean Political Economy Analysis.

3.2 Evaluation scope and audience

The following considerations defined the evaluation scope and guided the implementation of the assignment:

- The evaluation generated evidence by looking at 15 programmes (**Table 1**) that constitute the Caribbean Development Team's (CDT) resilience portfolio from 2015-2023.⁴
- The geographic scope of the evaluation follows FCDO's definition of the Caribbean, referring to the 15 full members⁵ of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
- Among these 15 countries, seven are English-speaking Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) eligible countries that CDT directly supports. Among the remaining 8 countries there are: 4 English-speaking non-ODA eligible countries;⁶ a French-speaking ODA eligible country (Haiti); a Dutch-speaking ODA-eligible country (Suriname), and a Spanish-speaking ODA-eligible country (the Dominican Republic). This is reflected in **Figure 2**. All of the countries in question are classified as Small Island Development States (SIDS) by the United Nations (UN). However, not all

⁴ Whilst the scope of the evaluation did not include a detailed review of FCDO centrally managed programmes, it has looked at a number of entry points and synergies between CDT and centrally managed programmes across the Caribbean SIDS.


⁵ CARICOM full member countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, The Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. Although Montserrat is also a CARICOM member country, it is a British Overseas Territory. Montserrat was not included at this stage of the analysis.

⁶ Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, St Kitts & Nevis and The Bahamas.

of them are islands: Belize, Guyana and Suriname are in the Central American or South American mainland.

Figure 1 below summarises the assignment’s objective.

Figure 1. The objective of the assignment



The audience of the evaluation includes:

1. **FCDO staff that is part of CDT.** Evidence from this assignment will guide CDT staff in informing and deciding on priorities to develop a relevant and coherent FCDO strategy for the Caribbean over the period 2025-2030.
2. **Global FCDO staff working in SIDS.** Evidence from the evaluation can be of interest and relevance to FCDO teams addressing resilience challenges in SIDS at the global level (notably the SIDS Hub and the Overseas Territories Directorate).
3. **The development community working on resilience-building efforts in the Caribbean.** Evidence from this evaluation informs what works well and what does not when it comes to building systems to enhance resilience in the region. This evidence could inform how the development community frames resilience-building efforts in the Caribbean.
4. **The wider development community working on resilience-building efforts in SIDS.** It is hoped that relevant lessons learned in resilience building could be of interest to the SIDS development community; relevant Caribbean experiences could be replicated in other SIDS around the world.

The Evaluation Use and Dissemination Plan is available in Use and Influence Plan.

3.3 Report purpose

The purpose of this Final Report is to report on emerging findings from the evaluation, combining evidence from:

1. Document review, country case study visits⁷ and discussions with FCDO staff, government stakeholders and partners engaged in the implementation of the 15 programmes constituting the CDT resilience portfolio from 2015 to 2023.
2. Consultations with donors and development partners engaged in resilience-building activities in the Caribbean.

This Final Report Volume 1 builds on evidence from the Interim Report that was submitted to FCDO in May 2024. The Interim Report included findings from portfolio mapping, initial conclusions, recommendations and evidence from country case studies conducted up to early May 2024.⁸ Final Report Volume 1 fine tunes findings following feedback received from FCDO and evidence gathered through additional portfolio mapping, key informant interviews (KIIs), and the Belize country case study conducted in May 2024.

Final Report Volume 1 incorporates findings that answer **Overarching Evaluation Question 1**: To what extent is the approach taken by the Caribbean Development Team to improve the resilience of the Caribbean region – to climate shifts, natural disasters, economic and other shocks – relevant and strategically targeted to deliver the UK objective of strengthening resilience? *This question focuses on ODA-eligible countries.*

Following the Interim Report submission, it was agreed with FCDO to split the Final Report into Volumes: Volume 1 focusing on Overarching Evaluation Question 1 and Volume 2 focusing on Overarching Evaluation Question 2 (see Section Comments on the TOR on comments on the Terms of Reference – TOR for more detail). Later discussions agreed that there should be three volumes in total. Following the first iteration of the Final Report, it was decided to add a third Volume (Final Report Volume 3 – Supplementary Evidence) for reading ease.

3.4 Report structure

Final Report Volume 1 is structured as follows:

Chapter 1. Introduction. This section provides an overview of the evaluation purpose, scope, and audience for the report findings.

Chapter 2. Methodology. This section describes the evaluation team's observations on the TOR. It describes the analytical framework used for the evaluation, including the evaluation questions (EQs), the evaluation design and research tools used to answer the EQs. Finally, it outlines the limitations and mitigation measures as well as the ethics and safeguarding considerations.

Chapter 3. Mapping the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio. This chapter combines evidence from interviews, country case studies and document reviews and outlines the findings by EQ following the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) criteria (Relevance and Coherence; Effectiveness; Efficiency and Value for Money; Impact and Sustainability). Findings are arranged by the 4 main EQs following the 2 Overarching evaluation questions on strategic fit and best practice as well as recommended new ways of working.

Chapter 4: Conclusions, Lessons Learned and Recommendations. This section discusses what the evidence tells us regarding how the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio contributes to building resilience regionally, answering Overarching Evaluation Question 1. The Chapter also provides lessons on best practice FCDO should bear in mind to plan for its next phase of strategy development. Complementing lessons and best practice, it provides recommendations related to:

⁷ Country case studies were conducted in Belize, Dominica, Jamaica, Barbados, Suriname, Guyana and The Bahamas over the period March – May 2024.

⁸ Country case studies were conducted in Barbados, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and The Bahamas by early May 2024.

- Effective programming in the Caribbean, including options for regional and bilateral programming that includes support to non-ODA countries;
- Partners to work with, including potential avenues that could make existing partners more effective;
- Thematic areas for resilience where efforts should be prioritised (or where a consideration to discontinue them should be assessed), including new areas that FCDO should consider going into.

The following Annexes are included as part of this Report Volume:

Annex 1. Evaluation Terms of Reference – TOR

Annex 2. Evaluation Framework

Annex 3. Documents reviewed.

Annex 4. Evaluation Team.

Annex 5. Evaluation Framework – EF.

Annex 6. Assessment of the evidence strength per data source.

Annex 7. Use and Influence Plan.


Annex 8. Overview of Caribbean Resilience Challenges.

Annex 9. CDT resilience portfolio: summary of available documentation.

Annex 10. Terms of Reference: Evaluation Management Group.

Annex 11. Country Case Study Selection Methodology Note.

Figure 2. The 15 countries covered by the evaluation



4 Methodology

This Chapter details the evaluation methodology that was followed to implement the assignment. It describes our takeaways from the TOR and explains the analytical and conceptual frameworks used for the evaluation. This includes an overview of the EQs and how they relate to the two overarching evaluation questions, as well as details on evaluation design and constituent tools.

4.1 Comments on the TOR

The assignment's TOR can be found in Evaluation Terms of Reference. We would like to note the following additional points, which have framed the evaluation's approach and methodology:

- 1. The initial project timeline (November 2023 to March 2024) was amended to reflect a wider scope.**
 - Following kick-off, the preparation and implementation of a methodology to select case study countries and discussions with FCDO, it was judged that a larger case study sample would increase the robustness of the findings. The initial methodology and timeline included conducting case studies in 3 countries. However, as the project started, the consideration was that a larger sample would better encapsulate the complexity and diversity of Caribbean resilience challenges and how they manifest in different countries. The evaluation timeline was therefore amended to June 2024 and changes to logistics were made to reflect an amended scope with case studies in 7 countries.

Following discussions with FCDO, the evaluation methodology was crafted to emphasise the development of evidence in 4 specific areas, as follows:

- **How FCDO should approach programming in the Caribbean by articulating a regional and a bilateral approach to programming.** Regional programming is understood as a programming approach designed to progress efforts in a common area (or common areas) across multiple countries. Bilateral programming is understood as a programming approach emphasising UK support delivered to a single country. The assignment's methodology was adapted to explore how FCDO could frame the optimum balance between regional and bilateral programming to address Caribbean resilience challenges, while enhancing UK visibility.
- **The appropriateness of thematic areas of intervention.** The methodology was tailored to investigate how the CDT portfolio is working in the most pressing challenges that Caribbean countries face to build resilience, and reflect the priorities of Caribbean countries themselves. This includes a consideration of potential new areas for programming.
- **The suitability of the approach followed in the choice of partners to support programme implementation.** The methodology explored how partners supported programme effectiveness, allowed the support of efforts in ODA and non-ODA countries, and enabled FCDO to target the right areas for resilience building in the Caribbean.
- **The ability of FCDO's internal structure in the Caribbean to enhance CDT portfolio effectiveness and the delivery of cohesive programming with FCDO at the central level.** The methodology considered how the FCDO geographic footprint and deployment of resources in the Caribbean supported the efficiency of portfolio programmes; the methodology also included a consideration on how CDT programming works in synergy with Centrally Managed Programmes (CMPs).

At the end of the inception phase, FCDO set up an Evaluation Management Group with an oversight role over the assignment and ensuring quality control of evaluation activities. The TOR of the Evaluation Management Group (EMG) is in Terms of Reference: Evaluation Management Group; the EMG rationale was to play an active role when it came to advising on field work, commenting on draft reports, communication and dissemination. The detailed composition of the EMG and how it

contributed to evaluation, design and quality assurance is in [Section](#) The role of the Evaluation Management Group and iterative evaluation design.

Following the submission of the Interim Report in May, subsequent discussions with FCDO, and feedback from EQUALS on the Draft Final Report submitted in June, the Final Report was divided into three distinct deliverables:

- **Final Report – Volume 1.** This deliverable focuses on Overarching Evaluation Question 1 and embeds answers to EQ1, EQ2 and EQ3. This Volume provides a final assessment and recommendations on the coherence, effectiveness and sustainability of the CDT portfolio in the period 2015-2023; capturing lessons learned and best practices in view of preparing the next phase of strategic programming. The present document constitutes Volume 1.
- **Final Report – Volume 2.** This deliverable focuses on Overarching Evaluation Question 2 containing answers to EQ4. This Volume reflects on FCDO’s “ways of working” in the Caribbean and how resources can be best organised to support the efficient delivery of programming in the region.
- **Final Report – Volume 3 (Supporting Evidence).** This deliverable provides the evidence base supporting the findings in Volume 1 and Volume 2. This includes evidence from the case studies conducted during the evaluation, an understanding of Caribbean resilience challenges used to frame the Caribbean Resilience Framework and further details on projects that are part of the CDT resilience portfolio and how they map against the Caribbean Resilience Framework.

4.2 Analytical framework

4.2.1 Developing a Caribbean Resilience Framework

For the design of tools and the systematic analysis of evidence, the development of an analytical framework is the starting point. The objective of the two broad overarching questions from the TOR ([Box 1](#)) provided the structure of the analytical map.

Box 1 The two overarching evaluation questions served as the structure for the analytical map

- **Overarching question 1:** To what extent is the approach taken by the Caribbean Development Team to improve the resilience of the Caribbean region – to climate shifts, natural hazards, economic and other shocks – [relevant and strategically targeted to deliver](#) the UK objective of strengthening resilience? This question focuses on ODA-eligible countries.
- **Overarching question 2:** What changes in the way FCDO’s [use of available resources could improve overall effectiveness](#)? This question focuses on ODA-eligible countries as well as non-ODA eligible countries.

To make an adequate assessment of the impact of FCDO programmes in the region, a further unpacking of FCDO’s thematic priority areas (FCDO, 2023k) in the region was required. The thematic framework developed for this evaluation during the project’s inception phase, herein termed as the “Caribbean Resilience Framework” ([Figure 4](#)), categorises thematic priority areas into eight dimensions of vulnerability which impact resilience and correspond to the most salient challenges that Caribbean countries face (Lewis, 2022). The Caribbean Resilience Framework acts as an entry point to assess the thematic programming of FCDO CDT’s interventions in the region and brings the fragmented but extensive range of resilience programming under one umbrella.

Caribbean Resilience Framework description

The eight Thematic Resilience Areas proposed in the Caribbean Resilience Framework are described below. An assessment of the vulnerability challenge is presented for each Resilience Thematic Area, followed by a definition of what resilience would look like.

1. Economic resilience.

What is the economic vulnerability challenge? Caribbean countries are characterised by a high dependence on a single economic sector (tourism) and a lack of economic diversification. This results in high economic vulnerability, particularly when external shocks hit.

How would economic resilience look like? Economic resilience means that economic structures in Caribbean countries enter a new phase in development as they become increasingly diversified and support a vibrant private sector while they continue to capitalise on revenues generated by tourism.

2. Fiscal resilience.

What is the fiscal vulnerability challenge? Levels of debt frequently represent a high proportion of GDP in Caribbean countries. This limits their ability to sustain growth and their room to act when shocks hit. External shocks can also lead to borrowing and increased debt, thereby perpetuating a negative systemic cycle. High inflation levels have recently caused food insecurity challenges.

How would fiscal resilience look like? Fiscal resilience means that with improved financial management and macro-economic stability, Caribbean countries can sustain long-term growth and have more room to act when shocks hit.

3. Workforce resilience.

What is the workforce vulnerability challenge? Caribbean countries have limited capacity to effectively respond to all the requirements of a functioning government. Although populations in Caribbean countries are young and may benefit from high levels of education, the private sector is limited and there is a mismatch between skills and economic sectors, which hinders sustainable growth. Brain drain also impacts the workforce.

How would workforce resilience look like? Workforce resilience means that with efficiency gains and building capacity and human capital, Caribbean countries can better perform government functions. Also, Caribbean countries capitalise on their high levels of education to support the development of a highly-skilled and vibrant private sector in a way that minimises brain drain.

4. Social and democratic resilience.

What is the social and democratic vulnerability challenge? There are persistent high levels of inequality despite relatively low poverty levels. Violence and organised crime are widespread, which undermine social cohesion, particularly among the youth. Pervasive high levels of corruption hinder the rule of law and the strength of institutions. High levels of child malnutrition and stunting pose long-term human and social challenges in some countries.

How would social and democratic vulnerability look like? Social and democratic vulnerability means that improved social cohesion and health structures create more powerful and empowered communities that are able to prosper and better respond when shocks hit. It also means that stronger accountability fosters transparency and effectiveness to sustain growth and social cohesion and enable government systems to better respond when shocks occur.

5. Regional integration resilience.

What is the regional integration vulnerability challenge? Caribbean countries face significant intra-regional connectivity challenges which hinder growth and resilience. While organisations promoting regional integration have emerged and Caribbean integration and coordination bodies (CDEMA, Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC)) have driven action in climate and disaster management; economic integration (as in the CSME⁹) has been slow to take off.

How would regional integration resilience look like? Regional integration resilience means that Caribbean regional organisations drive success in resilience-building. The effectiveness of their activity can inspire other organisations guiding action in SIDS.

⁹ Caribbean Single Market and Economy

6. Infrastructure, settlement, and energy resilience.

What is the infrastructure, settlement and energy vulnerability challenge? Poor quality infrastructure acts as a barrier to sustained growth, and more than half of the Caribbean population live in urban areas, which are concentrated in the vulnerable low-lying coastal zone. Despite some exceptions, Caribbean countries are heavily reliant on fossil fuel imports and few have significantly invested in renewable energy infrastructure.

How would infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience look like? Infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience means that the built environment and infrastructure support economic growth, sustain shocks and allow Caribbean countries to effectively bounce back when disasters occur. It also means that Caribbean countries also build economic resilience by reducing energy dependency and promoting a shift to renewable energy.

7. Climate and disaster resilience.

What is the climate and disaster resilience vulnerability challenge? Caribbean countries are some of the most exposed countries in the world to the effects of climate change and natural hazards. Although the emphasis is to be placed on the reduction of climate and disaster vulnerability, effective emergency response systems are needed to cope with emergencies. Caribbean countries should be able to bounce back in an inclusive way that brings benefits for all. Given the relatively small contribution of the Caribbean to climate emissions, adaptation (and not mitigation) emerges as the salient priority.

How would climate and disaster resilience look like? Climate and disaster resilience means that Caribbean countries are able to progressively reduce their vulnerability to climate shocks. It also means that Caribbean countries have adequate emergency response systems in place to effectively work when shocks hit, and swiftly and inclusively bounce back while enabling a transition to the recovery phase.

8. Environmental resilience.

What is the environmental resilience challenge? Inadequate environmental protection frameworks do not fully support the resilience of biodiversity systems and can exacerbate climate change impacts.

How would environmental resilience look like? Environmental resilience means that environmental protection frameworks are put in place and mitigate climate and disaster vulnerability, effectively look after biodiversity and forestry management, as well as support the development of the blue economy.

4.2.2 Building a Theory of Change of what it means to be a Caribbean resilient country

Theory of Change development process

The Caribbean Resilience Framework provided a valuable entry point to frame – in an integrated way – the different aspects impacting resilience building in Caribbean countries. The Framework not only served to assess how FCDO programming is working across the different areas that shape resilience in the Caribbean, but it also provided the theoretical foundation to build a Theory of Change (TOC) of what it means to be a Caribbean resilient country.

Similarly to the Caribbean Resilience Framework, the TOC (Figure 5) was developed during the inception phase; it responds to the Caribbean Resilience Framework and summarises the various actions needed to build resilience across the vulnerability areas identified. A definition of resilience is provided for each of the eight Resilience Thematic Areas (following Section Developing a Caribbean Resilience Framework), and an overall vision of what resilience means for the Caribbean region is put forward.

The proposed TOC was not developed in isolation; it aims to integrate and build on existing initiatives framing resilience-building in the Caribbean (as outlined in Chapter 5 in the Inception Report). As a region, the Caribbean made headway in thinking about regional approaches and frameworks to support resilience-building (Figure 3). Due to the resilience challenges the region faces and the existential threat posed by climate change, regional integration organisations such as CARICOM and the OECS have led thought leadership efforts to guide what a resilient Caribbean would look like.

The 5C's [Regional Framework for Achieving Development Resilient to Climate Change](#) (published in 2009 and also known as the “[Regional Framework](#)”) and CDEMA's [Building a Pathway for Disaster Resilience in the Caribbean Community](#) (published in 2017 and also known as the “[Caribbean Resilience Framework](#)”) emerge as the two authoritative documents framing regional resilience-building action:

- The [Regional Framework](#) follows the 2009 Liliendaal Declaration, which was endorsed by CARICOM and established the international position of Caribbean countries regarding climate challenges. The Regional Framework was an important milestone as it outlined CARICOM's strategic approach to address climate challenge through five elements.¹⁰ It not only established regional goals, but also set regional mechanisms for implementation, including how regional coordination was to act in concertation with national action.
- The wreaked havoc caused by the 2017 hurricane season led to rethinking what resilience should look like across the Caribbean. The [Caribbean Resilience Framework](#) follows this rethinking by framing a holistic philosophy of integrated resilience that recognises interlinkages between natural hazards and social and economic well-being reflected through five pillars.¹¹ CDEMA's Caribbean Resilience Framework complements 5C's Regional Framework with its holistic approach: the Caribbean Resilience Framework enshrines a broader definition of hazards (it goes beyond climate hazards) and notably, it recognises the importance that poverty and inequality, infrastructure and socio-economic conditions have in resilience-building.

Both the Regional Framework and the Caribbean Resilience Framework are important documents in that they emerged from a consensus driven by CARICOM heads of government and were developed based on a partnership and consultation process with member states (USAID, 2020). They set the initial foundations to build frameworks orienting the approach to resilience at both the regional and national levels while also aligning to country needs.

The Regional Framework and the Caribbean Resilience Framework were subsequently built on by donors. Notably, as part of its 360° approach to resilience in the Caribbean, released in 2021, the World Bank mobilised the five pillars established within the Caribbean Resilience Framework to develop a traffic light system (TLS) aiming to identify gaps, support target setting and monitor progress across all sectors and aspects of resilience (World Bank, 2021). Five priority areas¹² are outlined by the 360° degree approach and used to map progress in resilience building; under each priority area, three maturity levels (nascent, emergent, established) are used to classify indicators.

The aforementioned efforts signal substantive progress in thinking how Caribbean resilience-building frameworks could be implemented through existing regional coordination mechanisms and on the needed regional / national synergy and balance for effective action.

The TOC developed under this project complements existing efforts. It advances a holistic framework to incorporate *all* the challenges that hinder resilience-building in the Caribbean. While CDEMA's Caribbean Resilience Framework goes beyond the climate emphasis put forward by the 5C's Regional Framework and considers socio-economic and environmental dimensions, and while the World Bank's 360° degree approach to resilience builds on the Caribbean Resilience Framework by adding debt and fiscal policy considerations in resilience-building, an approach that looks in a systemic way at *all* the vulnerability aspects illustrated in the Caribbean Resilience Framework ([Figure 4](#)) may be lacking.

Intended application of the Theory of Change: Scope and Limitations

¹⁰ The five elements outlined by the Regional Framework are: (1) Mainstreaming climate change adaptation strategies into the sustainable development agendas; (2) Promoting the implementation of adaptation measures; (3) Fostering a shift to renewable and cleaner energy through fossil fuel reduction; (4) Encouraging action to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems; (5) Sustainable forestry.

¹¹ The five pillars put forward in the Caribbean Resilience Framework are: (1) Social protection for the marginal and the most vulnerable; (2) Safeguarding infrastructure; (3) Enhancing economic opportunity; (4) Environmental protection, and; (5) Operational readiness and recovery.

¹² The five priority areas outlined by the 360° degree approach to resilience are: (1) Facilitate risk reduction decisions by firms and households; (2) Design resilient infrastructure systems, urban and coastal plans; (3) Build resilient health and education systems; (4) Help people and firms manage residual risks and natural disasters, and; (5) Anticipate and manage macro-fiscal and financial issues.

The Caribbean Resilience Framework and TOC developed as part of the evaluation are starting points that FCDO can build on for future programming. The process of developing the Caribbean Resilience Framework and TOC were backtracked in that they took place subsequently to CDT designing and implementing a *fragmented* resilience portfolio. The intention of the Framework and TOC was to make sense of the CDT portfolio and find initial common entry points and synergies among portfolio projects to highlight how they *collectively* work to build resilience.

The TOC acts as an entry point to use a common definition of resilience and the components (Resilience Thematic Areas) that structure it so that FCDO has a baseline to better understand how the efforts it is undertaking are helping to *jointly* build resilience in the Caribbean. The evaluation rationale was not to build complex or advanced interrelationships between the TOC and the CDT portfolio. The TOC simply provides a baseline so that FCDO frames how its initiatives address the complexity of building resilience in the Caribbean.

The next step is for the TOC to be operationalised further. Indicators under each Resilience Thematic Area can be developed and selected so that the TOC is operationalised. It was not in the scope of this evaluation to formulate a detailed TOC baseline framework with scoped out indicators.

Figure 3. The progressive evolution of frameworks to assess resilience building in the Caribbean




Figure 4. The Caribbean Resilience Framework and the proposed 8 Thematic Resilience Areas

Resilience can be defined as the overall ability of a country – including the ability of its institutions, systems, businesses and population – to survive, adapt and thrive no matter what kinds of chronic stresses or acute shocks it experiences

1. Economic resilience

What is the economic vulnerability challenge? Caribbean countries are characterised by a high dependence on tourism and a lack of economic diversification. This results in high economic vulnerability, particularly when external shocks hit.

How would economic resilience look like? Economic resilience means that economic structures in Caribbean countries enter a new phase in development as they are increasingly diversified and support vibrant private sectors while they keep capitalising on revenues generated by tourism.

2. Fiscal resilience

What is the fiscal vulnerability challenge? High levels of debt frequently represent a high proportion of GDP in Caribbean countries. This limits their ability to sustain growth and their room to act when shocks hit. External shocks can also lead to borrowing and higher levels of debt, thereby perpetuating a negative systemic cycle. High inflation levels have recently caused food insecurity challenges.

How would fiscal resilience look like? Fiscal resilience means that with improvements in financial management and macro-economic stability, Caribbean countries can better sustain long-term growth and have more room to act when shocks hit.

3. Workforce resilience

What is the workforce vulnerability challenge? Caribbean countries have limited human capacity to effectively respond to all the requirements of a functioning government. Although populations in Caribbean countries are young and benefit from high levels of education, the private sector is limited and there is a mismatch between skills and economic sectors, which hinders on sustainable growth. Brain drain further impacts on workforce strengths.

How would workforce resilience look like? Workforce resilience means that with efficiency gains and capacity building in human capital, Caribbean countries can better perform their government functions. It also means that Caribbean countries build from high levels of education to support the development of a highly-skilled and vibrant private sector in a way that minimises brain drain.

4. Social and democratic resilience

What is the social and democratic resilience challenge? There are persistent high levels of inequality despite relatively low poverty levels. Violence and organised crime are widespread, which undermine social cohesion, particularly among the youth. Pervasive high levels of corruption hinder on the rule of law and the strength of institutions. High levels of child malnutrition and stunting pose long-term human and social challenges in some countries.

How would social and democratic resilience look like? Social and democratic vulnerability means that improved social cohesion and health structures create more powerful and empowered communities that are able to prosper and better respond when shocks hit. It also means that stronger accountability fosters transparency and effectiveness to sustain growth and social cohesion and enable government systems to better respond when shocks occur.

8. Environmental resilience

What is the environmental resilience challenge? Caribbean countries establish frameworks and implement actions that effectively allow them to protect ecosystems while sustainably use resources in the ocean and coastal areas. Forestry management and blue economy efforts go hand-in-hand with tourism promotion.

How would environmental resilience look like? Environmental resilience means that environmental protection frameworks are put in place and mitigate climate and disaster vulnerability, effectively look after biodiversity as well as support the development of the blue economy.

7. Climate and disaster resilience

What is the climate and disaster vulnerability challenge? Caribbean countries are some of the most exposed countries in the world to the effects of climate change and natural disasters. Although the emphasis is to be placed on the reduction of climate and disaster vulnerability, effective emergency response systems are needed to cope with emergencies. Caribbean countries should be able to bounce back in an inclusive way that brings benefits for all. Given the relatively small contribution of the Caribbean to climate emissions, adaptation (and not mitigation) emerges as the salient priority.

How would climate and disaster resilience look like? Climate and disaster resilience means that Caribbean countries are able to progressively reduce their vulnerability to climate shocks. It also means that Caribbean countries have the adequate emergency response systems in place to effectively work when shocks hit and swiftly and inclusively bounce back while enabling a transition to the recovery phase.

6. Infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience


What is the infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience challenge? Poor quality infrastructure acts as a barrier to sustained growth, and more than half of the Caribbean population live in urban areas, which are concentrated in the vulnerable low-lying coastal zone. Despite some exceptions, Caribbean countries are heavily reliant on fossil fuel imports and few have significantly invested in renewable energy infrastructure.

How would infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience look like? Infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience means that the built environment and infrastructure support economic growth, sustain shocks and allow Caribbean countries to effectively bounce back when disasters occur. It also means that Caribbean countries also build economic resilience by reducing energy dependency and promoting a shift to renewable energy.

5. Regional integration resilience


What is the regional integration vulnerability challenge? Caribbean SIDS face significant intra-regional connectivity challenges which hinder on growth and resilience. While organisations promoting regional integration have emerged and Caribbean integration and coordination bodies (CDEMA, CCCCC) have driven action in climate and disaster management, economic integration has been slow to take off.

How would regional integration resilience look like? Regional integration resilience means that Caribbean regional organisations drive success in resilience-building. The effectiveness of their activity can inspire other organisations guiding action in SIDS.



Towards a multi-dimensional and common definition of resilience in the Caribbean


Figure 5. The proposed Caribbean resilient state Theory of Change



4.3 The Evaluation Framework

Together the two overarching analytical questions from the TOR (Box 1) and the eight Thematic Resilience Areas in the Caribbean Resilience Framework serve as the analytical framework through which the evaluation developed the Evaluation Framework (EF) and Evaluation Questions (EQs). This is summarised in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Designing the Evaluation Framework



The EF is structured around four Evaluation Questions, which assess and present performance against OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (OECD, 2010):

EQ 1. Relevance and Coherence: To what extent is FCDO’s programming in the Caribbean both relevant and coherent in terms of building resilience?

EQ 2. Effectiveness: To what extent has the programming been effective in delivering resilience outcomes? In which contexts and why? Where in each of the eight Resilience Thematic Areas has it been most effective?

EQ3. Efficiency: Is the FCDO footprint in the Caribbean deployed in an appropriate manner to deliver on to the resilience challenges the region faces?

EQ 4. Impact and Sustainability: What is the evidence illustrating that FCDO programming has built resilience in a sustained and integrated manner? How can FCDO best continue to provide relevant support as Caribbean SIDS progress into graduating from ODA-eligibility?

Addressing comments on the Evaluation Framework presented in the Inception Report, the EQs were further broken down into Sub-Evaluation Questions (SEQs) and Judgement Criteria (JCs). Following discussions with FCDO, the evaluation team also revised the evaluation questions to reflect the key considerations set in Section Comments on the TOR – Comments on the TOR, including:

- How FCDO should approach programming in the Caribbean through the articulation of regional and a bilateral approach to programming.
- The appropriateness of thematic areas of intervention in the CDT portfolio.
- The suitability of the approach followed by FCDO in the choice of partners to support programme implementation.




- The relevance of FCDO’s internal structure in the Caribbean to enhance CDT portfolio effectiveness and the delivery of cohesive programming with FCDO at the central level.

The final EQs and SEQs are set out in Evaluation Framework

The strength of the evidence gathered through each data source is assessed with the classification presented in **Table 1**. Assessment of the evidence strength per data source provides an understanding of:

- (1) The strength of the evidence gathered through each data source;
- (2) The evidence limitations identified under each data source;
- (3) The adopted triangulation measures and / or measures to mitigate the identified data limitations and bias brought about by each data source.

Table 1. The 15 countries covered by the evaluation

Colour code	Qualitative assessment	Classification
	A very strong evidence body was obtained through the data source	Extensive sources were mobilised (e.g. different types of documents, from different authors; multiple KIIs with varied informants) to develop evidence. Data could be extensively triangulated to verify the finding through complementary document review and / or additional KIIs.
	A strong body of evidence was obtained through the data source	Multiple sources were mobilised (e.g. targeted number of KIIs with varied informants) to develop evidence. Data could be partially triangulated to verify the finding through complementary document review and / or additional KIIs.
	A moderate body of evidence was obtained through the data source	Limited sources were mobilised (e.g. limited and targeted number of KIIs) to develop evidence. Limited triangulation to verify the finding through complementary document review and / or additional KIIs.

4.4 Evaluation design and tools

4.4.1 Evaluation timeline and alignment with FCDO strategic decision-making process

Timeline overview

The evaluation was implemented in the following sequence:

December 2023 – January 2024: Kick-Off & Inception. Kicking-off in December 2023, the evaluation inception phase finished in January 2024 with the inception report submitted in early February 2024. During inception, the Caribbean Resilience Framework, TOC and EF were developed. A methodology to select country case studies was developed; case studies were agreed on following discussion with FCDO. The evaluation team travelled to Barbados and Jamaica to present inception findings to CDT in late February / early March.

March – May 2024: Field Work & Data Collection. Following the closure of the Inception Phase, the evaluation team proceeded to conduct portfolio mapping and analysis, literature reviews and undertake country visits in the 7 case study countries over March to May 2024. Findings from this Phase were consolidated in the Interim Report, which was submitted to FCDO in May 2024; subsequently, the evaluation team travelled to Barbados to discuss interim findings with CDT in June. Once FCDO provided feedback on the Interim Report, the evaluation team submitted a draft Final Report in July 2024.

July 2024 – present: Finalisation. Following the submission of the draft Final Report in July 2024, the evaluation team has been working to address feedback from FCDO and EQUALS in view of preparing an updated version of the Final Report.

How is the evaluation timeline aligned with FCDO strategic decision-making process?

As presented in the Introduction, the evidence generated by the evaluation is meant to inform the development of the next phase of FCDO's resilience strategy for the Caribbean. The evaluation was undertaken simultaneously to CDT's efforts to craft the Caribbean resilience strategy.

The timing of the evaluation aligned with the FCDO strategic decision making process in that:

1. The evaluation interim findings were mobilised to produce the Caribbean resilience strategy draft.
2. Final Report findings will be used to update the Caribbean resilience strategy draft. Given the change in UK Government in July 2024, CDT will revise the draft of the Caribbean resilience strategy as emerging priorities coming from the new UK Government regarding international development priorities, and the role that the Caribbean region will play in this, start to become clearer.
3. In this sense, the timing of the evaluation and the Final Report finalisation is in alignment with a potential revision of the Caribbean resilience strategy draft. FCDO has indicated that the strategy review process will take about 3-4 months to take place; Final Report findings will be used to update the resilience strategy draft.

The evaluation timing is in alignment with FCDO strategic decision-making processes in that the evaluation evidence will allow to inform the update of the Caribbean resilience strategy to the reality and priorities from the incoming UK Government.

4.4.2 Evaluation Design

The evaluation design translates the Evaluation Framework to collect, analyse and synthesise data sources at the following three levels:

- **Document review & portfolio mapping** of FCDO programmes and wider initiatives in the Caribbean region.
- **Light touch process review** of FCDO's governance structures and organisational systems. The process review spoke to the analytical questions and drew a distinction between ODA vs non-ODA funding in the region; as well as the programmes spearheaded by CDT vs central programmes.
- **In-country case studies.** The case studies included desk review and evidence generated from interviews to determine the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and impact of FCDO interventions. A second use of the case studies was to generate lessons to inform future programming.

4.4.3 Data collection, analysis and reporting

Document review & portfolio mapping

The evaluation team started by consolidating the existing resources for the 15 projects integrating the CDT resilience portfolio, which included: Business Cases, Logical Frameworks, Annual Reviews (ARs) for the periods 2016-2023, Project Completion Reviews (PCRs) as well as Mid-Term Reviews and Evaluation Reports. The summary of existing portfolio documentation is available in CDT resilience portfolio: summary of available documentation.

Once an understanding of existing portfolio documentation was built, a detailed review of existing documentation was undertaken. The document review fed into the portfolio mapping. Qualitative information was mined for evidence against the evaluation questions to ensure the optimal use of existing secondary literature. A final list of **over 100 internal and external documents** were selected for mapping against the analytical framework (Documents Reviewed). MS Excel was used to code documents against the EQs, using the agreed judgement criteria.

The document review fed into the country case studies and provided evidence against each of the evaluation questions.

Key Informant Interviews (KIs)

Informants for KIs were selected following an iterative process with FCDO. The interviewee selection processes was undertaken through the following guidelines:

1. For each country, an understanding of implementing partners per project forming part of the CDT portfolio was developed. This allowed to swiftly identify government counterparts and beneficiaries as well as implementing partners CDT is working with (at both the regional and country scales) and prioritise the scheduling of conversations with them. Implementation partners FCDO is working with can include government counterparts (e.g. the Climate Resilience Execution Agency – CREAD in Dominica), bilateral donors (e.g. Global Affairs Canada), multilateral donors (e.g. Inter-American Development Bank – IDB) as well as regional organisations (e.g. CDEMA).
2. FCDO provided a complete list of CDT staff to interact with across different locations (Guyana, Jamaica, Belize, Barbados) as well as access to diplomatic staff that was deemed key to consult, including High Commissioners in Barbados, Belize, the Bahamas, Guyana and Jamaica. CDT also enabled contact with parts of FCDO considered as strategic due to their synergy with work in SIDS and the Caribbean region, such as the SIDS Hub and the Overseas Territories Department (OTD).
3. Finally, FCDO provided names of representatives working in organisations that are not CDT implementing partners but were considered strategic for conversations due to their salient stake in regional resilience building (e.g. USAID).

With the guidelines above, a list of informants for KIs per country was established. The following categories were used to classify informants:

- FCDO / bilateral donor
- Bilateral donor
- Multilateral donor
- Government agency
- International NGO
- Regional research organisation
- Regional organisation

The full list of informants consulted is available in Key Informants Interviewed. An indication of the informant's organisation, position, remit (regional or country) and location is provided. Informants are also identified as per the above categories.

In a first instance, access to relevant interviewees for KIs was facilitated by FCDO.

- Around 30 KIs were conducted with CDT / FCDO staff.
- Around 35 KIs were conducted with bilateral and multilateral donors. This includes bilateral and multilateral donors that are FCDO implementing partners as well as multilateral and bilateral donors who are not FCDO implementing partners but that have a stake in Caribbean resilience building processes.
- Around 20 KIs were conducted with staff in government agencies that are FCDO implementing partners across the 4 ODA countries that were selected for case study.

- KIIIs with Regional Research Organisations, Regional Organisations (e.g. CDEMA) and International NGOs were conducted to complement KIIIs with CDT / FCDO, staff in government agencies and representatives working with bilateral and multilateral donors. 3 KIIIs were conducted with staff working in Regional Organisations and 5 KIIIs were conducted with staff working in either Regional Research Organisations or International NGOs.

Interview guides were tested with initial respondents and refined over time. Interviews were conducted using Microsoft Teams by one or more members from the evaluation team. Verbal informed consent was obtained from interviewees at the outset of the interview. Data gathered was collected and stored on Triple Line's SharePoint, which abides by EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) guidelines.

The scope of the evaluation was to understand how projects that are part of the CDT resilience portfolio collectively contribute to building resilience at the regional level. As such, the focus was on building an extensively detailed understanding of how each project individually worked but to look at the big picture. In line with this scope, it was not prioritised to conduct extensive KIIIs with vulnerable groups such as indigenous communities. Where appropriate, views and information illustrating how beneficiary groups were supported by specific projects were captured through the document review undertaken.

Feedback from government beneficiaries and implementing partners supported by FCDO as part of projects in the CDT resilience portfolio was gathered through document reviews as well as KIIIs with government agencies.

Process

Key Informant data was collected through conducting **over 90 interviews** in the period March to June 2024:

- Around 25 key informant interviews were conducted with FCDO staff.
- Around 25 key informant interviews were conducted with government representatives in Caribbean countries covered by CDT programming.
- Around 40 key informant interviews were conducted with representatives from the donor community in the Caribbean.

Country Case Studies

The approach in undertaking case studies was largely qualitative in nature. Case studies were selected through the crossover of 4 components (see Annex 11 for further detail on country selection methodology and the indicators used under each component):

- **Component 1: Country vulnerability profile.** In line with the Caribbean resilience framework and the 8 Resilience Thematic Areas, this component builds an understanding of the various socio-economic variables at play that contribute to country vulnerability in the Caribbean.
- **Component 2: Geographic representation and ODA-eligibility.** This component considers geographic dispersion (mainland states and island-countries) crossing with ODA / non-ODA eligibility.
- **Component 3: FCDO programming in the country.** By looking at the 15 programmes that form part of the CDT resilience portfolio, this component builds an understanding of how UKAID flows are being directed among the 15 country group, the countries where the programmes constituting the portfolio are intervening and where data from Final Evaluations is available.
- **Component 4: Presence of existing development partner interventions in the resilience space.** This component considers the extent of existing investments and efforts by other development partners to support the country in resilience building.

Seven case study countries were selected and included a mix of ODA and non-ODA countries: Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, Belize, Guyana, Suriname and Bahamas. When approaching and understanding the country case studies, it is important to note the following:

1. Due to their ODA status, the salience of persistent vulnerability challenges, the importance of UKAID expenditure and the presence of CDT programmes in-country, more emphasis was placed in the case studies undertaken in Dominica, Jamaica and Guyana relative to Belize. This is reflected in the number of KIIs conducted with government agencies visible in Key Informants Interviewed.
5. Among the non-ODA countries, more emphasis was placed on the Barbados case study due to the regional hub role that the country plays and the significant presence of multilateral and bilateral donors as well as Regional Organisations in Bridgetown. Case studies in The Bahamas and Suriname were undertaken through a lighter-touch approach as compared to Barbados. This is reflected in the number of KIIs conducted in the three non-ODA countries visible in Key Informants Interviewed.

In order to efficiently manage country visits, and due to planned public holidays and festivities, it was agreed that data collection and analysis would be undertaken in two phases spread over March – May 2024 (Table 2). Due to logistical reasons, Guyana and Suriname were combined into one case study mission. An overview of the case studies is available in Volume 3 (Supporting Evidence).

Table 2. Data collection plan for case studies

Groups	Countries	Implementation timeline
Group 1	Jamaica, Dominica, Barbados, The Bahamas, Guyana & Suriname	March & April 2024
Group 2	Belize	May 2024

Country case studies were conducted during the **Field Work & Data Collection Phase** laid out in **Section** Evaluation timeline and alignment with FCDO strategic decision-making process above. This meant that findings from case studies undertaken in Jamaica, Dominica, Barbados, The Bahamas, Guyana and Suriname were integrated as part of the Interim Report, submitted to FCDO in May 2024. Findings from the Belize Case study were integrated as part of the Final Report, submitted to FCDO in July 2024.

The phased approach adopted to undertake the country case studies as well as the development of the Interim Report and, subsequently the Final Report, supported a sequenced and progressive engagement with key informants allowing to keep momentum and minimising evaluation fatigue. The sequenced and progressive stages in the Field Work & Data Phase enabled to engage key informants at different stages and for different data points in order to obtain follow-up pieces of information or to clarify pieces of information. This process thus facilitated an iterative conversation with key informants, thereby diminishing the possibilities of exhaustion from engagement as part of the evaluation.

Analysis of Data

Data was analysed using the analytical framework presented in **Section** Analytical framework and the evidence gathered was mapped against the EQs and SEQs outlined in Evaluation Framework. Thematic analysis was conducted using the Caribbean Resilience Framework (**Figure 3**). The effectiveness and impact of FCDO resilience programmes were coded against each of the eight Thematic Resilience Areas in the Caribbean Resilience Framework.

The evaluation used established techniques from qualitative analysis for triangulation to bring together data from different sources and establish a sufficient level of confidence in the emerging findings and conclusions. The credibility and validity of evidence gathered across data sources was tested to enrich, contradict, confirm and/or explain findings. Assessment of the evidence strength per data source provides and understanding on how data from different sources was verified and triangulated.

Gender, equality, disability and social inclusion (GEDSI) considerations were mainstreamed as part of the analytical framework used for data analysis by:

1. Assessing how GEDSI aspects are addressed through the project cycle, i.e. at project design, implementation, through interaction with implementing partners and project outcomes. Effectively, this meant looking across the board at:
 - i. The extent to which the design of projects at the core integrates the needs of women and girls, disabled and marginalised groups.
 - ii. The extent to which the implementation of projects addresses the needs of women and girls, disabled and marginalised groups.
 - iii. The extent to which the needs of women and girls, disabled and marginalised groups was a salient factor considered when FCDO interacted with implementing partners during project implementation.
 - iv. The extent to which the needs of women and girls, disabled and marginalised groups were integrated and / or sustained as part of changes to government approaches and processes enabled by projects in the CDT resilience portfolio.
6. Answering SEQs in the EF (e.g. SEQ 1.3) that specifically integrates the needs of women and girls as part of the analysis.

4.4.4 The role of the Evaluation Management Group and iterative evaluation design

As stated in **Section** Comments on the TOR, an Evaluation Management Group (EMG) was set-up at the end of the Inception Phase to have an oversight role over the assignment and ensure quality control of evaluation activities.

The composition of the EMG included a member of the CDB Office of the Independent Evaluation (OIE), a member from the United Nations (UN), a member from Dominica's CREAD and three CDT staff. CDT staff included the CDT M&E Adviser as well as the CDT Climate Change Adviser and CDT Economic Adviser.

The EMG played an active role when it came to advising on field work, commenting on draft reports and communication/dissemination. Evaluation deliverables were shared with the EMG; the EMG assumed an active and iterative function in evaluation design and quality assurance by providing feedback in the following:

- Following the inception phase, the EMG commented on the Caribbean Resilience Framework and the TOC. A specific comment was made to complement the Resilience Framework to include "Environmental resilience" as a specific Resilience Thematic Area. The EMG also suggested to specify, under each Resilience Thematic Area, how would resilience look like. Feedback was integrated and reflected in the Caribbean Resilience Framework and TOC.
- Regarding interim findings, the EMG advanced the following feedback to strengthen the evaluation narrative:
 - Including a specific chapter on the key resilience challenges that the Caribbean is facing and a summary / conclusion illustrating how the CDT portfolio is working to address them. A dedicated Chapter on Caribbean resilience challenges is in Overview of Caribbean Resilience Challenges.
 - More strongly highlighting best practice and aspects that FCDO should keep doing to build resilience in the Caribbean.
 - Better specifying how the 3 CDT emergency response / humanitarian assistance programmes integrate as part of the resilience portfolio.
 - Re-balancing the portfolio narrative to highlight achievements produced by small CDT portfolio projects in addition to specific achievements or challenges brought about by UKCIF.
 - Re-calibrating EQ scorings to more strongly take into account that the transformational change sought by CDT projects can take long to materialise.

In addition to providing feedback on the Caribbean Resilience Framework, TOC as well as the Interim Report and Final Report, EMG members attended the presentations held with CDT for Interim Report in June and Final Report findings in August.

4.5 Evaluation limitations and mitigation measures

- **Evaluation timeline.** The evaluation had a large scope, with a relatively short turnaround time. To address a larger scope for country case studies (7 case studies were conducted as opposed to 3 initially stated in the TOR), the timeline was revised and extended from March to June 2024. Following inception, an additional evaluation team member (Dr Richard Slater, see Evaluation Team for detail) was mobilised to ensure quality assurance of evaluation methods and participate in country case studies. The short timeline limited to some extent the capacity of the evaluation team to “snowball”. The evaluation team mitigated this by engaging in written follow-up with respondents where possible, and by supplementing KIs with secondary documentation. As highlighted earlier, the data collection plan was also broken down into two phases to cover more ground and ensure a progressive, gradual and iterative process of key informant engagement and development of findings.
- **Primary data collection.** The evaluation scope meant that extensive KIs with vulnerable groups such as indigenous communities were not prioritised. Where appropriate, views and information illustrating how beneficiary groups were supported by specific projects were captured through the document review undertaken.
- **Complexity.** The scope, temporal period, geographic spread and wide range of programme types and themes necessitated a selective approach to the evaluation. We adopted a proportionate approach, including a simplified model, purposive sampling strategies, and light touch data collection techniques to generate evidence against the evaluation questions.
- **Political and social interests:** The evaluation is rooted in a context characterised by a network of varied stakeholders and organisations, who are driven by their own political and social interests. These interests are reflected in the interpretation of events, achievements and challenges and can lead to bias. To improve reliability, the team conducted a robust stakeholder mapping to maintain objectivity and triangulated findings with multiple informants and secondary data sources.

4.6 Ethics and safeguarding

The evaluation upholds recognised standards and good practices in carrying out evaluations. These include practical principles and norms outlined by OECD/DAC (2022) and United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG, 2016), such as impartiality and independence, credibility, utility, and integrity, as well as FCDO’s Ethical Guidance for Research, Evaluation and Monitoring Activities. It abides by Triple Line’s safeguarding policy, which underlines the ‘**do no harm**’ approach ensuring that all staff contributed to this assignment (including Triple Line employees and sub-contractors) were subject to all relevant security and background checks. This includes zero tolerance for abuse and exploitation by staff or associated personnel to ensure that everyone Triple Line comes into contact with, regardless of age, gender identity, (dis)ability, sexual orientation or ethnic origin is protected from all forms of harm, abuse, neglect, and exploitation.

All team members have received mandatory safeguarding training within the past two years, and the Team Leader ensured compliance with the safeguarding policy throughout the lifecycle of the evaluation. In addition to this, the evaluation team was able to maintain independence, working freely and without interference. The Team Leader managed potential conflicts of interest (e.g. in our sampling or team structure) to protect the integrity of the data and overall evaluation. The same level of oversight was given to the procurement of information sources (to ensure the documents reviewed covered a range of sources including independent sources such as the OPM/Itad Baseline Evaluation of UKCIF, 2022, the Julian Murray Consulting Final Evaluation of SMART Hospitals, 2022, and the OPM/Itad Summative Evaluation of DFID’s Anti-Corruption Programming in the Caribbean, 2018). For a full list of documents reviewed, refer to Annex 3.

In summary, the following key safeguards were always ensured:

- **Informed consent was obtained;** safeguarding and ethical research protocols were put in place; training and pre-briefing with field staff engaged, incorporating safeguarding, was conducted.
- **Robust duty of care policies and procedures:** This included a country risk assessment, including ensuring understanding around escalation / emergency procedures.
- **Interviews were not recorded.** All transcripts were stored on Triple Line SharePoint Site – which uses two factor authentication. Anonymity was maintained at all times. At no point in this evaluation report has any informant been quoted directly, without permission.
- **Data minimisation:** Data was only gathered where it demonstrably contributed to the overall assignment and where the process did not put stakeholders/ team members at risk. No additional data was sought outside the remits of this evaluation.

5 Mapping the CDT Caribbean resilience portfolio

5.1 The portfolio in numbers


Figure 7 provides a summary of the CDT portfolio in numbers over the period 2015-2023. The evidence, informing the EF and EQs, highlights:

1. The regional emphasis in CDT programming – and the importance that some countries (notably Jamaica and Dominica to a lesser extent) have in terms of UKAID investment;
2. The multi-dimensional nature of the portfolio and how within this, there is a strong emphasis placed on infrastructure development as a thematic area – infrastructure development concentrates about 81 percent of portfolio investment in the period 2015-2023).

5.2 Finding Assessment Framework

This section outlines the evaluation findings following the Evaluation Framework (EF) and the Overarching Evaluation Questions. The in this section is **Overarching Question 1: To what extent is the approach taken by the Caribbean Development Team to improve the resilience of the Caribbean region – to climate shifts, natural hazards, economic and other shocks – relevant and strategically targeted to deliver the UK objective of strengthening resilience? This question focuses on ODA-eligible countries.** EQ1, EQ2, EQ3 are analysed in this Volume. For each EQ a qualitative assessment following the classification in **Table 3** is given. **Figure 8** presents the headline findings for EQ1, EQ2, EQ3 and further supported by detailed evidence in **Section Findings**.


Figure 7. The CDT portfolio in numbers (pages 64-65)



Total portfolio expenditure 2015-2023: ~£512M

	Infrastructure development and upgrading	Economic development	Governance	Climate and disaster
Thematic Area as per Caribbean Resilience Framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic resilience Fiscal resilience Workforce resilience Blue economy and biodiversity resilience 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social and democratic resilience 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate and disaster resilience
CDT programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UKCIF Improving Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy in the Eastern Caribbean SMART Hospitals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Caribbean Economic Development Programme – CEDP Youth Skills for Economic Growth in the Eastern Caribbean – SKYE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UK Jamaica Violence Prevention Partnership Serious Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Programme Caribbean Anti-Corruption Programme – CACP Citizen Security and Justice Programme 3 – CSJP3 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthening Disaster Recovery & Resilience – R&R CREAD & Support to CREAD Caribbean Humanitarian Assistance Emergency Assistance for Erika Humanitarian Support to Belize Following Lisa


UKAID yearly average expenditure for the period FY2019-2024 in GBP, ODA countries



ODA country ranking per level of expenditure

1. Jamaica
2. Dominica
3. Guyana
4. Belize
5. SVG
6. St Lucia
7. Grenada

No. of projects in-country from CDT portfolio, ODA countries



No. of countries covered by programme in the CDT portfolio




Table 3. The classification used to assess EQs






Colour code	Qualitative assessment	Classification
	Very satisfactory	The UK meets relevant needs through the portfolio approach it follows. There are no areas that have been identified for strengthening.
	Satisfactory	The UK generally meets relevant needs through the portfolio approach it follows. Some areas have been identified for strengthening.
	Emerging results are modest	The UK has set a basis from which it can build on for effective programming but areas for significant improvement have been identified.
	Significant effort needed	A significant effort is to be made to build structures for the effective delivery of programming.

Figure 8. Headline EQ findings: EQ1, EQ2 and EQ3



5.3 Findings

5.3.1 EQ 1. Relevance and Coherence: To what extent is FCDO's programming in the Caribbean both relevant and coherent in terms of building resilience?

Overall Finding

FCDO's regional portfolio of projects enables it to address resilience challenges in ODA-eligible countries while assisting non-ODA countries through available channels. FCDO's approach combines multilateral and bilateral approaches to project delivery, allowing tailored solutions at country level. FCDO programming reflects a multi-dimensional approach to resilience and works primarily through partnerships with regional organisations to deliver investments in: physical and social infrastructure; event driven disaster risk management; private sector and skills development, governance capacity and reforms Public Financial Management (PFM) and law enforcement. FCDO is seen as a trusted and flexible partner in resilience-building by governments and the wider donor community in the region.

Avenues for improvement

- Programmatic coherence and integration could be strengthened by taking the UK–Caribbean Region Development Partnership Summary a step further and clearly spelling out the FCDO approach and definition to resilience in the Caribbean and the resilience aspects that are specifically prioritised within (building on the Caribbean Resilience Framework and the Caribbean resilient country TOC). This would allow building a rational link regarding how programmes align with the resilience definition being put forward.
- FCDO's strategy should more strongly articulate the coherence of the portfolio in terms of how the main interventions mutually reinforce each other at regional and bilateral levels to ensure that the whole portfolio is greater than the sum of its parts.
- FCDO could develop a clearer rationale for its work at regional and bilateral levels to demonstrate how the portfolio can best achieve resilience outcomes whilst simultaneously reinforcing UK's foreign policy and business objectives in the region, based on where UK can best add value.



CDT programming is relevant from a building resilience perspective. Programmes fit with local priorities and generally have high local buy-in.

Finding 1. The Multi-dimensional approach has merit but needs stronger coherence: The FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio is multi-dimensional, broad in scope and diverse in the range of resilience challenges addressed; reflecting its assembly of legacy programmes working across varied themes. Programmatic coherence and integration should be strengthened in future programming.

- **As demonstrated in the document review and, and as confirmed through the majority of interviews, The CDT Caribbean resilience portfolio (15 programmes) covers a broad, multi-disciplinary approach to building resilience.** The *revealed* expenditure indicates a clear prioritisation on economic (physical transport, energy, and water) and social (health) infrastructure. A few noteworthy observations on the broad range of interventions are:
 - There is a strong focus on developing and upgrading infrastructure as a catalyst to economic resilience through UKCIF, Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, and SMART Hospitals. *Together, these programmes address the “infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience” thematic area in the Caribbean Resilience Framework.*
 - Programmes that support macroeconomic strength, fiscal stability, budgeting capacity and skills development are: Caribbean Economic Development Programme (CEDP) and Youth Skills for Economic Growth in the Eastern Caribbean (SkYE). *Together, these programmes address the “economic resilience,” “fiscal resilience” and “workforce resilience” thematic areas in the Caribbean Resilience Framework.*
 - There are programmes that aim to enhance governance, accountability, and rule of law structures – particularly focusing on challenges in Jamaica, they are: Citizen Security and Justice Programme 3, Caribbean Anti-Corruption Programme (CACP), Serious Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Programme 2020-2025, UK Jamaica Violence Prevention Partnership. *Together, these programmes address the “social and democratic resilience” thematic area in the Caribbean Resilience Framework.*
 - There are programmes that aim to improve long-term disaster risk management capacity or that focused on immediate recovery and reconstruction needs as a result of disasters that hit a specific country or countries: Strengthening Disaster Recovery and Resilience in the Caribbean Programme (R&R), UK Humanitarian Support to Belize Following Hurricane Lisa, Caribbean Humanitarian Assistance – Emergency Cash and Voucher Support to the Volcano Eruption in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Earthquake in Haiti, Emergency Assistance for the Relief Support in Dominica as a Result of Tropical Storm Erika, and Support to Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica – CREAD. *Together, these programmes address the “climate and disaster resilience” thematic area in the Caribbean Resilience Framework.*
- **The document reviews and KIs with CDT staff illustrate that there is evidence pointing to portfolio programmes attempting to build synergies across resilience thematic areas.** For example:
 - The R&R Programme includes a component mobilising CARTAC to assist countries to strengthen the management of fiscal resources that they receive following a disaster. This illustrates how efforts to enhance macro-economic and fiscal capacity can support disaster resilience and recovery.
 - Through support provided to the IDB COMPETE Caribbean facility as part of CEDP, efforts are focusing on how the private sector can be leveraged for climate action, i.e. jointly push for action in private sector development and addressing climate challenges.

➔ **Key highlight:** Evidence points to FCDO following a multi-dimensional approach to resilience-building in the Caribbean. This multi-dimensional approach responds to relevant identified

resilience needs and there are attempts to illustrate how efforts across dimensions work together in resilience-building.

- **What is the gap?** The multi-dimensional approach that the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio is following is not formally structured into a strategic document. The UK–Caribbean Region Development Partnership Summary establishes entry points but lacks a common operational definition of key priorities for building resilience in Caribbean. Future programming requires developing a clear framework defining the multi-dimensional approach that FCDO is intending to follow in the Caribbean.

Finding 2. Partnership Delivery Models are Working: FCDO’s partnership approach to programming has generally worked well. Interviews with implementing partners (governments and wider donor community) strongly indicated that FCDO is viewed as a trusted and flexible partner. FCDOs interventions are generally aligned to support regional / country level priorities (usually demand led), and are recognised for promoting reform, institutional strengthening and technically sound interventions.

- **Key points to note:**
 - Government stakeholders consider that FCDO targets the right areas to build resilience. They value FCDO efforts to forge working relationships based on trust and mutual respect. This is seen to support the relevance and coherence of efforts.
 - Like-minded multilateral and bilateral partners consistently associate with FCDO to address Caribbean resilience challenges and share a commitment to strengthening institutions and systems to enhance resilience-building in the region. As a KI working in a bilateral donor agency pointed out: *“We are on the same page with FCDO regarding what the (Caribbean) region needs”*.
 - Multilateral and bilateral programme implementation partners (such as PAHO, IDB and CARTAC) appreciate FCDO’s emphasis on technical excellence to frame programme value added. The emphasis on technical excellence is also present in programme implementation through efforts to establish follow-up accountability and reporting structures. As summarised by a KI *“We appreciate the relationship with FCDO. FCDO is invested in the results of the programme. There is a good basis for the day-to-day operation of the programme; the lines of communication are good and FCDO promotes the perfect balance between giving enough autonomy in implementation and raise important questions about programme performance”*.
 - There is evidence pointing to the UK leadership in organising development efforts in specific resilience topics, such as disaster risk financing. FCDO is seen to have taken a lead role in setting and driving a regional agenda around the topic and getting development partners around the table to discuss it. As a KI put forward: *“Disaster Risk Financing is a particular area of interest for the UK and FCDO has been seen to take the lead on it”*.
- **FCDO programme designs respond to core resilience challenges that the Caribbean countries face. This is highlighted through the programmes working across the varied thematic areas that the Caribbean resilience portfolio covers:**
 - As demonstrated in the document review, and as confirmed through the majority of KIs, evidence points to programmes focusing on developing and upgrading infrastructure being relevant in addressing resilient infrastructure gaps the Caribbean region faces while aligning to UK International Development Strategy priorities:
 - The UKCIF investments are well-aligned with the priorities of beneficiary countries: a significant proportion of the investments supported by UKCIF were existing projects (at least at concept level) that were missing financing

Country	Sector	Project	Alignment with national policy priorities	Alignment with sector specific plans	Alignment with cross cutting plans (GESI, climate, safety)
Antigua & Barbuda	Roads	Antigua Road Rehabilitation	Yes	Yes	Yes: road safety, climate, GESI
Barbuda & Barbuda	Energy	Barbuda Energy Resilience	No	Yes	Yes
Belize	Roads	Coastal Highway	Yes	Yes	Yes – climate No – GESI, road safety
Belize	Roads	Philip Godson Highway	Yes	Yes	Yes – climate, road safety No – GESI
Dominica	Roads	Dominica Road	N/A	N/A	N/A
Dominica	Water	Dominica Water	N/A	N/A	N/A
Grenada	Roads	Western Corridor	N/A	N/A	N/A
Grenada	Water	Grenada water	N/A	N/A	N/A
Guyana	Roads	Linden to Mabura Hill	Yes	Yes	Yes – climate, road safety
Jamaica	Agriculture	Essex Valley Agricultural Development – EVAD	Yes	Yes	Yes
Jamaica	Agriculture	Southern Plains Agricultural Development – SPAD	Yes	Yes	Yes
Montserrat	Ports	Montserrat Port	Yes	Yes	No
St Lucia	Roads	Millenium Highway	Yes	Yes	Yes – climate, road safety No – GESI
SVG	Ports	SVG Port	Yes	No	Yes

- Evidence gathered through document review, and confirmed through the majority of KIIS, points to programmes focusing on governance, accountability and enhancing rule of law structures being relevant to reduce widespread violence, organised crime and corruption that hinder growth and prosperity in Caribbean countries, particularly Jamaica. Breaking links between crime and economic benefit (crime does not pay) to reduce the attractiveness of dangerous lifestyles and illegal activities is one thrust of this programming effort.
 - The programmes aimed at underpinning links on how the trafficking of drugs and guns work together to fuel violence and create demand for money laundering. In turn, programmes explored how law enforcement mechanisms can be strengthened to support a reduction in violence and corruption – thereby enabling social cohesion.

engagement supporting the Community Liaison Officers. A community of practice was also established so that Community Liaison Officers could share experiences and lessons learned – thereby supporting programme adaptability.

- **Evidence gathered through the document review and confirmed through interviews with implementing partners highlight that the portfolio has displayed capacity to be agile and rapidly integrate emergency response efforts following regional disasters that have particularly devastated one or two countries.**
 - There are programmes that have been designed with a humanitarian response lens in mind to support immediate relief and reconstruction efforts following disasters. This includes the following programmes: UK Humanitarian Support to Belize Following Hurricane Lisa, The Emergency Assistance for the Relief Effort in Dominica as a Result of Tropical Storm Erika, as well as the Caribbean Humanitarian Assistance – Emergency Cash and Voucher Support in Response to the Volcano Eruption in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Earthquakes in Haiti.
 - The CREAD experience in Dominica illustrated how programming swiftly intervened following a disaster and articulated humanitarian response with long-term reconstruction and resilience-building.

Finding 4. A Balance of Regional and Bilateral Programmes: Evidence gathered by the document review and confirmed through the majority of KIs reveals that FCDO’s CDT portfolio of programmes has enabled the UK to address resilience challenges in ODA-eligible countries while assisting non-ODA countries through *shared delivery channels* (e.g. CARTAC). Alongside regional programmes are selected bilateral efforts (e.g. programming with a particular focus on Jamaica or the CREAD experience in Dominica).

- **FCDO is implementing programmes that are multi-country that address common regional challenges while emphasising support to English-speaking ODA eligible countries. A regional approach is taken across various resilience thematic areas, including infrastructure development and upgrading, energy efficiency and the transition to renewable energy, macro-economic stability, long-term disaster risk reduction and anti-corruption.**
 - 7 out of the 15 programmes that constitute the portfolio are working in 4+ countries (**Table 8**). These programmes are thematically varied and integrate infrastructure development and upgrading, energy efficiency, macro-economic stability and skills development, long-term disaster risk reduction as well as anti-corruption. This highlights the regional lens that FCDO is employing to Caribbean programming.
 - 4 out of the 15 programmes that constitute the portfolio are working in 7+ countries. This includes the flagship programme in the portfolio (UKCIF) as well as the largest programmes in the portfolio in terms of expenditure.
 - Out of the 8 programmes that just covered 1 or 2 countries, there are 4 programmes that intervened following a specific climate shock or disaster. These programmes provided punctual emergency response or reconstruction efforts.
- **Regional programmes are complemented by specific bilateral efforts tackling particular needs or challenges. While the articulation of a regional approach complemented by bilateral efforts appears relevant, the case as to why this is the case could be made more strongly.**
 - Bilateral efforts targeting violence and anti-corruption in Jamaica emerge as relevant given the salience of the country in the regional context as well as its historic ties with the UK and presence of a British diplomatic post. Within bilateral programming, an effort is made to establish how efforts in Jamaica could be relevant for other parts of the Caribbean, i.e. assess how investments done in anti-corruption and accountability in Jamaica could be replicated elsewhere. A clearer articulation of why bilateral

efforts in Jamaica complements a regional approach could strengthen portfolio coherence and integration.

- The bilateral support provided to Dominica through the CREAD experience emerges as a relevant response to a series of punctual shocks devastating the country. Programme coherence could be strengthened with a stronger rationale as to how bilateral efforts following specific shocks complement a regional approach.
 - Complementing the CREAD effort in Dominica, bilateral humanitarian assistance efforts remain relevant in the context of increasing climate vulnerability and response to specific and punctual shocks. The 3 programmes in the CDT portfolio characterised by a humanitarian lens (support provided to Belize following Hurricane Lisa, support provided to Dominica as a result of the Tropical Storm Erika and the emergency cash and voucher support in response to the volcano in SVG and earthquake in Haiti) were all part of the UK Caribbean support strategy focusing on disaster response and management assistance. The disasters all met the UK intervention threshold criteria triggering a response.
 - **FCDO funds and supports regional organisations that provide assistance to both ODA and non-ODA countries. Evidence gathered through document review and further explored during KIs suggests that this approach is relevant as a way to provide support to non-ODA countries of FCDO interest. An explicit acknowledgment that FCDO articulates a regional approach providing support to regional organisations assisting non-ODA countries that often face similar resilience challenges to ODA countries could strengthen portfolio coherence; this would speak to FCDO's own internal needs to bring all of its regional interests into a common narrative and shared vision.**
 - HMG generally refers to the Caribbean as the fifteen full member countries constituting CARICOM, which federates both ODA eligible and non-ODA eligible countries. While FCDO emphasises assistance to the 7 English speaking countries that are part of CARICOM, a stronger acknowledgement that this support does not work in isolation and works in a wider system of countries facing similar challenges will enhance portfolio coherence.
 - Thematic regional organisations that have been set-up to progress specific resilience efforts (e.g. 5C, CDEMA or CARTAC) do not distinguish between ODA and non-ODA countries. They have endeavoured to develop and implement support mechanisms that apply at a regional scale indistinctive of ODA eligibility. FCDO has funded these organisations, which have delivered change to non-ODA countries through FCDO general support. In this complex regional scenario, more clearly advancing how a regional approach involving the use of regional organisations as a relevant means to deliver support to non-ODA countries could strengthen portfolio coherence and widen buy-in across all FCDOs internal interests.
- ➔ **What is the gap?** The regional portfolio approach complemented by specific bilateral interventions has been relevant to address a range of resilience challenges in the Caribbean. However, FCDO's resilience portfolio is not *explicitly* defined as an integrated regional resilience programme *per se*. Clearly establishing why FCDO is pursuing a regional approach and why it is beneficial to complement regional programming with specific bilateral efforts could strengthen portfolio coherence and wider political support. The use of a regional approach to support both ODA and non-ODA countries is sensible and could be more firmly articulated.

Finding 5. There is considerable evidence gathered from the document review and confirmed through KIs with implementing partners to support that FCDO is building on existing efforts and working in synergy with some donors to jointly address Caribbean resilience challenges. Given the scale of the regional resilience-building endeavour, this approach supports portfolio coherence. Evidence

regarding how portfolio coherence is achieved through synergy with CMPs / wider HMG initiatives and integration with FCDO Country Business Plans in the region is more limited.

- **At a regional scale, evidence points to FCDO programming in the Caribbean resilience portfolio building on existing donor efforts and / or jointly working with donors (particularly Global Affairs Canada, EU and the IDB) to design programmes addressing relevant resilience challenges. This has involved an appropriate use of multi-donor trust funds and illustrates how FCDO is placing efforts to approach Caribbean resilience-building in a coherent manner.**
 - The Citizen Security and Justice Programme 3 (CSJP3) in Jamaica was jointly designed, co-funded and co-implemented through a multi-donor trust fund set-up by the IDB and the Canadian Government. FCDO provided funds to the IDB, which subsequently financed activities through Government of Jamaica systems. The programme built on previous joint FCDO and IDB efforts, which were seen as highly successful as highlighted in the CSJP Business Case.
 - The CREAD effort in Dominica came about through a multi-donor trust fund with the Canadian Government, with FCDO and Global Affairs Canada jointly funding the establishment and operation of CREAD. The effort also involved engaging UNDP for programme monitoring and evaluation.
 - The SMART Hospitals programme was jointly designed and implemented with PAHO. Building on the 2012 PAHO pilot initiative around Safe Hospitals, the SMART Hospitals effort added a “green” dimension to safety considerations in the resilience of health infrastructure.
 - CEDP was structured in 3 components through which FCDO closely worked with IDB (providing funding to COMPETE Caribbean) and the IMF (through the provision of funding to CARTAC).
- **Evidence gathered through the document review illustrates that the articulation between CDT programming and how it supports the objectives of Country Business Plans needs to be clearer.**
 - FCDO Caribbean Country Business Plans generally speak to common challenges that the Caribbean resilience portfolio is tackling (such as widespread violence, corruption or climate hazards) but how these will work effectively and more efficiently with CDT initiatives needs to be strengthened.
 - A stronger effort is needed to more clearly demonstrate how programmes in the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio and FCDO centrally managed programmes (CMPs) integrate and build on each other. For instance, in Belize, a narrative clearly explaining how CDT programmes operating in the country in infrastructure development and upgrading (UKCIF, SMART Hospitals) and economic development (CEDP, Compete Caribbean) work in synergy with other HMG efforts as part of a resilience continuum could be developed and more strongly integrated into the Country Business Plan:
 - The narrative could explain how the Small Island Developing States Capacity and Resilience (SIDAR) initiative, a CMP managed by the SIDS Hub and working with the 5C to enhance capabilities so that countries are better able to develop bankable projects complements / works in synergy with UKCIF, CEDP and SMART Hospitals activities in resilience building.
 - Similarly, the narrative could explain how environmental management and biodiversity programmes implemented by the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in the country (e.g. Biodiverse Landscapes

Fund) complement and work in synergy with FCDO / CDT efforts to build resilience.

- On the positive side, the Business Case of the recently launched UK Jamaica Violence Prevention Partnership is a good example clearly explaining how the programme is part of Caribbean multi-country development effort in the Caribbean. The Business Case also illustrates how the programme is aligned with FCDO regional strategic documentation (the Caribbean Growth and Resilience Diagnostic) and a specific pillar in the Jamaica Country Strategy.

→ **What is the gap?** A systematic approach to clarify how synergies are built not only with existing donor efforts in the Caribbean but also with FCDO programmes at central level (and wider HMG efforts as relevant), and subsequently, how all of this is integrated within FCDO country programming could enhance portfolio coherence and build greater FCDO internal buy-in.

Finding 6. Safeguarding Inclusion and Social Protection: As demonstrated in the document review and confirmed through the majority of KIIs, mainstreaming mechanisms to ensure marginalised and vulnerable groups interests are fully considered in is generally advanced across the portfolio where relevant and practical.

- **Programmes working in governance and the rule of law generally integrate a strong focus on vulnerable and marginalised groups.**
 - For example, the Citizen Security and Justice Programme 3 and the UK Jamaica Violence Prevention Partnership place working with women, girls and youth-at-risk at the core of their programme approach. Action to underpin links between organised crime, violence and corruption is placed as a key means to enhance social cohesion and the living conditions of women, girls and youth-at-risk – which are disproportionately impacted on by widespread violence.
 - A key value-added of UKCIF was mainstreaming more rigorous GESI and ESIA processes and tools within the CDB and the implementing MDAs, all of which were positively acknowledged.
- **Programmes whose remits are not explicitly in social development areas embed an inclusion dimension as part of their approach:**
 - The R&R programme embedded a strong inclusion dimension in its approach to enhancing disaster risk management and recovery. Through efforts in recovery planning, it aimed to improve national shock response systems for the most vulnerable which includes expanding transfer mechanisms and effective use of national social protection data and tools. It also set to strengthen responses from national climate change coordination bodies through ensuring they incorporate strategies for inclusive (gender and vulnerable persons) and rights-based approaches to resilience. This is described as Inclusive and ‘EnGenDER-ed’ resilience action.
 - The support provided to Dominica as part of the CREAD experience embedded a strong community resilience perspective, through an acknowledgment that there cannot be island-wide resilience without community resilience (as communities are the first respondents when shocks occur). This approach involved a close articulation with local government to work with youth and vulnerable groups, including the *Kalinago*.
 - UKCIF aimed to enable a shift in the approach to infrastructure design by embedding Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) as part of project design. This includes a consideration on how infrastructure development impacts

on vulnerable groups. The independent Baseline Report of UKCIF finds that the infrastructure investments are designed in a way to result in substantial benefits to users, including vulnerable groups.

- One of the SkYE components focused on providing basic and work readiness training for disadvantaged youth. SkYE was designed to respond to the lack of skills and high unemployment, particularly among the disadvantaged youth (ages 15-30) in four of the poorest countries in the region (Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) in order to increase their chances of securing employment or further training opportunities.
- The 3 CDT humanitarian assistance programmes targeted vulnerable groups in their design and during implementation:
 - The Emergency Cash and Voucher Support in response to the Volcano in SVG and earthquake in Haiti followed agreed intervention criteria in line with humanitarian principles and Grand Bargain commitments to respond to the most vulnerable, crisis-affected populations.
 - As part of the UK Humanitarian Support to Belize following Hurricane Lisa, priority for shelter and home repair assistance were given to single-parent households, persons with disabilities and the elderly.
 - Finally, documentary evidence finds partners working on the Emergency Assistance for the Relief Effort in Dominica as a result of Tropical Storm Erika continually assessing the situation and adjusting their response in real time (e.g. IFRC reduced the number of cash transfer recipients to reflect needs on the ground and redirect funds toward urgent priorities).
- ➔ **What is the gap?** The efforts to mainstream GESI, ESIA and disability into programmes, projects and interventions need to be backed up by further capacity building. CDB and MDAs in the UKCIF have pointed to the need to continue building capacity, systems, tools and skilled people, across the region. Sustainability of the innovations will depend on further investment GESI, ESIA and disability sensitive systems.

5.3.2 EQ 2: Effectiveness: To what extent has programming been effective in delivering resilience outcomes? In which contexts and why? Where in each of the eight dimensions of resilience has it been most effective?

Overall Finding

The CDT portfolio made a measurable contribution to various dimensions of resilience covered through its programmes and interventions. Effectiveness is uneven across the portfolio; UKCIF and Increasing RE and EE in the Eastern Caribbean have been much slower to execute and thus the resilience outcomes and economic benefits have not yet been realised. The planning and implementation of these two programmes contributed to reforms and institutional strengthening of the implementing partners although much more needs to be done on this front.

The portfolio of programmes in disaster risk management and economic development also performed satisfactorily in improving resilience in their target areas and stakeholder constituencies. Notable results include:

- Through the financing of COMPETE Caribbean, CEDP has advanced regulatory reforms enabling private sector competitiveness. Results were observed in 7 institutions with the mandate to regulate private sector competitiveness in the Caribbean.
- Supporting CARTAC through CEDP and the R&R programme has allowed for progress to materialise in macro-economic stability, revenue collection and budgeting, as well as improved financial management systems when disasters hit. For instance, assistance provided by CARTAC through CEDP enabled 23 member countries to comply with the System of National Accounts and 17 countries to measure-on-time filing compliance for large taxpayers; both efforts illustrate that CARTAC support can reach non-ODA countries. Assistance provided by CARTAC under the R&R programme, on the other hand, has been considered successful in strengthening pre and post disaster management through improving financial planning for disaster preparedness.
- The support provided to CREAD supported Dominica in the aftermath of a disaster to set a vision on how to become a resilient country. The CREAD experience can be considered as best practice due to the institutional and regulatory changes it triggered; the policy vision it framed and how this was integrated within line ministries; the community engagement exercise it fostered, and the monitoring and evaluation scheme it embedded. While CREAD illustrates a positive first step in enabling a shift to a culture of long-term resilience building, efforts are still needed for this to be enshrined across decision-making.

The complex and diverse nature of the Caribbean region, the multiple legal jurisdictions and generally constrained capacity requires that a lot more work is to be done to “move the dial” in terms of resilience. On balance, FCDO’s portfolio of interventions has contributed to improved resilience across most dimensions that the programmes focused on but these changes have generally not achieved transformational change. Exposure to climate, environment and natural hazard risk is likely to increase and thus further investing in resilience programming following a multi-dimensional lens is strongly supported.

Avenues for improvement

- Infrastructure development and upgrading

Emerging results are modest

The CDT portfolio is contributing to resilience outcomes, but progress is slow and not yet complete.

Major delays in the implementation of UKCIF and the RE/EE have impaired overall effectiveness of the portfolio given their scale.

The portfolio of programmes in disaster risk management and economic development has also generally performed satisfactorily in improving resilience in their target areas and stakeholder constituencies.

- To bridge the infrastructure gap, a greater emphasis on the wider *infrastructure eco-system* is needed to accelerate infrastructure development in the region; since infrastructure projects typically take 5-10 years to develop and execute, infrastructure deficits will continue to reduce resilience.
- An infrastructure lifecycle design and costing model is needed. A greater emphasis needs to be placed on operation and maintenance (O&M) of infrastructure – this means moving beyond the ex-ante plan to ensuring effective and sustained implementation of the O&M plans.
- Increased access to green or climate-related finance is needed to allow more end-to-end infrastructural investment **Linkages between governance reform, macro-economic stability and disaster preparedness**
 - Build on the linkages that have started to be made across different Resilience Thematic Areas and how they work in synergy as part of a joint resilience-building process. Specifically, the importance of PFM, macro-economic stability and accurate budgeting in disaster planning and recovery could be taken further as part of programming framing how governance reform is linked to improved macro-economic stability and PFM systems.
 - Improving budget expenditure efficiency is a key area to make a step change in effective infrastructure investment (economic and social).
- **Emergency response and long-term resilience building**
 - Building on the CREAD experience, develop a clearer narrative and programming approach laying out how emergency response efforts could enable a transition paving the way for institutional strengthening, vision setting and reforms enabling long-term resilience building.

Overall Finding: The document review shows that the portfolio of programmes is strongly weighted to the creation and or upgrading of physical assets delivered through: UKCIF investments; energy efficiency or renewable energy interventions and retrofitting SMART health facilities. Collectively, these address key resilient infrastructure backlogs and deficits across the region. These three programmes account for over 80% of the total portfolio, and if effective, they are expected to contribute to the majority of the impact weighting.

As demonstrated by the document review, and confirmed through the majority of KIs, the UK focus on infrastructure development is generally seen as effective means to contribute to resilience-building in the Caribbean. There is recognition that infrastructure development investments are aiming to go beyond the simple delivery of physical assets and are set to change processes in the way infrastructure is conceptualised and subsequently materialised. As a KI pointed when referring to UKCIF: *“The UKCIF is an excellent vehicle. It has delivered very good projects for the region. They are resilient in every sense of the word – infrastructure, social, climate”*.

KIs with bilateral and multilateral donors as well as government counterparts revealed that infrastructure development is an area where the UK is seen to bring value added in that it is leveraging existing technical expertise and addressing gaps that other (bilateral) donors are not covering. This results in strong UK visibility both among recipients (physical investments are notably visible) and the development community (FCDO stands out through a major contribution in an important area for resilience other partners are not directly investing in). As a KI working in a bilateral donor agency pointed out *“There is a huge infrastructure need in the region and it is a huge aid for the Caribbean. It's great that the UK takes the lead on this as other donors don't.”*

Given the infrastructure deficit in the Caribbean and the contribution of infrastructure development to resilience building, anchoring regional programming in infrastructure investment efforts emerges as an effective and positive approach. This is even more the case as programming is complemented by

efforts in economic development and macro-economic stability, climate and disaster resilience as well as governance reform and the rule of law that have generally resulted in positive change.

Box 2 The elements considered when assessing effectiveness in infrastructure development

The following aspects are considered in assessing effectiveness in infrastructure development and upgrading throughout this section:

- 1. Delivery Mechanisms and Intermediaries:** The extent to which the chosen delivery mechanisms, primarily CDB, contributed to better infrastructure financing, PPP, project screening, design and delivery;
- 2. National Ministries Departments and Agencies (MDAs):** The extent to which the participating MDAs, are now able to better plan, procure, implement and operate the newly created assets sustainably; and;
- 3. Asset Build and Operations:** The assets were delivered on time, to budget at an acceptable quality, that is fully functional.

Finding 1. The document review and KIIs with stakeholders involved in the implementation of infrastructure programmes illustrate that the combination of infrastructure investments in UKCIF and the promotion of renewable energy has helped to leverage finance beyond the original grant financing structure. There are several relevant observations to report:

- First, both CDB loans and government sources have been leveraged to ensure projects are developed and can be completed.
- Second, leveraging has been used to help package projects into larger more transformational investments that will act as drivers of resilient growth. This is evidenced in the case of the road project in Guyana and to some extent in the irrigation projects in Jamaica. In a similar light, the economic benefits that can be brought about by the two roads projects in Belize are strongly advanced:
 - The Philip Godson Highway project is recognised due to its potential to ease the move of goods of products across Belize and onto Mexico.
 - The Coastal Highway project is recognised due to its potential in allowing the movement of goods (particularly heavy vehicles) towards coastal areas. As a KI pointed out referring to the Coastal Highway: *“We needed a proper road so that goods and heavy roads vehicles can get to the coastal areas easily”*.
- Third, in the case of the EE / RE project in Dominica grant funding was vital to de-risk early stage geothermal drilling and market viability potential opening the way forward to a PPP type of arrangement with a major geothermal energy developer.
- Fourth, there is evidence that FCDO mandated grant utilisation criteria related to enhanced GESI and Climate Resilience requirements improved project quality, standards and supervision. UKCIF supported projects were subject to extensive and rigorous screening and selection standards ensuring all CDB and FCDO were diligently adhered to. PAHO supported mainstreaming of more resilient building codes for critical social-infrastructure – hospitals and primary health care centres.
- Fifth, the document review and KIIs identified the core strengths of CDB as an International Finance Institution (IFI) and their relevance to the execution of UKCIF:
 - In broad terms, the prime value added of the CDB is its technical advisory role to the Borrowing Member States, all of whom are often very constrained in terms of sector expertise and capacity for executing complex projects.
 - The CDBs sector strengths are selective and tend to have a relatively strong social emphasis, with education, agriculture and basic water supply areas noted in the interview process.
 - The CDB also has competence in DRM and climate risk intervention areas, as well as incorporating climate risk exposure, mitigation and management criteria into all TA and lending operations.
- Sixth, the efficiency of the CDB is impeded by a number of factors, one of which is its small – scale lending operations which are understood to be comparatively high cost (and seemingly more bureaucratic than other IFI / MDBs). Small scale loans, say \$50m, may attract costs (in terms of time, resources and expenses) comparable to much larger loans of \$150m plus. A fundamental barrier to improved efficiency through larger lending operations and loan sizes is the balance sheet of the CDB; there have been no major capital increases over the past decade. Risk management protocols, independently designed and applied within the bank, effectively limit large loans.

Finding 2. The document review and KIIs with stakeholders involved in the implementation of infrastructure programmes highlight that the delivery of physical assets and their full functionality is a *necessary condition to achieve effectiveness* where these are the core of the programme and central to enhanced resilience.

- **Figure 9** clearly demonstrates that in the case of UKCIF timely and on budget delivery has proved difficult. There are both significant time and cost variations from initial plans. Several external (non-controllable) and internal (and more controllable) factors cause time and cost overruns..
- Programme delays and slowness in implementation, particularly as related to UKCIF, could be explained, at least partly, due to setting disproportionate ambitions from the onset. In simple terms, UKCIF projects may have not gone as planned as they were perhaps too ambitious from the start; Programme design didn't necessarily take complete consideration of the capacity of countries to deliver large-scale infrastructure investments, which subsequently resulted in delays. As a KI pointed out: *"It was unrealistic in the initial draft to think that governments could implement (UKCIF projects) in 5 years. There needed to be a full understanding of the implementation deficit"*.
- The assessment is that the strength of existing capacity and the level of political support for technical expertise act as key drivers in the timely delivery of infrastructure investments. The Belize experience sheds light on this point, as it illustrates how UKCIF was able to capitalise on the 20-year strong expertise of the Project Execution Unit at the Ministry of Infrastructure to effectively implement the two road projects it set. As a KI illustrated *"In Belize, the project management unit had been in existence for a while. In other countries, the project units had to be established, which added to the time of delivery. Belize is really seen as having the right formulate for the roads sector: the level of political support has been strong, due to the way the political relationship between the Ministry of Works and the projects have been articulated"*. In a similar light, a different KI stated that *"UKCIF is one of the best projects that I've seen. It's been incredibly well handed by Belize"*.
- The selection of the CDB to be the main delivery mechanism for UKCIF has proved challenging on getting projects selected, prepared and executed given CBD's nascent capacities. In terms of physical delivery of the assets and their full operationalisation UKCIF has struggled to maintain timely delivery and costs control – see **Figure 11** below.
- The drivers of cost escalation and the reasons for the delays are multiple and vary across the participating countries. The challenges are:
 - Getting UKCIF governance and project arrangements established in reasonable time;
 - Internal to CDB: The CDB capacity to take on a project of the scale and complexity of UKCIF was low relative to what was needed, notwithstanding pre-existing bureaucracy and ways of working;
 - In most participating countries, the MDAs charged with implementing the UKCIF projects have binding capacity constraints which often were exacerbated with new and more demanding project implementation requirements imposed as part of the development process. In short capacity was very limited.
 - The UKCIF design was very light on TA to support UKCIF implementation. The CDB had a number of shortfalls. First, it had limited on the ground presence in the participating countries. Second, there was, and still is, highly restricted availability and quantity of expertise to support project preparation. There was no provision for embedded TA within CDB to top up resources, and the supply of qualified technical experts / consultants was also constrained in terms of quantity and timely availability.

- Lifecycle approach with greater support to moving from project identification, procurement, contract management and then diligent execution of supporting O&M regimes to ensure assets are functional and resilient. Whilst project identification improved, procurement and contract management remained a challenge and impeded timely delivery (e.g. multiple failed procurements).
 - Whilst the more robust ESIA and related processes have helped to better address safeguarding risks, to gain full benefit from transformational impacts requires a more holistic and integrated approach that would, for example, include spatial planning, land zoning and development control along with requisite legal and regulatory frameworks around enforcement.
 - Interestingly, in the case of SMART Hospitals, the chosen delivery agent was not a specialised procurement agency. While PAHO is not an agency with specific expertise in infrastructure development and upgrading, and there was a learning curve to meet this requirement, the perception is that programme effectiveness was not compromised due to this. As a KI pointed: *“The SMART Hospitals initiative is presented as a very successful intervention. The intervention is about promoting green AND smart hospitals. It is grounded in construction standards and capacity building. The results are very visible. The project is highly valued by government.”*
- ➔ **What is the gap?** Due to the CDT portfolio focus on infrastructure development and upgrading, there may be a need for any subsequent programming in this sphere to better recognise country technical capacity deficits and more strongly embed this consideration when setting timelines and scheduling.

As demonstrated by the document review, and confirmed by the majority of KIs, a stronger assessment of technical capacity deficits would enable to set more realistic timelines when it comes to the implementation of programming. Programming should capitalise on existing structures (e.g. Project Execution Unit at the Ministry of Infrastructure in Belize) to swiftly deliver infrastructure investments while recognising when such structures are not in place and may take time to set, which would subsequently result in longer implementation periods. This approach could enable to encapsulate a more accurate assessment of effectiveness performance.

Figure 9. Delivery of Physical Assets – UKCIF Execution is Slow to Mature*

Country	Project	Grant	Disbursed	%	Status	Progress Rating
Antigua & Barbuda	Road Infrastructure Rehabilitation	£13.9M	£13.9M	100	Ongoing	C
	Barbuda Energy Resilience	£2.89M	£2.89M	100	Ongoing	A
Belize	Coastal Highway Upgrading)	£26M	£26M	100	Completed	A
	Philip S.W. Goldson Highway Upgrading	£16M	£15.97M	100	Ongoing	A
Dominica	Loubiere to Grand Bay Road & Bridge Rehabilitation	£36.5M ⁸	£1.8M	5	Procurement	B
	Water Supply & Wastewater Infrastructure Upgrade	£14.1M ⁹	£12.4M	9	Procurement	B
Grenada	Western Road Corridor Upgrade (TA)	£0.45M ¹⁰	0.45M	100	Completed	
	Water Supply Expansion & Sewerage Improvement	£17.1M	£0.34M		Procurement	A
Guyana	Coastal & River Infrastructure Rehabilitation TA	£0.6M	£0.6M	100	Completed	
	Linden to Mabura Hill Road Upgrade	£52.2M	£23.9M	46	Ongoing	B
Jamaica	Essex Valley Agriculture Development	£35.5M	£27.6M	78	Ongoing	A
	Southern Plains Agriculture Development	£17.3M	£14.5M	84	Ongoing	A
Montserrat	Port Development Project	£28.3M	£10.6M	37	Ongoing	A
Saint Lucia	Millennium Highway and West Coast Rd	£28.5M	£9.3M	33	Ongoing	C
St Vincent & the Grenadines	Kingstown Port Modernisation	£27.7M	£20.8M	75	Ongoing	A

*Progress rating is taken from the latest AR. The colour coding is as follows: Green – On track (no project has been able to achieve a timeline close to original plans or even revised timeframes; Amber – Project is now making good progress to complete by end of the new contract end; Red is the project is severely delayed as procurement is not yet complete and risk remain on getting started. The rating is intended to highlight the challenges in getting infrastructure projects off the ground and implemented, signalling a need for a new approach.

UKCIF - Project Timelines																											Additional estimated delay on construction end date since Jan 22 (months)																																						
Updated January 31 2023																																																																	
Project	2020		2021				2022				2023				2024				2025				2026																																										
	Nov-20	Dec-20	Jan-21	Feb-21	Mar-21	Apr-21	May-21	Jun-21	Jul-21	Aug-21	Sep-21	Oct-21	Nov-21	Dec-21	Jan-22	Feb-22	Mar-22	Apr-22	May-22	Jun-22	Jul-22	Aug-22	Sep-22	Oct-22	Nov-22	Dec-22	Jan-23	Feb-23	Mar-23	Apr-23	May-23	Jun-23	Jul-23	Aug-23	Sep-23	Oct-23	Nov-23	Dec-23	Jan-24	Feb-24	Mar-24	Apr-24	May-24	Jun-24	Jul-24	Aug-24	Sep-24	Oct-24	Nov-24	Dec-24	Jan-25	Feb-25	Mar-25	Apr-25	May-25	Jun-25	Jul-25	Aug-25	Sep-25	Oct-25	Nov-25	Dec-25	Jan-26	Feb-26	Mar-26
Antigua - Road Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project	Works prior to construction (e.g. TA, Procurement)																							Construction underway		Defects liability period		32																																					
Barbuda - Energy Resilience Project	Works prior to construction (e.g. TA, Procurement)												Construction underway				Defects liability period				17																																												
Belize - Coastal Highway Upgrading Project	Works prior to construction (e.g. TA, Procurement)												Construction underway				Defects liability period				-2																																												
Belize - Philip S.W. Goldson Highway Upgrading Project	Works prior to construction (e.g. TA, Procurement)												Construction underway				Defects liability period				7																																												
Dominica - Loubiere to Grand Bay Road and Bridge Rehabilitation Project	Works prior to construction (e.g. TA, Procurement)																							Construction underway		Defects liability period		26																																					
Dominica - Water Supply and Wastewater Infrastructure Project	Works prior to construction (e.g. TA, Procurement)												Construction underway				Defects liability period				26																																												
Grenada - Water Supply Expansion and Sewerage Improvement Project	Works prior to construction (e.g. TA, Procurement)												Construction underway				Defects liability period				26																																												
Guyana - Linden to Mabura Hill Road Upgrade Project	Works prior to construction (e.g. TA, Procurement)												Construction underway				Defects liability period				13																																												
Jamaica - Essex Valley Agricultural Development Project	Works prior to construction (e.g. TA, Procurement)												Construction underway				Defects liability period				16																																												
Jamaica - Southern Plains Agricultural Development Project	Works prior to construction (e.g. TA, Procurement)												Construction underway				Defects liability period				13																																												
Montserrat - Port Development Project	Works prior to construction (e.g. TA, Procurement)												Construction underway				Defects liability period				20																																												
St Lucia - Millennium Highway and West Coast Road	Works prior to construction (e.g. TA, Procurement)												Construction underway				Defects liability period				16																																												
St Vincent and Grenadines - Kingstown Port Modernisation Project	Works prior to construction (e.g. TA, Procurement)												Construction underway				Defects liability period				5																																												
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Finding 3. The document review and KIIs illustrate that Infrastructure investments have shown some degree of success in building government capacity to approach infrastructure development in a more holistic way and link it to resilience building. However, the extent of a step change in Caribbean MDAs capacities to be resilient institutions in themselves and deliver resilient services has not yet been established [see EQ3 on sustainability for further detail]. FCDO programming has contributed to positive if perhaps modest changes.

- There is evidence that UKCIF participating MDAs are more aware and to some extent now better able to address GESI and climate / environment. This is in part measured as programmes are not completed or there has only been a short time since the programme ended thus making definitive assessments premature.
- There is evidence that the introduction of more rigorous ESIA protocols including the development of a gender and social development action plan for the road project in Guyana is now under implementation.
 - The government is training people from indigenous communities in micro business management. They are currently working in two villages along the route of the new road (that is being financed by FCDO) and will be working in a third. Once the road is completed the Ministry of Amerindian affairs and the Ministry of Social Security will continue working with the communities since this is their primary responsibility. Further involvement will include increasing access to government services, training on management of small business, and work on reducing gender-based violence (GBV). Topics covered in the training include and emphasis on how to manage funds. Also, funds will be made available for people to apply for to start a business. The second phase of training will include a gender focus and gender resilience plan since GBV is a concern. The current phase trains everyone, but the next phase will have a gender focus. This phase will also support development and execution of Village development plans with an emphasis on improving water supplies for domestic use. Further involvement will include increasing access to government services and training in how to manage funds. Funds will be made available for people from local communities to apply to start businesses.
 - Capacity development activities will be expanded to include the Ministries of Amerindian Affairs and Social Services and other MDAs in the next phases of road construction and after the road is completed. The current phase trains everyone, but the second phase will have a gender focus and gender resilience plan since GBV is a concern in some indigenous communities. The next phase will support development and execution of village development plans with an emphasis on improving water supplies for domestic use.
 - On the environmental side the Guyana Forestry Commission has developed strong capacity to manage forest resources drawing on long engagement with donor partners including as the UK, Norway and the EU.
 - Evidence gathered from interaction with the Planning Institute of Jamaica supported the position of better project execution in terms of GESI and climate / environment risk screening and mitigation measures.
 - In terms of reforms and management of improvements related to asset operations and maintenance, positive changes were noted in the road sector. In particular, considerable attention was focused in introducing new regulations and enforcement regimes governing axel loads and vehicle operation practices – this are critical to efficient life-cycle asset management and resilience.

Finding 4. The document review and KIIs illustrate that, as with infrastructure above, portfolio programmes on economic development, fiscal reform and workforce resilience display mixed results in terms of capacity building. Whilst there is some evidence pointing to the effectiveness of institutional strengthening in macro-economic performance, public finance reforms and private sector development, this is less clear in the case of building workforce resilience. Here, for example, there is mixed evidence on the level of awareness raising amongst government and employers on the importance of skilled labour to sustain long-term economic prosperity.

- CEDP (A rating in the 2023 AR) is considered to be effectively contributing to economic and fiscal resilience through progressing reforms and systems that promote macro-economic stability, enhance public finances and support private sector led inclusive growth.
 - Through its support to COMPETE Caribbean, CEDP has worked to enhance the regulatory environment supporting private sector competitiveness. For instance, evidence illustrates it supported government regulatory reforms (including the development of sustainable financing plans as well as the technical training of personnel) in 7 institutions overlooking private sector competitiveness. Reported results illustrate that support materialised in the creation of 2,700 additional jobs and direct assistance to about 1,500 Caribbean firms in the improvement of business practices or workplace organisation.
 - Evidence gathered from the document review and confirmed through the majority of KIIs illustrates that CARTAC has a strong effect in assisting countries on core economic management. Illustrative findings show that TA provided by CARTAC allowed:
 - 23 member countries to align and comply with the System of National Accounts (SNA) 2008 following international best practice standards.
 - 17 countries to measure on-time filing compliance for large taxpayers. The impact was particularly visible in Guyana, where CARTAC assisted the Guyana Revenue Authority (GRA) to establish a large Taxpayer Division. By doing so, the use of targeted audits in Guyana led to an increase of tax assessment by USD 210M (representing 4% of annual GDP) in the period 2017-2020. An increase of VAT and Corporate Income Tax declarations by close to 90% were also noted.
- The SKYE (A rating in the PCR) programme displays mitigated results. While the programme displays tangible quantitative results in workforce resilience among the youth and includes a relevant social equity dimension (training over 5,000 graduates across four countries), the programme presents contrasting results in raising awareness among government and employers on the importance of skilled labour to sustain long-term economic prosperity.

Finding 5. As demonstrated in the document review and confirmed through the majority of KIIs, portfolio programmes in the climate and disaster management space have shown a strong degree of effectiveness in strengthening of recovery and resilience-building systems and responses. This includes mechanisms to better plan for disasters and mainstream gender-sensitive and inclusion approaches to recovery. These interventions have also helped to strengthen the integration of emergency responses, reconstruction activities and long-term resilience-building initiatives. While attention has focused on ODA eligible countries, results have been visible in non-ODA countries as well.

- The R&R Programme (A+ rating in the PCR) is seen as having been highly successful in strengthening pre and post disaster management through improving financial planning on disaster preparedness and GESI. The R&R programme is recognised for its holistic approach which includes developing synergies with PFM initiatives, for example, and the extent of its geographic reach:
 - Under the programme component delivered by CARTAC, considerable changes to public financial management systems were introduced. This included establishing policy tools to assess climate and disaster resilience, (such as Climate Public Investment Management Assessments – PIMA, and the Financial Analysis and Risk Assessment model), as well as formulating Disaster Preparedness Plans for Tax and Custom authorities. Crucially, the project targeted TA in 6 countries but managed to deliver assistance in 20 countries.
 - Working with CDEMA, the programme initially intended to improve systems for disaster preparedness, response and recovery in 7 countries; the use of regional delivery mechanisms allowed to go beyond the initial geographic scope and achieve disaster preparedness system improvement in 15 countries.

- The CREAD experience in Dominica (both programmes were given an A rating in PCRs) could be presented as a best practice case study when it comes to the institutionalisation of DRM practices, awareness raising for resilience action at the national and local level, as well as the set-up of needed mechanisms to enable a successful transition from recovery to long-term resilience building. As pointed out by a KI *“In Dominica, they realised that the task of reconstructing the country was so big that they needed to create something new. It had to be a statutory organisation to be taken out of the structure of government”*.
 - Following the devastation caused by hurricane Erika in 2015 and hurricane Maria in 2017, the UK is perceived to have intervened effectively to support Dominica in establishing the needed institutional arrangements to undertake the level of rehabilitation that the country needed. As an interviewee mentioned, *“CREAD would not have been possible without the support of FCDO and Canada.”*
 - Document review evidence points to British support being effective in materialising the political vision of making Dominica the first climate-resilient country in the world through 3 levels of intervention – technical, financial and administrative – that allowed CREAD to come to light:
 - Technical support was effective to:
 - (1) Support the reform of the legislative and institutional framework to give rise to CREAD and the National Development Resilience Strategy through the Climate Resilience Act.
 - (2) Develop the Dominica Climate Resilience and Recovery Plan (DCRRP) as the overarching document to guide climate resilient recovery and development; in this process, FCDO assistance was notably welcomed in the definition of “pillars of resilience” supported by 6 result areas and 20 targets.
 - (3) Articulate how national and community level resilience efforts should work as part of a common continuum and particularly involved vulnerable groups such as the youth and the *Kalinago*. Efforts at the community level were particularly recognised to

have raised awareness regarding resilience and strengthened the level of preparation to face disasters.

- Administrative support was effectively perceived in supporting CREAD's organisational structure (presence of a Supervisory Committee gathering donors involved supported by a Policy Board) and in providing guidance regarding the accountability, monitoring and reporting mechanisms (CREAD Audit Report, Annual Statement of Progress and Participatory Principles Assessment) put in place to track CREAD's performance.
 - Financial support was effective to cover CREAD staff salaries for a limited period – thereby supporting day-to-day operations.
- The process that CREAD triggered in Dominica is seen to have enabled a cultural shift when it comes to thinking about resilience in the island. As a KI reported *“A key achievement is that the island is more aware of resilience and there are visible signs of that. We take resilience more seriously now and the island is sensitised.”* Further, the processes kicked-off by CREAD is seen as integrating the necessary elements to enable a continuum between recovery and long-term resilience building. As summarised by a KI:
- “What CREAD did is what needs to be replicated. CREAD demonstrated all the ingredients you need for resilience building:*
- (1) *High level commitment*
 - (2) *Mainstreaming resilience in all sectors*
 - (3) *Having a clear plan and targets*
 - (4) *An accountability framework to enable government progress as CREAD was set-up through a performance based agreement”*
- The humanitarian assistance programmes have been effective in responding to disasters in the region and committed to building local humanitarian response systems; this, however, can be challenging if accountability and evidence systems are weak and when they are highly dependable on the proactive leadership of countries' authorities:
- For example, as part of the emergency relief effort in Dominica after storm Erika, national agencies such as the water authority played a proactive role in re-establishing water services and FCDO reporting documents advised caution in attributing the achievement of programme outputs to UK support alone.
 - The Emergency Cash and Voucher Support in response to the volcano in SVG and earthquake in Haiti was also effective with cash distributions being one of the first administered by WFP as part of the earthquake response. The timely response was facilitated by the choice of the implementing partner WFP who can be nimble and have a strong footprint in the region.

Finding 6. The evidenced integrated by the document review and confirmed by the majority of KIs illustrate that FCDO has successfully developed partnerships with regional organisations in the Caribbean (CDB, CARTAC, IDB, PAHO, CDEMA) as an effective means of extending the reach of its portfolio across multiple country contexts. This has enabled FCDO to operate in a diverse and complex region by leveraging specific partners' strengths (technical, geographic) and networks, whilst capitalising on existing bi-lateral partnerships where relevant (i.e. Jamaica).

FCDO has leveraged on the political acceptability of Caribbean regional organisations to deliver programming, although this has not occurred without challenges.

- CDB is perceived as a trusted regional player integrating all members of CARICOM, i.e. it is a Caribbean organisation to the service of Caribbean countries.
 - CDB is regionally recognised for its technical capacity and the support it provides to Caribbean SIDS in capacity building.
 - The choice of not continuing a close arrangement with CDB in the way it materialised through UKCIF may be perceived as a political choice.
 - CDB allowed FCDO to have effective geographic coverage to deliver support to targeted countries.
 - However, the pace of implementation through CDB has not always gone as planned.
- Where relevant, FCDO has strategically leveraged the capacity of specific CARICOM agencies, such as CDEMA, to strengthen systems for disaster recovery.
 - As part of the R&R programme, FCDO engaged with CDEMA to operationalise a regional mechanism for a CARICOM Regional Recovery Support Facility (CRRF) with the intention to build a base for efficient and effective deployment of surge recovery support.
 - CDEMA served as support to document the CREAD experience and identify lessons learned in the continuum between recovery and long-term resilience building that that could be applicable to other Caribbean SIDS.
- **FCDO has used regional partners effectively to deliver targeted support to ODA-eligible countries, as well as influencing non-ODA countries.**
 - Funded through CEDP, COMPETE Caribbean provides support to 13 countries in the region, including non-ODA countries.
 - The CARTAC component under the R&R programme originally targeted support to 6 ODA-eligible countries but managed to deliver assistance in 20 countries, which included non-ODA countries.
- **FCDO has also channelled support to national Ministries Departments and Agencies (MDAs) as relevant and appropriate. This has frequently occurred in coordination with other donors or development partners.**
 - As part of the Citizen Security and Justice Programme 3, FCDO worked with Global Affairs Canada and the IDB to strengthen the Jamaica Ministry of National Security (MNS). FCDO provided funding to IDB who subsequently used Government of Jamaica systems.
 - As part of the Caribbean Anti-Corruption Programme (CACP). FCDO working with the Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA), the Financial Investigations Division (FID) and the Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) to strengthen capacity in law enforcement and asset recovery with the aim of breaking links between grand corruption and organised crime in Jamaica.
- **The portfolio has worked well with relevant partners to meet needs arising from specific events. This has been particularly the case for emergency relief efforts.**
 - E.g. working with WFP in Caribbean Humanitarian Assistance programme.
 - E.g. joint efforts with PAHO and the Dominica Red Cross as part of the Emergency assistance to support relief efforts in Dominica as the result of the impact of Tropical Storm Erika programme.

Finding 7. Interaction with KIIs illustrates that, in the infrastructure space, there remains a lot to do in getting more private finance and private infrastructure investors engaged.

- On balance, although the overall portfolio is not centred on private sector engagement and participation, the portfolio programmes that are geared towards strengthening macro-economic stability (notably CEDP) have included a dimension of support to private sector development.
 - The IDB COMPETE Caribbean, which provided specific assistance to the private sector as one of the CEDP components, successfully delivered against its output milestones, strengthening 7 institutions that support private sector competitiveness.
 - Despite the perceived achievement brought about by COMPETE Caribbean in terms of private sector competitiveness, there is a feeling that the programme could go further in raising the visibility of the UK among private firms. When prompted on the impact of the programme in the Belize context, a KI reported that *“It is not entirely clear what (COMPETE Caribbean) is funding. It is funding SMEs but it is hard to find the contributions it is making. For example, supported SMEs didn’t know that the UK was involved – they thought it was Canadian money. We have to do more on the visibility front”*.

- The geothermal project in Dominica has also progressed on an innovative PPP arrangement to develop the energy potential.

- In some cases, it has been reported that UKCIF procurement and contract management requirements have helped to raise standards of private contractors engaged in various aspects of project implementation with a particular focus on the quality of construction as well as materials and safeguards. However, much more needs to be done on this front and could be a focus of future programming.

- The SMART Hospitals experience, on the other hand, provides a positive illustration when it comes to engaging with the private sector as part of infrastructure upgrading. The project embedded an innovative use of PPPs to facilitate the integration of enhanced construction practices. As a KI pointed out *“SMART Hospitals made very good use of PPPs: PPS are one of the key components of the project. A lot of effort was spent on shifting development among private sector contractors so they internalise new construction standards. PPP efforts focused on capacity building.”*

5.3.3 EQ 3: Impact and Sustainability: What is the evidence illustrating that FCDO programming has built resilience in a sustained and integrated manner? How can FCDO best continue to provide relevant support as Caribbean SIDS progress into graduating from ODA-eligibility?

Overall assessment

There is a long way to go to move the Caribbean region on to a secure and sustainable resilience pathway. External support will be needed at scale over the foreseeable period. Programming should embed a consideration of available channels to provide continuous support as Caribbean countries prepare to graduate from ODA support.

First, CDT programmes have generally contributed to strengthened resilience in all the countries within which they were operating. Programme size was not a determinant of sustainability as targeted small programmes performed well whereas larger programmes have taken much longer to mature.

Second, the sustainability of the reforms, institutional strengthening and infrastructure services support are not fully established in most programme areas. Underlying capacities of the participating country MDAs is important as these set the context and “frontier” of what is possible in terms of the scale of lasting change. Smaller states face much greater HR constraints than larger states, but most participating MDAs are well short of needed capacity to achieve broad based resilience in their domains, and at national level.

Third, in the case of the UKCIF and EE/RE, the projects are not yet completed and thus sustainability of optimal asset performance has not yet been tested.

Fourth, in the case of CREAD in Dominica, there is evidence that reforms and innovations have transitioned to GoD and are part of routine business processes (for example the Major Project Office within the Ministry of Finance). In the case of the Jamaica (e.g. Serious Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Programme), reforms have set the basis for lasting and effective institutional changes that improved law enforcement accountability (e.g. INDECOM, as well as better policing methods and practices).

Avenues for improvement

- First, there is a need to go to scale and accelerate investment in critical economic and social infrastructure that can enable resilient growth – the current programme TOC and mechanism need to be adapted based on experience to date.
- Second, sustaining change will require greater attention on institutional development and capacity building of critical regional organisations and national level MDAs.
- Third, a new financing model is needed. This model should capitalise on the strengths of the current system, complement this with new mechanisms for blended climate financing and leverage green financing regionally and globally .

Emerging results are modest

CDT programming has contributed positively to the resilience of all the participating countries/MDAs and communities.

Outcomes and impacts are yet to be fully realised and highly uneven given the variable country contexts.

Finding 1. Evidence gathered in the document review and confirmed through the majority of KIIs shows that FCDO has judiciously combined technical assistance (TA) and financial assistance (FA) in several programme areas. In the case of UKCIF this was instrumental in unlocking additional finance to increase the scale of investment and potential transformational impacts of these programmes (e.g. Guyana, Jamaica). The sustainability of this model, high levels of earmarked FA for grant funding for infrastructure related investment, is not yet substantiated. Furthermore, the sustainability of the projects themselves is not yet proven since it is mostly too early to tell.

- **The UKCIF model combining TA support with grant and loan financing for capital works has increased the value and scale of critical investments and potential outcomes and impacts.**
 - UKCIF was initially designed as TA and grant financing through the CDB for infrastructure project preparation and delivery. This has subsequently evolved into a model which leveraged additional loan funding to accommodate sharp cost escalations following the pandemic as well as extending the scope and coverage of projects and their transformative potential.
 - Stakeholders within CDB and in country MDAs, including Ministries of Finance, have strongly endorsed this model and value its contribution as a mechanism to access concessional funding of a larger investment package combining loan financing and government grants to increase the transformative potential of projects (i.e. the Linden to Mabura Hills road in Guyana and Jamaican Irrigation projects). In Guyana the Ministry of Finance reported that it was highly appreciative of FCDO’s grant support as a critical element of the broader financing package for this strategic corridor.
 - CDT and government stakeholders involved in UKCIF projects are highly supportive of the UKCIF model combining TA and FA as it enabled to move from project preparation and design onto implementation. As a KI indicated *“with UKCIF we had grant funding for project preparation and design and also FA funding for implementation providing a unique opportunity to design and deliver more robust and resilient infrastructure”*.
 - **Similarly to UKCIF, FCDO has mobilised TA and FA to de-risk investments in the Eastern Caribbean. This has been especially relevant in encouraging Eastern Caribbean governments to adopt low carbon energy systems in the absence of adequate finance, capacity and market opportunity. FCDO grant funding played a critical role in overcoming these constraints.**
 - Investment in renewable energy transition, particularly geothermal energy, carries significant risks for Caribbean SIDS. This is due to the high cost of mobilising drilling rigs and the uncertainty of not knowing if the resource will be viable. Caribbean governments are frequently unable to absorb the risk themselves given their strong debt levels and limited access to finance: high debt burdens hinder SIDS ability to borrow at affordable rates and / or to extend an incentive to potential funders in projects supporting the development of geothermal energy, which are capital intensive and high risk.
 - In this context, FCDO grant funding can play a catalytic role: as FCDO is able to provide grant aid (and most other donors can only offer access to concessional lending), this enables governments and the private sector to access better loan terms and other forms of assistance – thereby reducing investment risk. Providing grant funding was particularly important to meet the output of providing support for geothermal development in the Eastern Caribbean: specifically, it allowed Dominica to complete two wells thereby removing the upstream geothermal resource risks for the domestic geothermal power plant (DGPP) and increased the bankability of its development.
- ➔ **What is the emerging consideration for sustainability?** While the model articulating TA and grant funding to enable a transition to capital works is proving impactful for infrastructure

development in Caribbean SIDS, questions can arise regarding its replication and scalability, i.e. will the UK be able to mobilise a large enough envelope that does not only include TA.

As a KI summarised to highlight the importance of not only focusing on TA *“TA grant funding is always welcome. TA allows to do the preparatory phase to move to the capital fund phase. Sometimes countries don’t even have the necessary funds to get started (...). But conversely, we have to realise than a TA can sit there for quite a long period before even the project gets to the capital works phase. It was a fantastic thing that UKCIF did to allow to move from TA to the capital funds phase”*.

Finding 2. Evidence gathered through document review and confirmed by the majority of KILs illustrates that operation and maintenance (O&M) is mission critical to resilience and sustainability but is often not planned for or not adequately funded. Assets thus perform below design functionality and deteriorate faster than design and economic life. Consequently, total lifecycle costs of assets are increased, and user benefits reduced, with other negatives such as reduced safety in the case of roads. These problems plague the Caribbean region and the CDT programmes relevant to O&M, with UKCIF particularly important, have at least made a concerted effort to elevate O&M requirements into project design. The extent to which O&M plans are fully implemented and sustained is yet to be determined.

- UKCIF grant funding was contingent on O&M plans for the newly created asset being put in place upfront and agreed. This is a positive step and creates the right incentives to elevate O&M.
- Interviews indicated that preparing O&M plans were viewed as a valued benefit though there remains concerns on how well they will be implemented in practice. Political priorities and competing budget pressures can undermine support for O&M. Budget rules, such as annual cycles and allocations, work against more efficient O&M contracting solutions such as performance-based contracting (PBC) which require multi-year funding commitment to maximise effectiveness. The Ministry of Public Works in Guyana reported the adoption of stronger O&M procedures and practices in compliance with CDB requirements for more effective O&M functions and finances.
- The evidence to date is limited on actual implementation of agreed O&M plans as most projects have not yet been completed. In general, there is a need to step up the emphasis on lifecycle cost considerations in the overall design process and within this make a change to ensure O&M plans are not only created but fully funded and implemented. As highlighted by a KIL in the Belize case *“ We did develop a Draft Operations and Maintenance Plan (as part of UKCIF). This is meant to be used across all highways, not only UKCIF-funded ones. But maintenance may have to be subcontracted out – we have a few months to finalise the (financial) arrangements”*.
- Retrofitting of health facilities under SMART is designed to improve O&M, reduce lifecycle costs and reduce everyday running costs. In some cases this objective has been achieved but the evidence from KIL indicates that O&M breakdowns, mechanical outages and electrical outages remain a problem. In Guyana, UN agencies reported power numerous power outages whilst on inspection visits to newly developed SMART facilities.
- Highly targeted capacity building support is needed to develop O&M capacities – this needs to embrace Ministry of Finance, Ministries of Public Works, and other national MDAs with mandates for O&M, as well as at local levels. Training and capacity building on understanding asset lifecycles, funding and management of O&M relevant to the asset class, user needs and charges, and the technical and HR requirements to ensure optimal operations, availability and resilience.

Finding 3. Evidence gathered through document review and confirmed by the majority of KIIs highlights that FCDO’s portfolio has helped to establish new systems and processes in MDAs for identifying, screening, designing, planning, financing and managing resilience in the targeted countries and across the thematic intervention areas. However, the degree of sustainability remains unclear as many systems are yet to be fully embedded and institutionalised in government.

- **FCDO interventions in infrastructure development have led to multiple improvements in project development systems and processes such as improved project screening and selection, more detailed and comprehensive feasibility assessments, ESIA, enhanced design standards and procurement processes with a stronger focus on resilience at each stage. However, the evidence to demonstrate how governments are *actually* adopting a new way of doing things remains limited.**
 - UKCIF is recognised because of the change it is fostering when it comes to conceptualising infrastructure projects. As part of project design, UKCIF incorporates robust infrastructure identification and screening processes as well as feasibility studies, ESIA and climate risk assessments.
 - This approach is more comprehensive and integrated than that routinely followed by MDAs in the Caribbean SIDS. As one key informant explained *“UKCIF has strengthened the way the project is conceived. A lot of governments would not undertake such detailed feasibility studies, ESIA, climate assessments. Governments would just get quotes from different contractors and get on with it”*. Another informant indicated that *“infrastructure investments promoted by the UK have enabled a shift towards a more holistic approach”*. While such statements point to positive change, evidence to highlight how a more resilient approach to infrastructure development has *actually* been embedded within government systems is more limited.
 - Regarding the SMART Hospitals initiative, evidence illustrates that the relevance of the “smart” + “green” paradigm is welcomed by recipient countries and MDAs, although these have not yet been properly institutionalised and replicated in government. As a KI reported *“Governments have adopted or are adopting the standards promoted by SMART Hospitals. For example, the Ministry of Health in Jamaica has incorporated SMART Hospital guidelines. But it is the only country that can provide evidence on this level of integration”*.
 - Jamaica is perhaps the country where strongest sustainability effects can be demonstrated as it has committed to embedding the SMART principle by establishing the policy goal of development health facilities that are climate and disaster resilient; it has also incorporated the SMART toolkit in health standard guidelines. Some countries in the Eastern Caribbean, are looking at including SMART targets as part of their health national adaptation plans, currently under preparation.
 - In addition, evidence gathered through KIIs highlights that in some countries SMART standards have been incorporated into MDB or donor partner investment projects. As a KI promoted *“The EU and IDB in Belize are also using the standards in the design of new health facilities. 4 OECS countries have loans from the World Bank that integrate the standards as well. But the integration of the standards should go well beyond health (i.e. amending construction codes).”*
 - While Caribbean countries are still to enshrine the SMART paradigm in policy, there are indications that the model is catching the attention of countries beyond the region and reaching Latin America. For instance, there was mention of the interest displayed by Mexican Government on the SMART Hospitals Toolkit and how it was working to contextualise it for Mexico.

- **As demonstrated in the document review and confirmed through the majority of KIs, portfolio interventions on climate and disaster management and recovery have generated mixed results in terms of sustaining new systems to enable countries to adopt more robust approaches to long-term resilience building leaving no one behind.**
 - The CREAD experience in Dominica displayed mixed results regarding sustainability. While CREAD was designed as a temporary body and an exit plan which involved transferring back resilience building responsibilities assumed by CREAD to line ministries was put in place when the programme was designed, consulted stakeholders displayed a strong degree of scepticism regarding the effectiveness of the arrangement. A KI highlighted that the resilience mandate CREAD embodied has dissipated now that the institution is no longer *“CREAD also outside the line ministries, which meant it could talk to all of them more directly. CREAD allowed to promote a unified resilience approach through government, not a ministerial approach. There is a feel that at the national level, the big picture (on resilience) is lost now that CREAD is no more”*.
 - Concerns were raised by KIs regarding the capacity of line ministries and agencies to effectively assume the resilience responsibilities that CREAD used to hold. The intention in the exit plan was for each line ministry to designate a resilience focal point but in practice this has been hard to materialise; resilience building is integrated as part of the (many other) day-to-day responsibilities of a designated government official, with the feel that the relevance of resilience is lost with this set-up. As a consulted KI mentioned, *“With CREAD, we could have started a great story but we may not be able to sustain it. With the hand over to CREAD activities to line ministries, there is a risk that resilience work may get diluted. Line ministries are not dedicated to resilience-building – they have competing priorities and may not be equipped to cope with resilience activities. It is difficult to have resilience officers in every line ministry”*.
 - The document review and interaction with KIs illustrates that the R & R project, on the other hand, resulted in more sustainable systems improvements in areas such as PFM to support climate resilience and mainstreaming gender considerations into climate resilience interventions. The programme increased the degree of impact by building on lessons from CREAD, for example, with respect to resilience planning, community resilience and recovery governance:
 - Although the R&R CARTAC component was initially structured around a pilot to illustrate how disasters affect PFM systems, the effectiveness of the initiative led CARTAC to expand its climate resilience programme to embed climate work across its work programme. This illustrates an impactful result for sustainability, as partially informed by the experience of the R&R programme, CARTAC (and the IMF by extension) have embedded a climate resilience dimension in most of their workstreams.
 - To assess the progress of any projects including a climate component, the IMF results framework now incorporates specific objectives and outcomes in the climate sphere. Sustainability is enhanced as, within CARTAC, there is now an explicit strategy to more strongly underpin how efforts to strengthen PFM can also impact on climate resilience.
 - The R&R programmes build a case for impact and sustainability as there is evidence to illustrate how governments are now more sensitised to the importance of incorporating a gender lens in climate resilience as a result of activities under the EnGenDER component.

considerable progress in its audit capacity. This has materialised in an additional USD 210M on tax collection (accounting for 4% of GDP). The remaining challenge is to establish a system to track if the additional tax is being used in a way that strengthens resilience building – thereby supporting a case for sustainability.

- While CEDP incorporated efforts on gender and inclusion and the development of blue economies, lessons learned in these spheres have not been sufficiently documented. As such, there may not be evidence to illustrate how interventions in gender and inclusion and progressing with the blue economies allows to build a sustainability case.
- SKyE also presents a mixed picture when it comes to achieving sustainable long-term impacts in skills training. As a KI reported *“I got a sense that we moved along the national training agencies. We embedded quality and coordination officers and put a rigor to the training protocols”*. Despite this perceived progress, the SKyE experience identified several points to strengthen impact and sustainability when it comes to training and skills programming:
 - Enhancing channels to disseminate evidence and insights were employed to link advocacy in the TVET sector and policy development.
 - More strongly linking TVET programming to highly regarded international qualifications for teachers and TVET graduates.
 - Engaging the private sector in discussions for inclusive TVET funding.
 - Brokering early discussions with the OECS regarding how it would contribute to programme development and implementation.
 - Ensuring longer term political buy-in and funding support to national TVET initiatives.
- **When it comes to programming in the governance sphere in Jamaica, evidence gathered from the document review and confirmed through KIIs illustrates that sustainability questions arise regarding the replicability and enshrinement of approaches placing at-risk individuals at the core of programming, institutional frameworks allowing inter-ministry collaboration, as well as cooperation with the private sector.**
 - The Citizen Security and Justice Programme 3 (CSJP3) demonstrated tangible results in crime prevention and supporting young people at risk. However, questions arise when it comes to lessons regarding its approach focusing on at risk individuals, inter-ministry cooperation and financing, as well as long-term public / private sector partnership building. The emerging questioning is if changes can be sustainably incorporated by government in future programming:
 - While the programme was positively seen to support young people in getting and maintaining jobs and a considerable effect on crime prevention at the community level was observed, establishing a causality link between programme efforts and observed results making the case for sustainable change is hard to establish.
 - Despite the demonstrable metrics of success, there are emerging points for sustainability that could challenge how programme lessons are taken on by Government:

- Although the expectation is that the focused approach mobilised by the programme (i.e. framing efforts through a comprehensive risk assessment and case management approach to emphasise funding for the most at risk individuals) will influence Government of Jamaica policy decisions and programmes, the evidence to demonstrate how this has actually been the case is limited.
 - If CSJP3 tested a multi-agency implementation model, efforts are needed at the highest level to demonstrate how this model could be replicated and taken forwards, which includes assessing the financial options to operationalise the model. Without this effort, a sustainable transition with key ministries may be jeopardised.
 - To be truly sustainable, future programming should include the root causes of crime and violence. This should be framed as a long-term effort and embed efforts to build public / private partnerships to support success.
- Similarly, to CSJP3, the CACP experience demonstrated that programme sustainability was built through network and partnership building at the organisational and individual level. However, programme documentation recommends that for sustainability, roles and responsibilities among various organisations should be formalised and options of funding to support inter-ministry and agency cooperation (i.e. limiting reliance on external support) are to be explored more strongly. To further advance sustainability and replicability, it is suggested that Jamaica could be treated as a regional centre of excellence in combatting organised crime and corruption, and lessons transferred to the regional context.

Finding 4. The Caribbean region is highly exposed to climate risks and other shocks. The vulnerability to these and the ability to respond and recover is not necessarily correlated with GDP. As demonstrated by the document review, and confirmed by the majority of KIs, working through regional bodies that work with both ODA and non-ODA jurisdictions can provide wider access to resilience building initiatives and resources.

“It can be problematic to deliver to non-ODA countries when we try to channel support through CARICOM agencies. Countries that are not ODA eligible are re-considering graduation in order to obtain funding”.

- One issue that emerged continuously was the need to capture exposure to risk, vulnerability to risk and the capacity to manage risk better; from reducing exposure through to better preparedness, recovery and rehabilitation. The ODA / non-ODA differentiation for purposes of accessing concessionary financing is viewed as sub-optimal. As a KI clearly pointed out *“We have not noticed capacity difference between ODA / non-ODA countries.”* In a similar light, when prompted on the changes observed when working with ODA and non-ODA countries, a different KI pointed out that *“Responsiveness in non-ODA countries is not always there. Non-ODA countries can be harder to work with”.*
- Discussions around using the MVI as an additional metric to establish eligibility to access concessional finance have proven to be difficult in terms of finding common ground.
- There is merit in considering less data dependent tools to assess vulnerability and these approaches could be explored further and used to better target support across the region and reach all Caribbean jurisdictions.
- Economies of scale strongly suggest using regional approaches to support resilience building initiatives wherever possible.

- Where regional approaches call for mobilising regional institutions, for example for political buy-in, then this requires ensuring a good fit between the regional institution(s)¹³ selected and the objectives, programme design parameters and instruments, capacity requirements and risk tolerances.
- The UKCIF programme implementation experience suggests a few important considerations in selecting a regional implementing partner:
 - There is a need for a thorough due diligence and organisation readiness assessment to fully appreciate delivery capacity. Delivery risks need to be carefully calibrated and assessed.
 - Based on the above, if the preferred (or chosen) partner needs support and capacity building these need to be put in place and funded up front with incentives to make the necessary enhancements in a timely manner.
 - There is a need to strengthen oversight and allow for performance improvement support where there are significant shortfalls in delivery performance.
- Going to scale is likely to require a mix of partners bringing different value propositions to the table. UKCIF also brings into sharp relief the risks associated with a single delivery pathway in attempting to make transformational interventions. Due consideration should be made around bring multiple partners together and finding scalable pathways – this is perhaps especially relevant to major infrastructure investment and accessing wider pools of concessional finance.
- **Interaction with KIs illustrates that FCDO has built positive working relationships with bodies working at the regional scale (e.g. CARTAC, CDEMA, 5C) who do not use the ODA / non-ODA distinction to provide support to countries when addressing common resilience building challenges across the Caribbean. Working with such partners has allowed the UK to expand its influence to include non-ODA countries. FCDO should build on this experience to provide continuous support to organisations working at the regional level irrespective of country ODA eligibility as this is an effective vehicle to assist Caribbean countries that graduate from ODA eligibility.**
 - Through CEDP, CARTAC supported 17 countries (including non-ODA countries) to strengthen systems and processes for the on-time filing of tax compliance for large taxpayers.
 - In a similar light, through the R&R programme, CARTAC delivered assistance to 20 countries in introducing policy tools to assess links between climate and disaster resilience and PFM as well as developing Disaster Preparedness Plans for Tax and Custom authorities. In addition, in conjunction with CDEMA, the strengthened disaster preparedness systems in 15 countries.
 - The ability of organisations such as CARTAC and CDEMA to work across both ODA and non-ODA countries is proven. FCDO should capitalise on this ability to provide continuous support in a regional context paced by countries preparing to graduate from ODA eligibility.

Finding 5. Reducing vulnerability of marginalised groups (e.g. women, girls, youth, indigenous communities & people with disabilities) is critical to overall resilience in the Caribbean given unequal

¹³ Regional institutions may include Caricom and OECS type of organisations, IFIs, as well as specialised delivery vehicles (e.g. GCF, GEF, etc).

income distributions and numbers of people excluded. Pro-poor and inclusion objectives, mechanisms and support interventions need to be further mainstreamed.

Evidence gathered through the document review points that, even while programmes have largely been effective in supporting marginalised groups such as women, youth, indigenous communities and people with disabilities, more work is needed to ensure gains are sustained by providing technical assistance to governments in integrating equity considerations in their national plans and using checklists to oversee project progress regarding social and gender aspects in particular.

- The Project Completion Review (PCR) of Strengthening Disaster and Recovery and Resilience in the Caribbean states vulnerable communities including persons with disabilities and indigenous communities have benefited from the support and improved their resilience to shocks. It also makes an explicit reference to gender equity considerations, previously identified as a key weakness in annual reviews, which are now included in national adaptation and sector plans because of the support provided to national climate change coordination bodies.
- The Caribbean Humanitarian Assistance - Emergency Cash and Voucher Support in Response to the Volcano Eruption in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Earthquake in Haiti experience indicates that the nimble nature of WFP allowed FCDO-funded cash distributions to be one of the first administered as part of the earthquake response. Further, within 6 months of the disaster events in SVG and Haiti, emergency cash support was provided to vulnerable households.
- The PCR of SkYE reports significant contributions in providing training and support to disadvantaged youth with the programme exceeding targets for the number of certified trainees from disadvantaged backgrounds, including those with disabilities.
- Finally, the mid-term review (2021) of UKCIF finds that while there are projects that show promising efforts in community engagement, increased attention to safeguards, and greater emphasis on road safety, there still is a need for systematic efforts to ensure that social and gender dimensions are addressed throughout the project cycle:
 - The mid-term review finds that disability inclusion, which is still a relatively new area for FCDO, CDB and beneficiary countries is not well integrated across the UKCIF portfolio.
 - There has been progress in this area with the latest Annual Review (2024) stating that the programme has successfully integrated social, gender and environmental elements in its investments. It goes on to recommend a few actions to sustain these gains such as expanding the Disability Inclusion integration awareness initiative launched in 2023 (which could be a model for engagement of development partners more generally in the Caribbean) and for CDB to increase its support to Project Steering Committees in conducting strategic reviews as they play a vital role in overseeing project progress, especially regarding social and gender aspects.
 - Finally, the AR recommends that the CDB foster greater use of the Social and Gender integration checklist and templates by project teams to improve the integration of social and gender considerations in the design and implementation of projects.

6 Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations

EQ1: Relevance & Coherence. To what extent is FCDO's programming in the Caribbean both relevant and coherent in terms of building resilience?

The “resilience approach” and themes informing CDT programming are *relevant to the UK objective of strengthening resilience in the Caribbean and aligned well with regional and national priorities across the portfolio*. CDT programming in the period 2015-23 addressed many core challenges that the region faces in resilience building through a multi-disciplinary approach across multiple thematic areas. Overall, the projects were positively received by the stakeholders interviewed and ownership was generally high among implementing partners. Effective partnerships were formed with the CDB, EU, Inter- American Development Bank, IMF, World Bank, and bilateral agencies (notably Global Affairs Canada). Relevant points to highlight include the following:

- The FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio responded to changing circumstances. The long-term programmes in physical infrastructure development and institutional capacity building have shown a degree of adaptability to changing contexts and needs. The portfolio has used event driven assistance to address specific shocks following disasters, and to transition towards long-term resilience building.
- FCDO has successfully built on previous programme experience and has worked with donors to address Caribbean resilience challenges. The UK has addressed resilience challenges in ODA-eligible countries while assisting non-ODA countries through available channels (e.g. CARTAC). It has also allowed for specific bilateral efforts to materialise whenever relevant (e.g. programming with a particular focus on Jamaica or the CREAD experience in Dominica).
- EE/RE and SMART Hospitals infrastructure driven projects are also positively addressing core resilience challenges that the Caribbean faces:
 - The EE/RE programme helped to enable a transition to renewable and clean energy while minimising dependence on fossil fuels – thereby improving economic resilience. This effort is particularly relevant since de-risking investment in renewable energy using innovative financial mechanisms is likely to be a key innovation enabling a transition to cleaner energy sources.
 - The SMART Hospitals initiative addressed the core challenge of upgrading health facilities and having a demonstration effect on how this effort can be successfully achieved. The SMART hospitals also placed significant emphasis on O&M sustainability improvements which is an underemphasised aspect of infrastructure management.
- CDT programming in the economic development space, such as CEDP and SkYE, addressed challenges related to fiscal and macro-economic stability, private sector constraints as well as skills development.
 - CEDP efforts in enhancing revenue collection allows Caribbean countries to improve their fiscal position, reduce dependency on income coming from tourism and provides greater space to act flexibly when shocks hit. Similarly, CEDP efforts to reform organisations regulating private sector competitiveness address the need to reduce barriers in the private sector operating environment – thereby supporting economic diversification and growth.
- SkYE, addressed the shortage of certified relevant needs in the workforce, which constrains investment and growth at the regional scale. The programme attempted to address the persistent challenge of inadequate skills for key growth sectors.
- The CDT portfolio worked to address the need to advance DRM institutional and policy frameworks while fostering a shift to a proactive culture of resilience building. In addition to advancing DRM frameworks by adopting an inclusion perspective with the aim of leaving no one behind when shocks hit, the R&R programme worked to break silos across thematic areas. The

programme looked at the importance of fiscal flexibility to manage shocks and worked to enhance PFM systems so that they are better able to plan for disaster preparedness. This addresses a key constraint and attempts to break a negative cycle that perpetuates a cycle of indebtedness.

- The CREAD experience in Dominica shows how to support a transition from response and recovery to long-term resilience building. The Caribbean has equipped itself with response mechanisms to approach resilience building – the 5C Regional Framework and CDEMA's Caribbean Resilience Framework are illustrations of this. However, there is a need to support moving towards prevention and risk avoidance.
- The CDT portfolio was flexible and able to adapt and design programming responding to natural shocks that took place from 2015 to 2023. The portfolio integrated relief efforts to address devastation resulting from Tropical Storm Erika (2015), Hurricane Maria (2017), La Soufriere Volcanic Eruption (2021), the 2021 Haiti earthquake and Tropical Storm Lisa (2022). While these experiences built on disaster response to enhance systems for long-term resilience building, more needs to be done.
- The CDT portfolio also worked to improve social cohesion and address governance challenges such as widespread violence, linkages between organised crime and systemic corruption, and aimed to improve accountability mechanisms. While this programming has focused on Jamaica, transferable lessons for the wider Caribbean have been identified.

EQ2: Effectiveness. To what extent has programming been effective in delivering resilience outcomes?

On the effectiveness criterion, FCDO programming has not yet achieved the target outcomes and impacts across the portfolio:

- While the CDT portfolio contributes to resilience outcomes, progress is slow and incomplete. Major delays in the implementation of UKCIF and the RE/EE have impaired overall effectiveness of the portfolio given their scale (share of the portfolio). The delivery of physical assets and their *full functionality* is necessary to be effective and deliver the planned outcomes and impacts, and this has not been achieved in UKCIF and EE/ EE.
- The portfolio of programmes in disaster risk management and economic development have generally performed satisfactorily in improving resilience in their target areas and stakeholder constituencies.
 - Portfolio programmes on economic development, fiscal reform and workforce resilience display mixed results in terms of capacity building.
 - Portfolio programmes in climate and disaster management have shown a strong degree of effectiveness in strengthening recovery, resilience-building systems and responses.
 - FCDO has successfully developed partnerships with regional organisations in the Caribbean (CDB, CARTAC, IDB, PAHO, CDEMA) as an effective means of extending the reach of its portfolio across multiple country contexts. This enabled FCDO to operate in a diverse and complex region by leveraging specific partners' strengths (technical, geographic) and networks, whilst capitalising on existing bi-lateral partnerships where relevant (i.e. Jamaica).

EQ3: Impact & Sustainability. What is the evidence illustrating that FCDO programming has built resilience in a sustained and integrated manner? How can FCDO best continue to provide relevant support as Caribbean SIDS progress into graduating from ODA-eligibility?

- Evidence, Annual Reviews and KIIs, show that FCDO has combined technical assistance (TA) and financial assistance (FA) in several programme areas with positive outcomes, but the sustainability of this model is not fully substantiated.
- FCDO's portfolio helped to establish new project preparation systems in the CDB to address resilience, GESI and climate risk. The systems are being utilised and it is understood based on KIIs with CDB staff that they are being institutionalised more widely within the CDB.

- There has been a concerted effort to elevate O&M requirements into project design. The extent to which O&M plans are fully implemented and sustained is yet to be determined and should be a focus of further investigation where projects are operational.
- Pro-poor and inclusion objectives, mechanisms and support interventions need to be further mainstreamed across all programming given extensive income and social exclusion challenges.
- In the infrastructure space, a step change in mobilising more private finance and private infrastructure investors remains a priority and needs new programming approaches and innovations. The RE/EE has taken a pathfinder role around use of a PPP model in geothermal in the Caribbean – this has been a protracted process with many learnings that can be captured and built into future PPP transaction design.

However, the CDT portfolio is best described as a collection of programmes, each relevant, that address various dimensions of resilience at regional or national level. *Collectively* they were not systematically and mutually reinforcing towards the common goal of building systemic resilience in the region. More of the same is not advisable. A compelling narrative is needed that will bring coherence and transformational potential to the CDT programme in the region.

6.1 Lessons

Lesson 1. Partnerships with like-minded development partners to co-design and implement programmes contributes to enhanced coherence and effectiveness. Partnerships should be based on respective capacities and value – added to ensure complementarity of efforts.

FCDO benefits from strong working relationships with development partners, multilateral and bilateral donors across the Caribbean. Based on the KIIs with the relevant partners, successful programme examples include: the CSJP3 programme, implemented with IDB and Global Affairs Canada; the CREAD experience in Dominica, a joint effort with Global Affairs Canada and UNDP; and the SMART Hospitals Initiative, a combined effort with PAHO. The evidence from documents and KIIs indicate the benefits of regional partnerships are that they contribute to:

- Achieving economies of scale;
- Collective and complementary efforts among development partners reduce risk of duplication and offers the potential of stronger transformational impact;
- Participating in regional conversations on resilience-building by exchanging ideas and programming approaches.

Lesson 2. FCDO has strongly emphasised inclusion of vulnerable groups as a core element in programme design, implementation and safeguarding measures (leaving no one behind).

CDT programming has proactively developed and sought to mainstream mechanisms to ensure the interests of marginalised and vulnerable groups are fully considered and institutionalised within implementing partner systems and procedures. This approach ensures a UK commitment to placing the needs of the most vulnerable at the core of development efforts, and fosters resilience-building initiatives that promote greater social cohesion by embedding inclusiveness.

Lesson 3. FCDO has used adaptive management to adjust UKCIF interventions to enable better use of grant funding and TA to support infrastructure investment. This is important as bottlenecks emerge during the implementation lifecycle. Adaptive management is critical to effective programme delivery and should be continued.

The UKCIF model shifted from a grant funding model to a grant and concessional loan financing model. TA was flexible and designed to ensure a progression from project preparation into implementation. This allowed projects to move more efficiently to delivery (compared to projects without UKCIF) and has been positively perceived by implementing partners. The EE/RE initiative combined TA and FA allowing governments in the Eastern Caribbean to de-risk investments in renewable energy. Looking ahead, intervention design should allow for flexible use of technical assistance and grant funding fit for purpose to the objectives targeted. Increasing FCDO staff

accessibility and willingness to discuss programme progress more informally is seen as a positive way to ensure effectiveness and achievement of results.

Lesson 4. A strong emphasis on technical capability and independent advisory services builds confidence and trust. Development partners in the Caribbean recognise the UK for its commitment to address development challenges through technical excellence.

Development partners acknowledged the emphasis that the UK places in ensuring robust and appropriate technical solutions are implemented to address resilience building challenges.

Lesson 5: FCDO programme effectiveness is strengthened by building a culture of ownership, open communication and progress tracking among implementing parties.

The CREAD experience was notable in this regard. The document review and KIIs illustrate that FCDO staff were open to discussing programme progress, formally and informally, and this was seen as a positive means of supporting effectiveness, allowing local level partners to influence delivery, and achieving results. FCDO should continue to promote open communication to foster accountability and programme ownership.

Lesson 5. Upfront readiness and capacity assessments of implementing partners is mission critical to realistic project delivery effectiveness and achieving target outcomes.

The document and KII evidence related to UKCIF, the largest programme in the CDT portfolio, strongly indicated that programme schedules and milestones were too ambitious. Lack of readiness impaired effective delivery and significantly extended timelines. A clear lesson from the UKCIF programme is the need for rigorous delivery partner readiness assessments prior to programme execution and then to ensure appropriate implementation support measures are in place to enable effective implementation.

- Readiness and capacity deficits were evident in both the financial intermediary, CDB, and in the partner government implementing agencies (with exceptions of Jamaica and Belize).
- Given the critical importance of country level implementing agencies, which account for perhaps 80% of the delivery effort, country capacity assessments and targeted institutional strengthening could ease implementation delays and strengthen effectiveness in delivery. Within the UKCIF, the use of the Project Execution Unit at the Ministry of Infrastructure in Belize to deliver the two road investments on time and schedule is a notable example of good practice.

6.2 Recommendations

The recommendations are structured around three focus areas FCDO CDT requested guidance on for future programming:

1. The relative weighting given to regional and bilateral programming and related interventions;
7. The priority thematic areas to guide programming content;
8. The choice of partners to work with and make these partnerships more effective.

The recommendations are best viewed as packages of changes that should be taken forward in parallel rather than sequenced priorities. Collectively, they are designed to improve the overall effectiveness, sustainability and VfM of CDT's regional programming. Based on discussions with FCDO CDT, the recommendations are exclusively aimed at FCDO CDT and the wider FCDO interests active in the Caribbean. The recommendations are not aimed at FCDO's development partners.

The three packages of interventions outlined below were tested with the CDT team and a wider stakeholder community. In all cases the evaluation team operated independently and used feedback from the stakeholder engagement sessions to inform the recommendations based on the merit of the case. Feedback from the stakeholders listed below was incorporated to develop the recommendations:

- CDT

- Extended FCDO stakeholders (SIDS Hub, Overseas Territories Department)
- Evaluation Management Group – EMG
- Wider stakeholder community: throughout our evaluation research process the Caribbean Resilience Framework, TOC and findings were “tested” and validated through either KIIs and / or document sharing. Global Affairs Canada was very engaged throughout much of the evaluation given their multiple partnerships with FCDO. WB, IADB, USAID and the EU were also engaged to test the direction of travel and resilience framework, and changes made as appropriate.

Further details on how consultations with FCDO, the wider stakeholder community and the EMG contributed to develop evaluation findings and recommendations are available on [Section](#) The role of the Evaluation Management Group and iterative evaluation design and Use and Influence Plan (Use and Dissemination Plan).

6.2.1 Focus Area: The relative balance between regional and bilateral programming

Recommendation 1. The FCDO CDT should develop a holistic resilience building strategy that provides a framework and roadmap for next generation programming – aimed at providing a stronger focus and streamlined set of programmes and partnerships.

- The strategy can further develop the Caribbean Resilience Framework and theory of change initiated as part of this review and assess the most appropriate way forward for regional and bilateral programming.
- The strategic approach can be “mission driven” bringing together a wide range of stakeholders from across the Caribbean (public, private and communities), leveraging FCDOs diplomatic relationships and clearly defining objectives that enhance resilience. The intention is to break down silos – administrative and thematic – to as great an extent as possible.

Recommendation 2. Regional programming should be *the* relative priority.

- Regional programming is an effective modality to tackle *common* regional resilience challenges in a systematic manner across multiple country contexts.
- It is more cost effective as it can generate greater economies of scale in the delivery of technical inputs that can be shared across multiple jurisdictions and contexts.
- It is well suited to a context where multiple partner countries may not have sufficient technical capacity to engage through bilateral arrangements.
- It provides a pathway for sustaining and replicating portfolio initiatives and innovation more widely across the region.
- Regional programming leverages and strengthens regional organisations with a clear mandate to address Caribbean resilience challenges.
- It offers a more flexible modality that can directly support ODA-eligible countries as well as non-ODA eligible countries through regional mechanisms or organisations that work in both contexts (e.g. CARTAC & CDEMA). This can set the basis to provide continuous support as Caribbean countries graduate from ODA-eligibility.
- Regional programming offers an effective platform for knowledge management, learning lessons, dissemination and policy advocacy so that experiences are shared, countries learn from each other and experiences are easily transferred and contextualised.

Recommendation 3. Bilateral programming should be retained where there are compelling value-added arguments and strong local relationships to build on.

- The UK has an extensive diplomatic network in the Caribbean constituted by seven representations. This could offer an effective platform to continue bilateral engagements (e.g. Jamaica, Dominica) or create new ones when relevant.

- Bilateral efforts complement regional programming as they allow the programme to address critical country level bottlenecks and deficits affecting green regional growth and climate resilience. Bilateral efforts are even more relevant where the UK can bring extensive technical expertise or in a country of particular significance for the UK (e.g. violence, governance and rule of law in Jamaica).
- Bilateral engagement offers an effective platform to provide flexible support when required, particularly following disasters and emergencies.
- The choice of regional as opposed to bilateral approaches depends on the types of interventions under consideration: in the case of working with local law enforcement agencies to secure shared objectives between the UK and the participating government, bilateral approaches seem a better choice.

Recommendation 4. Setting regional priorities should be evidence-based, using best available resilience related data and mapped against the resilience framework outlined in this report.

There are two useful points of departure to guide regional programming.

First, FCDO CDT should use the recently published UN Multi-Dimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI) to guide regional programming and reach beyond the ODA / non-ODA dimension. The UN Multi-Dimensional Vulnerability Index recognises that a country's resilience has three components: (1) Structural economic resilience; (2) Structural environmental resilience and; (3) Structural social resilience. Important considerations are:

- Since MVI scores do not correlate with income, it is suggested that scores be used as a complement to Gross National Income (GNI) in understanding a country's requirement for concessional financing, especially after extreme events.
- Most Caribbean countries are in the most vulnerable half of MVI world rankings. Some SIDS are highly vulnerable despite high per capita GNI and neither increased GNI nor increased GDP changes MVI. For instance, St Lucia, like several other Caribbean SIDS is likely to graduate from ODA status in 3 to 4 years. It will still be vulnerable but may not be eligible for concessional help after a disaster.
- The MVI could provide an entry point to frame vulnerability beyond the ODA / non-ODA fault line and provide common solution spaces (modified to local circumstances). This may be particularly helpful in the case of Caribbean countries which will soon graduate from ODA eligibility.

Second, FCDO CDT could develop a set of maturity models and indicators building on the resilience framework developed as part of this report. Each jurisdiction could be assessed and rated across all or a subset of resilience components, and the respective countries and components prioritised. In terms of components, where there are common gaps across the region this can provide a basis for designing programmes and interventions with shared approaches enabling both ODA and non-ODA jurisdictions to participate or access common knowledge products.

Recommendation 5. Prioritisation of interventions should reflect contextual differences in resilience across countries in the region.

- Programming should reflect the subtleties of working in mainland territories in contrast to island states. For instance, a key consideration in the mainland coastal districts of Guyana, Belize and Suriname relates to sea level rise, drainage and flood risk management which requires substantial capital investment in drainage canals, retention dams, pumping stations and sluices to reduce loss and damages to critical economic and social infrastructure and agricultural land arising from flooding and sea water intrusion in all coastal districts. This contrasts with the concern regarding tropical cyclones and the danger posed by high winds as occurs in the majority of Caribbean Islands.
- Evidence based prioritisation should be mainstreamed into project selection supported through UK interventions – this implies that where the UK is supporting resilience

investments in risk reduction, economic benefits need to be clearly described and compared to alternatives.

6.2.2 Focus Area: Identifying priority thematic areas

The stakeholder consultations and extensive FCDO CDT feedback provide solid support for the thematic areas outlined below and the need to restructure some of these to improve impact.

Recommendation 1. Infrastructure should remain a centre piece of programming, but new approaches are needed to accelerate investment and increase impact.

- There is a substantial gap in resilient infrastructure across the Caribbean. Countries have expressed the need for a continued investment in climate adaptive infrastructure. The UK can leverage existing knowledge and expertise in support of next generation programming.
- Investing in infrastructure can help to deliver transformative impacts in terms of enhanced climate resilience by:
 - Enhancing climate and disaster resilience by embedding climate / natural disaster risk considerations into infrastructure design (i.e. infrastructure is respondent to risks) and enabling effective access when disasters hit.
 - Supporting economic growth through improved infrastructure services, especially internet? connectivity and electricity.
 - Strengthening inclusion, social development and equity by placing the needs of women and vulnerable groups at the core of infrastructure design. Equitable accessibility is critical to maximising impact and sustainability.
- Continued investment in infrastructure will strengthen FCDO's influence and visibility in the region and complement the programming of like-minded development partners and fit will with many Caribbean multilateral institutions and national governments.

Recommendation 2. Invest in complementary enabling environment and assets to improve infrastructure services performance and unlock productivity.

- Infrastructure investments could be more closely tied in with resilient spatial planning, i.e. conceptualising infrastructure development in a way that it supports spatial planning while integrating resilience considerations and guiding the growth of settlements and asset creation away from high-risk exposed areas where possible. Infrastructure investment, land use frameworks and spatial planning should be more closely linked to promote resilience
- Strengthening the institutions working on? infrastructure services delivery and operations should be an integral component of all programming.
- An important area to improve resilience is the need to increase human capital and diversify skills. Efforts to do this are hampered by problems in the education system, including migration of teachers to other countries and, in Jamaica, generally poor educational outcomes. This leads to increasingly marginalised young school graduates (especially boys) who become vulnerable to gang recruitment and criminal influences. Regional approaches to increasing the effectiveness of primary and secondary education could assist in addressing the crime and violence problems in countries such as Jamaica, Trinidad and others in the region.

Recommendation 3. Develop new approaches to access green finance sources and use other financial product innovations including:

- Promoting blended finance transactions as a modality for funding in the climate space to attract private investment to help achieve critical developmental objectives. Whilst the majority of investments to date have been in renewable energy, blended finance is becoming increasingly important in other sectors including basic socio-economic infrastructure including water, drainage, transport, healthcare.

- Consideration could be given to creating new funds designed with Caribbean regional characteristics in mind and using the institutional options available; possible lines of investigation could include:
 - An Innovation Fund for Climate Resilience Solutions: Given the nascent stage of the sector, support to a fund structured to pool innovation capital from both concessional and commercial investors could be considered as part of the phase programming. The fund could be used to combine grants and concessional debt to support nascent innovators to test product-market fit and build markets for growing innovations around resilient inclusive growth enabling infrastructure.
 - Climate Smart Infrastructure Fund: support key stakeholders to establish a concessional debt fund with catalytic funding from development partners for low-cost lending by financial intermediaries. The fund could be used to reduce the cost of capital and unlock large scale transactions to build climate smart infrastructure and build the capacity of key stakeholders.
 - In all cases building partnerships and delivery agreements with the institutions that have the right competencies to maximise finance leveraging and strong technical support for project preparation should guide programme design.
- Exploring opportunities for developing innovative green finance mechanisms and instruments such as green bonds and other products. This could include a credit guarantee mechanism targeting green investments.
- Strengthening FDI frameworks and regulations aligned to good practices around ownership, taxation, profit repatriation and addressing cost and risks of FDI linked to exchange risks and hedging restrictions working with Central Banks, Ministries of Finance, IMF and MDBs.

Recommendation 4. Focus on the judicious and innovative use of TA to leverage additional resources to address resilience challenges across the region.

- Strategic thinking that takes an infrastructure asset lifecycle approach to design, implementation and operationalisation is strongly supported by the KII evidence, especially with UKCIF related stakeholders. Integrated end to end project support should focus on project pipeline preparation, selection and project development aligned to committed funding for capital investment, as well as follow on TA in contract management and lifecycle support.
- TA support for up-front planning and project preparation linked to innovative green financing structures, and delivered through MDAs with the capacity to efficiently procure, implement and operationalise the new assets is a good way forward.
- Complementary TA that addresses critical constraints in governance and management of local implementing partners: for example, PFM (expenditure efficiency improvement in resilient infrastructure); strengthening public procurement, PPP structuring and transaction support and lifecycle infrastructure management, are needed to improve programming performance.

6.2.3 Focus Area: Strengthening partnerships

The regional partners FCDO decides to work with should be selected through a systematic approach taking into consideration priorities as part of a regional programming approach to assess partner technical complementarity, geographic reach and levels of influence.

Recommendation 1. FCDO should continue to capitalise on established partnerships with organisations involved in regional resilience-building efforts.

- Continued partnering with the CDB should remain a part of the portfolio; with further strengthening of systems and delivery capacity. The CDB is a much-needed regional organisation that is often closest to many jurisdictions across the whole of the Caribbean and thus warrants being a centrepiece of infrastructure focused programming.¹⁴ CDB needs

¹⁴ CDB is a regional institution which is trusted and legitimate in the eyes of Caribbean countries. It also has extensive geographic spread covering the 8 ODA eligible countries and 7 non-ODA eligible countries targeted

significant capacity building to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. Moving to programming that involves CDB needs a robust readiness assessment so the organization can take on further mandates and operations.

- Complementary partnerships with other MDBs, such as the WB and IADB, provide more delivery options and enable capturing their respective strengths in different segments of the infrastructure lifecycle to enhance regional and sector coverage. The WB has already expressed strong interest in accessing FCDO TA to support its disaster risk management portfolio to address flooding in coastal areas of Guyana and Suriname.
- New forms of partnerships are needed where the FCDO can play an instrumental role in catalysing climate finance and working with the CDB, IADB and the World Bank to support mitigation, and adaptation to critical climate threats and other major risks.
- Established and ongoing partnerships that are deemed effective (such as IDB, PAHO, CDEMA, CARTAC) should be further developed where relevant.
- FCDO should continue to work with regional organisations (e.g. CDEMA, CARTAC) that work with ODA and non-ODA countries as this is a proven effective mechanism to reach non-ODA countries and expand the UK's influence sphere.

Recommendation 2. Regional programming should embed strong and trusted relationships at the national level to enhance ownership, effectiveness and sustainability.

- Government stakeholders are critical relevant implementation partners whenever bilateral interventions are pursued (either directly or through multilateral challenges). Evidence across the portfolio strongly supports developing solid working relationships at national level to ensure relevance (which should be straightforward in demand driven approaches), to better understand local constraints and challenges, and to tailor support that ensures efficient and effective implementation. This elevates the role for FCDO across the region, especially where there is diplomatic representation, to build these relationships and provide evidence of UK commitment to national policy goals and increasing resilience.
- A binding constraint across the region is national and local level capacity, so programmes need to reach these actors and be designed to maximise effectiveness and sustained change.
- Working closely at national level is especially important in sensitive areas such as policy reform and / or law enforcement (Jamaica's CACP and SOCAP interventions clearly depend on high degrees of trust and relationships build over time to effect cultural shifts and adopting new ways of doing things).
- Getting closer to implementation and working together is often much more effective in securing lasting change in capacities than "injections" of training. Thus, being on the ground is important no matter what channels are selected.

Recommendation 3. FCDO should place a strong emphasis on how to leverage its resources to catalyse finance to maximise scale and impact.

- Resilience challenges in the Caribbean are immense and beyond any single actor to comprehensively address. Thus, FCDO should design its next generation programming to leverage its funding support (all instruments) to aggregate funding across multiple partners and / or crowd in new investment.
- Leveraging/ catalysing green finance: FCDO should continue to emphasise leveraging available green finance sources and mechanisms and use its influence to improve access to these sources by SIDS.

by the Caribbean Development Team. The UK is a CDB non-borrowing member country sitting on the Board of Governors. It can capitalise on its influence to encourage reform and new operational practices.

- There is a need for a more selective use of grants with stronger criteria focused on leverage and ensuring strong links between project preparation and follow on capital investment. TA and FA should work in lockstep to secure capital financing.
- Grants should be a small share of overall project financing requirements going forward and to as great an extent as possible, they should be used to put together larger investment funds / packages.

Recommendation 4. FCDO needs to ensure lessons learned from programme experience feed into adaptive management systems, shared knowledge products, and are fully mainstreamed into next generation programming.

- During the research informing this evaluation it was noted that key programming data and documentation was not always at hand. UKCIF documentation was restricted or unavailable partly because of commercial sensitivities, but this impeded learning, cross-sectional evidence analysis (on project structures, KPIs, implementation effectiveness, implementing partner capacity challenges, and other material parameters) and effectiveness. Going forward, improving programme documentation availability beyond standard annual reviews and mid-term evaluations would be beneficial (with the appropriate NDAs in place).
- Capturing full infrastructure lifecycle performance data – through on-going longitudinal monitoring of operations and development impacts – would help to strengthen learning of what works and what needs improving. Of particular interest are the quality of O&M regimes in practice (as reflected in assets quality and service performance) and the extent to which users of assets created are benefiting (firms and households, and the distributional impacts on vulnerable groups and their equitable access to services).
- Related to the above, investment in shared knowledge products relevant to the Caribbean infrastructure and other sectors of interest should be increased. There is plenty of scope to build on extensive programme experience to develop model agreements, contracts and various guidance notes (e.g. O&M, performance based contracts, PPPs, risk allocation, etc) related to project preparation and the infrastructure lifecycle.
- If maturity modes are used (as suggested above), then an appropriate monitoring system must be in place, ideally locally owned and managed, to track progress and share implementation experience across the resilience components and dimensions. This could be a FCDO CDT regional initiative as part of a wider mission oriented programme.
- The FCDO CDT team should strengthen resilience programming evidence sharing and learning to support more effective adaptive management as well as bringing wider FCDO regional interests together around the agreed shared mission. This can systematically bring in regional implementing partners.
- A plan on how future partnerships should work and the results-based monitoring system should be agreed as part of any Memorandum of Understanding.

Annex 1.

Annexes

Annex 2. Evaluation Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION OF FCDO SUPPORT to improve resilience in the Caribbean region through a range of programmes and wider initiatives.

The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office of the UK (FCDO) seeks to procure the services of an organisation (henceforth referred to as the 'evaluation supplier') to undertake an evaluation of the FCDO support to improve the resilience of the Caribbean region to mitigate effects of climate change, natural disasters, economic and other shocks and to assess how FCDO can maximise the impact of the full range of resources (human and financial) available to us to improve our overall effectiveness. The evaluation will review the period 2015-2023.

Background and context

1. The Caribbean consists of geographically dispersed islands located in a wide arc between Venezuela and Florida, and larger mainland states in Central America (Belize) and South America (Guyana and Suriname). When HMG refers to the Caribbean, it is usually with reference to the fifteen independent members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), although the development programme focusses more specifically on the seven ODA-eligible anglophone independent countries in the region.
2. All countries in the region are Small Island Developing States (SIDS), although all are not ODA-eligible. As SIDS, they share the typical characteristics of small size and population, dependence on global trade with expensive transportation links to markets, low economies of scale with a lack of economic diversification, and the ever-present climate, environmental and economic vulnerabilities.
3. With a shared history, the Caribbean grouping may suggest a strong degree of homogeneity; but this is not the case in practice. Although there are commonalities among the countries, and all Caribbean nations are largely integrated into the world economy, they are generally highly independent. Their wide dispersion coupled with poor regional connectivity reinforces this heterogeneity. Different nations have different challenges and varying opportunities.
4. Caribbean SIDS face underlying structural constraints that have had a sustained, limiting effect on development, such as scale, vulnerability to shocks and low capacity, and it is the region most at risk of climate and natural disasters. Vulnerabilities are often interconnected, and concurrent events or shocks can derail development gains and stretch already inadequate capacity.
5. There are several UK missions in the Region, the largest located in Barbados and Jamaica. The Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean Business Plan (2022-2025) covers the Eastern Caribbean ODA and non-ODA eligible countries. The ODA eligible countries are Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and non-ODA countries Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and Saint Kitts and Nevis. The business plan has three broad goals; shared values and security; prosperity and trade; climate resilience and biodiversity.

6. The Guyana, Suriname and CARICOM Business Plan has objectives to a. Continue to increase trade and investment between UK and Guyana; b. Promote democracy, good governance and upholding of values. C. Strengthen engagement on climate change and resilience, biodiversity (green and blue economy) and renewable energy; and d. Deepen the UK's relationship with CARICOM.
7. The Jamaica country plan includes objectives to a. Reduce serious and organised crime and violence; b. Enhance resilience to climate change; c. Mutual and inclusive prosperity.
8. The Belize country plan includes objectives to: a. Strengthen bilateral relationship for initiatives on climate and biodiversity (terrestrial and oceans), b. Support to Human rights; c. Defence and resilience; d. Contribute to mutual and inclusive prosperity through strengthening and increasing efficiency in the trade and investment relationship.
9. There are separate Business Plans for our missions in Dominican Republic and Haiti, as well as the Bahamas, however the Caribbean Development Team does not currently contribute directly to either of these.
10. The Caribbean Development Team (CDT) directly supports all ODA-eligible anglophone Caribbean countries, namely: Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and Grenadines. We still have a legacy programme in Antigua and Barbuda, which graduated from ODA during our last programming cycle. A list of ODA and non-ODA programmes delivered by CDT, is provided separately and contains the names, dates, description of purpose and budgets for each regionally managed and centrally managed programme.
11. Planning for the new strategy for 2025 onwards has started. There is an updated Growth and Resilience Diagnostic and a revised Political Economy Analysis. These two documents together with evidence from this evaluation, will be used to direct the work of CDT going forward.
12. While many HMG policies and programmes contribute to improving the resilience of countries, there is no over-arching theory of change for building resilience within countries or across the region. Some regional organisations have been developing learning to better understand the theory of change for creating more resilient countries, but there are gaps in this learning and no overarching theory of change for creating resilient states is available.
13. An important output from the inception phase of this evaluation will be a theory of change for improving a country's resilience. Regional organisations such as the University of West Indies and Caribbean Policy Research Institute (CAPRI), have been working on a resilience theory of change and it is hoped the evaluation supplier can build on this work. We encourage bidders to reach out to regional organisations who are already developing thoughts on the theory of change or 'what a resilient state looks like' to identify potential partnerships or a consortium to advance the development and testing of a theory of change.

Evidence

14. There is a large body of evidence relating to the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of outputs and outcomes achieved by individual programmes, including annual reviews, project completion reviews and programme evaluations. However, there is limited evidence as to how these interventions have collectively contributed to improve the resilience of countries.
15. There are a number of different sources documenting the impact of FCDO's work in the region including, most recently, 10 social media stories ([Caribbean Resilience Series on Vimeo](#)) including:
 - Rebuilding stronger from Hurricane Maria (CREAD)
 - Economic resilience (Compete Caribbean)
 - Shock responsive social protection
 - Climate resilient health care facilities (SMART)
 - Increasing renewable energy in the Eastern Caribbean area
 - Nature-based resilience
 - Youth training for resilient economic growth (SkYE)
 - UK Caribbean Infrastructure Fund (UKCIF)
 - UK Humanitarian surge
 - Disaster risk financing

Alignment to Paris Declaration Principles

16. FCDO's approach to support resilience building is aligned to the Paris Declaration Principles:
 - a. **Ownership:** The work is consistent with the Caribbean Community Regional Framework for Achieving Development Resilient to Climate Change (2009-2019 and revised version 2019-2029); the Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy as well as individual beneficiary country climate action plans. It also delivers UK priority objectives for its International Climate Finance supporting the overall delivery of climate and environment ambitions, particularly the successful implementation of broader spending commitments to adaptation and resilience for vulnerable states like SIDS.
 - b. **Alignment:** FCDO works closely with partner governments and regional institutions when designing programmes. The work also helps inform national plans and actions and utilises as well as strengthens local systems where possible.
 - c. **Harmonisation:** FCDO regularly collaborates with development partners and many of our resilience programmes are harmonised or jointly financed with others. We work with regional partners to simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication. We actively participate in the Caribbean Development Partner Group platform for coordination as well as national /sector groups for coherence. We conduct field missions and analytical work with recipient countries.
 - d. **Results:** All programmes have a comprehensive approach to results through monitoring systems, annual reviews, and additional evidence generation processes.
 - e. **Mutual accountability:** Development results are shared with beneficiary countries and published. Our aid is untied and reflected in country budgets. FCDO Caribbean regularly consults and assesses progress in implementing its aid commitments and its regional development objectives/strategies.

Scope, Purpose, and Objectives

17. The Evaluation supplier will be expected to undertake an evaluation of FCDO's support to improve the resilience of the Caribbean region from climate shifts, natural disasters economic or other shocks. The two high level questions are:
 - i. To what extent is the approach taken by the Caribbean Development Team (across FCDO and other HMG partners) to improve the resilience of the Caribbean region - to climate shifts, natural disasters, economic and other shocks - relevant and strategically targeted to deliver the UK objective of strengthening resilience?
 - ii. What changes in the way we use the range of resources available to us could improve overall effectiveness?
18. Coverage for the first question will focus on ODA eligible countries. For the second question, on ways of working, the evaluation will include ODA and non-ODA countries in the Caribbean region, where the UK can have a strong influence on Caribbean regional resilience. 'Range of resources' refers to financial and human resources, other levers available to the UK to pursue our objectives internationally (including but not limited to: UK expertise, research, commercial relationships, private finance, and investment, convening power, thought leadership and our multilateral shareholdings and contributions to global funds), as well as coordination within the Caribbean Development team, across FCDO and across HMG. The FCO-DFID merger has created several opportunities which we would like this evaluation to explore.
19. The purpose of the evaluation is to support FCDO's, and other regional stakeholder's, learning. It should build the evidence base in areas of low evidence of what works to improve resilience in Caribbean countries. Where there is evidence of the performance of different interventions, there is less evidence on how different programmes and projects contribute to resilience (and what a resilient country looks like). Evaluation findings will directly inform the analysis and development of the FCDO's regional development strategy for the period 2025-2030.
20. The evaluation will create a better understanding of how the different policies, programmes and other HMG resources have contributed towards achieving the overall objectives related to improving the resilience of the Caribbean region to withstand climate and economic shocks and to become more prosperous, inclusive, and safe.
21. The evaluation will assess the different approaches taken to deliver UK objectives, what is working well and where, and will generate recommendations on what approaches should continue and highlight opportunities to maximise the effectiveness of all levers to enhance the UK's contribution, value add and impact in the region.
22. Many FCDO programs are delivered in partnership with Governments and other development partners. The evaluation will draw on available evidence generated by FCDO and partners.
23. The evaluation will provide evidence of areas where improved coordination between the Caribbean Development Team, CMPs, SIDS Hub (programmes and policy), UK posts in the region and other HMG departments can enhance UK Government impact on resilience in the region. It will also consider which levers have proved most effective and whether, for instance, the UK could have more impact through our non-ODA levers.

24. Final evaluation questions will be determined through stakeholder consultation during the inception phase.

Stakeholders

25. The primary audience for the evaluation consists of the Caribbean Development Team, the SIDs Hub, the Heads of Missions, wider FCDO. The secondary audiences will be other partners including partner Governments, donors, key suppliers of the regional portfolio of programmes and other key parties responsible for improving the resilience of countries in the Caribbean region.

26. The results of this evaluation will be shared with other key development partners in the region (WB, IDB, CDB, IMF, Canada, USAID, EU) e.g. through development partner coordination forums, such as the Eastern Caribbean Development Partners Group and Jamaica Development Partners Group, which provide support to address climate change, disaster risk management and economic development, to improve coordination and enhance collective resilience impact across the region.

Objectives

27. The objectives of this contract will be to:

- . Build the evidence base in the areas of low evidence of what works to improve resilience in Caribbean countries.
- . Establish the extent to which the approach taken by FCDO/Caribbean Development Team (across FCDO and other HMG partners) to improve the resilience of the Caribbean region – to climate shifts, natural disasters, economic and other shocks – relevant and strategically targeted to deliver the UK objective of strengthening resilience has been relevant and effective and helps fill evidence gaps.
- . Assess the different approaches taken and levers used to deliver UK objectives, what is working well and where, and what is not.
- . Generate recommendations on what approaches should continue and highlight opportunities to maximise the effectiveness of all levers to enhance the UK's contribution, value added and impact in the region.

Timing

28. The contract is expected to start in November 2023 and end in March 2024. The evaluation will cover the period 2015-2023.

29. The Evaluation supplier will have a 3-week inception phase starting at commencement of the contract. See 'Expected Outputs and Indicative Workplan' section in this ToR for more information.

Designing and executing evaluations

Evaluation criteria, questions, and cross-cutting issues

30. The [OECD-DAC evaluation criteria](#) describe the desired attributes of interventions, each of which can be evaluated. This evaluation will cover all criteria, but prioritise them in the following ways:

- Effectiveness refers to the extent to which an intervention achieves its objectives, and to what extent different interventions have achieved the intended results. This will be medium priority. The evaluation should understand success factors of interventions and how they contribute to wider resilience. This will be high priority.
- Impact refers to the extent to which interventions generate higher-level effects for targeted systems, infrastructure, people and finance, and increased resilience. This will be high priority.
- Efficiency refers to the extent to which interventions deliver results in an economic and timely way. The evaluation should interrogate the efficiency of delivery of key outputs and outcomes. This will be medium priority. This will be medium priority.
- Sustainability refers to the extent to which net benefits of interventions continue or are likely to continue. This will be addressed through assessing the theory of change and characteristics of a resilient state and to what extent outcomes contribute to sustainable benefits of resilience within Caribbean countries. This will be high priority.
- Relevance refers to the extent to which the different intervention objectives and design respond to needs, priorities and evidence, with regards to improving resilience. This will be high priority.
- Coherence refers to the extent to which interventions are compatible with other interventions in a region or sectors. This is high priority.

31. FCDO has not designed final evaluation questions at this stage. The Evaluation supplier will be required to design these in the inception phase in collaboration with FCDO.

32. Evaluation suppliers should consider the use of case studies to explore countries where FCDO has provided a range of support, e.g., Jamaica, Dominica.

33. To determine future ways of working Evaluation suppliers should consider exploring FCDO's approach in both ODA and non-ODA countries, e.g., Barbados.

34. Currently, FCDO has identified the following preliminary areas of interest. These questions should be reviewed at inception phase to determine which questions need to be answered to address the high-level questions and meet the evaluation objectives.

Relevance

- Is FCDO support relevant (i.e., does it tackle key domestic priorities) for their government partners?
- Is FCDO responding to needs as they develop in the region? - Is FCDO timely in its response?
- Is FCDO responding in a way that allows for adaptation and flexibility when shocks happen?
- Is FCDO's approach targeting innovative economic sectors with real potential for future growth in the Caribbean region?
- To what extent are FCDO programmes designed to have impact on the livelihoods of marginalised or vulnerable groups, especially women and girls?

- Is there a need to ensure efforts are significantly changed/ scaled up to build resilience and how could this be done in the most effective way?

Effectiveness and Sustainability

- There are four key areas that FCDO identify as needing to be addressed to improve a country's resilience, Systems, Infrastructure, People and Finance. To what extent has FCDO's portfolio of programmes and influence contributed to sustainable improvement, across these four key areas?
- To what extent does FCDO support address the necessary systems change? Has FCDO support led to increased capacity of systems (in both Governments and private sector) in the Caribbean region, and have the systems improved resilience?
- How effectively has FCDO support improved the resilience of marginalised and vulnerable groups, especially women and girls?
- Has FCDO supported the delivery of sound economic reforms, that have improved resilience?
- Has FCDO supported the fiscal sustainability in the region to allow governments to better respond to shocks?
- Has FCDO supported economic diversification, and has this improved resilience?
- What role have the UK's and partner governments' leadership played in addressing barriers to resilience in a sustainable way?
- Is FCDO amplifying the voices of Caribbean SIDS in international forums?
- To what extent does FCDO's role complement and add value to other (development partner and governments') support provided, to improve resilience.
- How well does FCDO manage support to countries as they (prepare to) graduate to high income status, which excludes them from receiving ODA? How well can FCDO manage support if a country reverses back to ODA after a disaster?
- To what extent do FCDO's Centrally Managed Programmes complement/add value to FCDO's regionally designed, bilateral programmes?
- To what extent does support from multilaterals complement /add value to the FCDO's wider bilateral efforts? How effective is FCDO in shaping IFI support to the region?
- To what extent is support designed and implemented to manage corruption related risks?

Efficiency

- Is FCDO delivering in the most efficient and cost-effective way?
- Where FCDO have taken a regional approach to tackling an issue, was this the most sensible VFM approach?

Impact

- Has FCDO support led to/contributed to an increase in overall resilience across the Caribbean region?
- Has FCDO's approach contributed to sector wide impact? For example, has our work impacted the agriculture sector, education, or the blue economy sector, as a whole, in the countries where we work?
- Do smaller projects, cumulatively, provide results which contribute to overall state resilience building?

Coordination

- How could the CDT, SIDS Hub, and wider directorate work together to improve coordination, increase effectiveness and impact from the UK's work in the Caribbean?
- Many development players are also working in the improving resilience 'space', therefore coordination of efforts, if done well would have significant impact. To what extent has donor coordination in the Caribbean led to increased resilience?
- To what extent are resources pooled to maximise impact?

New ways of working

- Given the monumental task of improving resilience across the region, where should FCDO focus to influence change, facilitate change, and deliver support to create change? Where would FCDO add the most value?
- How should FCDO's work change and adapt as more countries in the Caribbean transition to High-Income status and graduate from ODA?
- How might the shift to using a Multidimensional Vulnerability Indicator (MVI) to determine concessional finance and/or ODA graduation influence FCDO's ways of working?
- What future monitoring, and data and evidence is needed to help better understand resilience improvements and the remaining challenges?
- How could we be more effective at using our resources to address The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) action plans?
- How could FCDO work better with CARICOM?
- How could FCDO work better (with more coordination) across HMG?
- What is the FCDO staff footprint on climate and resilience issues in the Caribbean aligned with our objectives? Should this change over time, and if so, how?
- How can coordination be improved to maximise impact? Who is best placed to coordinate? Which Caribbean countries lead coordination efforts?
- Which governance structures, in the Caribbean, support donor coordination?

35. Final evaluation questions will be determined through stakeholder consultations during the inception phase, which will be reviewed and agreed between suppliers, CDT and wider FCDO stakeholders.

36. The current (and recent) regional portfolio includes the following programmes:

- UK Caribbean Infrastructure Fund (UKCIF): 2016 - 2026, £349.8m.
- Renewable energy: 2015-2023, £19.3m.
- Strengthening Health Facilities in the Caribbean: 2015-2023, £46.3m
- Youth Skills for Economic Growth in the Eastern Caribbean: 2017 to 2023, £10m.
- Caribbean Economic Development Programme: 2016-2024, £20m.
- Emergency assistance for the relief effort in Dominica as a result of tropical storm Erika 2015-2016 (budget tbc)
- Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica (CREAD) 2018-2019 (Budget tbc)
- Support to Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica (CREAD): 2019 to 2023, £3.8m.
- Strengthening Disaster Recovery and Resilience in the Caribbean: 2019 to 2023, £5m.
- Citizen security and Justice programme 3 2014-2021 (Budget tbc)
- Caribbean anti-corruption programme 2015-2020 (Budget tbc)
- Serious organised crime and anticorruption programme 2020-2025 (Budget tbc)
- UK Jamaica Violence Prevention partnership 2023-2029, £15m

- UK humanitarian support to Belize following hurricane Lisa 2022-2023 (Budget tbc)
- Caribbean Humanitarian Assistance. Emergency cash and voucher support in response to the volcano eruption in SVG and earthquake in Haiti 2021-2022 (Budget tbc)

37. Resilience support, through Centrally Managed Programmes, includes:

- Small Island Developing States Capacity and Resilience (SIDAR) Programme: £40m 2022-2027.
- Coalition for Climate Resilient Investment (CCRI) (Budget tbc)
- Infrastructure for Resilient Island States (IRIS) 2022-2030, £7.7m.
- Global Shield Initiative - Centre for Disaster Protection in London and the Global Risk Financing Facility (GRiF) (budget tbc)
- Forest Governance, Markets and Climate, 2011 – 2023, £8m - Guyana only:
- Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR): UK is contributing £310m, of which £50m is allocated to the Caribbean.
- Green Climate Fund (GCF) 2020-2023, full budget £671m.
- Commonwealth Marine/Blue Economies (CME) and successor the new Sustainable Blue Economies Programme (SBE), £36m from 2022-28.
- The new British Investment Partnership Hub: 2023 onwards – technical assistance including for offshore wind, and trade standards (£400k is allocated to the Caribbean).
- British International Investment (BII) – \$10M investment in a regional SME fund (SEAF).

Approach and methodology

38. The Evaluation Supplier will, at inception phase, develop a theory of change for developing resilience in Caribbean countries, setting out the pathways to resilience and what a resilient state looks like. Other organisations have been working in this space and the supplier will explore how they can work with others to develop a theory of change which could have ownership in the region. The evaluation suppliers/bidders will explore ways to work with UWI, CAPRI, or both, to develop the theory and explore the evidence behind work to date.

39. Addressing the areas of interest will require a mix of approaches, depending on the learning needs and operational constraints. The Evaluation supplier is required to develop a package of methods to deliver against the proposed questions and provide detailed evidence of their ability to execute a wide range of evaluation approaches and methodologies, which can be drawn from to design the final approaches in the inception phase. It is anticipated that there will be country case studies to explore evidence where there are broader approaches to support resilience. Consideration should also be given to conduct a country case study to explore the effectiveness of different approaches in a non-ODA country. Bidders are encouraged to outline innovative approaches to meet the evaluation purpose.

40. The Evaluation supplier will be expected to design the evaluation in collaboration with FCDO, in particular CDT.

Disseminating findings and recommendations

41. The findings for this evaluation will be shared with FCDO including the CDT, regional missions, and the SIDS hub. Further dissemination of key findings and recommendations will be shared with partners/stakeholders.

42. Bids should include a strategic and proportionate Use and Influence plan that targets key stakeholders.

Data and Evidence

43. The following data sources should be reviewed at inception phase to inform the evaluation design and to augment evaluation findings over the course of the implementation of the evaluation. Note this list may not be complete and further literature review should be done by the supplier. A mapping of relevant and available data sets should be carried out at inception phase.

Dataset/Document	Source	Characteristics
SDG country profiles	UNSD	Data on SDG Progress
World Development Indicators	World Bank	Key indicators related to resilience for Caribbean countries
IMF Economic outlook	IMF	Key indicators of economic performance
IMF Article IV's	IMF	Key indicators and trends of economic performance, and economic resilience
Multidimensional Vulnerability index (MVI)	UN	Country data for indicators used to determine their score against the UN MVI
FCDO Programme Business Cases, Annual Reviews and Programme Completion Reviews, log frames	FCDO	Programme details for current and past FCDO portfolio
Compete Caribbean datasets	IDB's Compete Caribbean website	Firm level data
Caribbean Government Websites	Caribbean Government Websites	To familiarise with data and evidence availability at the country level
Caribbean Development and bank information on progress	CDB website	Data and evidence held by CDB
CREAD country resilience plan	CREADs website	CREADs work on measuring resilience
360-degree resilience	Worldbank.org	A guide to prepare the Caribbean for a new generation of shocks

44. It is unclear how much evidence is available, through business cases, reviews, and programme evaluations, to support a theory-based evaluation. It is expected that key informant interviews will be required to build on existing evidence.

45. A mapping of essential and potential stakeholders/interviewees and identification of reliable secondary sources of evidence should be carried out under inception phase tasks. Key development partners include (but are not limited to) the CBD, UN, World Bank, Inter America Development Bank, and the IMF (including CARTAC).

Ethics and safeguarding

46. The Evaluation supplier should conform at all times to international best practice and standards of ethical conduct in evaluation (including [FCDO's ethical guidance](#)) and FCDO's guidance on safeguarding '[Enhanced Due Diligence – Safeguarding for External Partners](#)'. This will include, if deemed necessary, formal approval of the Ethics or Institutional Review Board. The following principles apply:

- . Do no harm through any activities resulting from this contract, by actively seeking to understand their consequences and mitigating risks. This is particularly important with regards to vulnerable people.
- . Respect. Ensure an understanding and respect for the local context (social, cultural, religious values and beliefs).
- . Participation of targeted people in the evaluation that is equitable.
- . Inclusion. Ensure data collection covers the population of interest, including based on gender, disability, location, age, ethnicity.
- . Feedback. Allow for opportunities to receive feedback at design stage and from targeted people in the implementation stage to ensure an effective and inclusive evaluation.

47. The Evaluation supplier will be required to adhere to high ethical standards in the collection and usage of data and will need to provide evidence of an excellent track record. This includes, but is not limited to:

- . Ensuring data integrity through ensuring a true reflection of views expressed in the collection of data and maintaining appropriate data storage and usage protocols.
- . Ensuring privacy during interviews
- . Ensuring confidentiality of any views expressed
- . Anonymisation of data
- . Adherence to proper consent and assent protocols.

48. The supplier will be required to adhere to the Principles for Digital Development, as outlined in the '[DFID Digital Strategy 2018-2020](#)'.

Expected outputs and indicative workplan.

49. The table below outlines the proposed outputs for this evaluation, and indicative timelines for their delivery. The supplier will be required to develop a complete workplan during the inception phase. Note that the inception report and final report will be quality assured by FCDO's evaluation quality assurance service, which takes up to two weeks. A report template will be provided to the supplier upon the commencement of the contract.

Task/ Output	Description	Indicative timings¹⁵	Milestone payments
Inception process and report	<p>Supplier to complete a document and data review. Supplier to facilitate dialogue FCDO, suppliers, implementing partners and other key partner organisations to determine final evaluation questions and methodology.</p> <p>Provide a mapping of relevant and available data sets and a mapping of essential and potential stakeholders/interviewees and identification of reliable secondary sources of evidence.</p> <p>Suppliers to develop a theory of change to produce a resilient state.</p> <p>Suppliers to produce a draft inception report for input from FCDO.</p> <p>The full inception report should contain:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a detailed methodology and approach, including questions, data collection methods, tools, sources, and analysis framework. - A strong approach to ethics and safeguarding - A detailed workplan, timeline and description of governance arrangements - A use and influence plan, including a dissemination plan. This should include stakeholder mapping and consider the timing of evaluation outputs and their dissemination. Any external factors that could affect the usefulness of the evaluation outputs should also be discussed as risks. 	December 2023	Yes
Main evaluation	To conduct a thematic evaluation of FCDO support to create country resilience in the Caribbean region	Draft Report By March 2024;	Yes

¹⁵ Dates may shift based on the actual contract start date, but the time required for each output should not shift.

Dissemination	Supplier to facilitate a dissemination meeting for FCDO (and others TBC)	End March/early April 2024	NO
Final report and summary	Supplier to produce full evaluation report presenting: analysis, key findings, and recommendations.	End March/early April 2024	Yes
An evaluation digest for the FCDO website, which is a 2-page summary using an FCDO template.			

Budget

50. This evaluation contract has a maximum budget at Invitation to Tender stage of £250,000 including all expenses and VAT.

Risks and challenges

51. FCDO identifies the following main risks and challenges to the evaluation. Bids should elaborate on these further and propose mitigation strategies in their tender proposals.

52. While there is a need to understand how FCDO's support has improved all forms of resilience across the Caribbean region, whether related to climate change, natural disasters, economic, or other shocks, there is a risk that the evaluation could become too large to allow clear evidence to direct FCDO's future strategy and priorities.

53. Other risks include:

- . COVID-19 and other health-related restrictions restrict the ability to do fieldwork. FCDO will keep track of developments of the spread of diseases to anticipate restrictions before the start of the contract.
- . Travel around the region is difficult, and can be disrupted due to natural disasters, planning is required to ensure affordability in terms of time and cost.
- . There are many data gaps in the region, and data quality is an issue.

Methodological/operational:

- . Delays in early mobilisation of the Evaluation supplier leads to difficulties in meeting the timeframe to feed into strategic planning starting early 2024.
- . Challenges in collecting the information/data required to answer the evaluation questions, for instance due to recollection bias of respondents, or the quality of the data collection field team.
- . COP 28 takes place late November early December so many stakeholders may not be available late 2023.

Roles and responsibilities

54. The Evaluation supplier will report to FCDO's Evaluation Adviser, who sits within CDT. Day-to-day contact will go through the Evaluation Adviser.

55. FCDO's Evaluation Adviser will support the Evaluation supplier to collect some of the documents needed at inception phase, however the Evaluation supplier has responsibility for setting out needs and obtaining information directly where possible.

56. The responsibility for taking forward recommendations and lessons coming from this evaluation will lie with the Development Director and HoMs working with other partners. It will be the responsibility of the Evaluation supplier to facilitate learning processes to convey recommendations.

57. This evaluation will be independent, which means the Evaluation supplier will have full autonomy over the findings and conclusions drawn. FCDO does expect to give inputs into the design of the evaluation activities throughout the course of the evaluation and report structures.

58. The evaluation team members should not have been involved in the planning and delivery of any project/programme that falls within the scope of the evaluation.

59. FCDO will have unlimited access to all material produced through this evaluation (as expressed in FCDO's general conditions of contract).

60. The inception and final reports will be subject to quality assurance through FCDO's Evaluation Quality Assurance Service (EQUALS). Reviews take up to two weeks. EQUALS can also be drawn upon for technical assistance where required.

61. The Evaluation supplier will be responsible for all logistical arrangements relating to this evaluation, including, but not limited to travel and in-country appointments.

Duty of care

62. In terms of duty of care, the Evaluation supplier will be responsible for the safety and well-being of their personnel and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. FCDO will share available information with the supplier on security status and relevant developments in-country.

63. The Evaluation supplier is responsible for assessing and accepting the risk to their personnel of catching and spreading COVID-19 during face-to-face data collection.

64. Suppliers must develop their Tender based on being fully responsible for Duty of Care and they must confirm this in their Tender. This includes potential security or health issues, such as personal security, and access to health care in case of emergency, and the Evaluation supplier's responsibility for team security.

Requirements for the Evaluation supplier team composition

65. The team leader implementing this contract should have the following skills and experience:

- . Over 10 years of experience in conducting large-scale mixed-method evaluations of climate change or economic resilience interventions.
- . Over 3 years of experience in leading mixed-method evaluations and collaborating with donors.
- . Excellent understanding of both qualitative and quantitative methods, with a proven track record in implementing a wide variety of them.
- . Experience working in the Caribbean region preferred.

66. The team (excluding team leader) should have the following skills and experience:

- . Strong and proven expertise implementing a wide range of mixed-method evaluation methods and approaches, including contribution analysis, realist methods, systematic reviews, meta evaluations, and data mining.
- . Strong expertise in evaluating climate change, economic and broader resilience programmes, and the dissemination of evaluation findings.
- . Strong understanding of the Caribbean context.
- . Experience in overcoming practical challenges associated with evidence generation.
- . An equitable gender balance within the team.
- . Where reasonable, the engagement of local consultants is preferred over international.

67. Bids should be no longer than 15-20 pages with supporting annexes.

68. The winning proposal will be selected through a rigorous and impartial procurement process led by FCDO Evaluation Department.

Annex 3. Key Informants Interviewed

#	Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Caribbean or country remit	Interviewee type
1	Aaron Spencer	USAID	Senior Development Specialist Advisor	Guyana	Caribbean remit	Bilateral donor
2	Abebech Assefa	Global Affairs Canada	Head of Cooperation for Eastern Caribbean	Barbados	Caribbean remit	Bilateral donor
3	Adam Loyer	Global Affairs Canada	Senior Development Officer	Guyana	Caribbean remit	Bilateral donor
4	Aiesha Williams	WWF Guyana	Conservation Director	Guyana	Caribbean remit	International NGO
5	Alaine Codner	FCDO Caribbean and Caribbean Development Bank	FCDO Communications Officer; Programme manager for UK CIF	Barbados	Caribbean remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
6	Alexander Gozney	FCDO - Climate and Disaster Risk Reduction Team	Technical Adviser	Barbados	Caribbean remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
7	Amalia del Riego	PAHO	Representative for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean	Barbados	Caribbean remit	Multilateral donor
8	Amrikha Singh	CARICOM	Programme Manager, Sustainable Development	Guyana	Regional remit	Regional organisation
9	André Fache	Delegation of the European Union to Jamaica, Belize, The Bahamas, Turks and Caicos and The Cayman Islands	Programme Manager	Jamaica	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
10	Angel Monorath	Ministry of Natural Resources-Mining	Deputy Director Mining	Suriname	Caribbean remit	Government agency

#	Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Caribbean or country remit	Interviewee type
		Directorate Deputy Director Mining (Suriname)				
11	Angela Sayle	The Planning Institute of Jamaica – PIOJ	Administrator	Jamaica	Country remit	Government agency
12	Antonette Grant	Governance and Security Team - FCDO	Regional Governance Advisor	Jamaica	Caribbean remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
13	Artessa Saldivar-Sali	World Bank	Senior Infrastructure Specialist in the Urban, Disaster Risk Management, and Land unit in Latin America and the Caribbean	Washington, D.C.	Caribbean remit	Multilateral donor
14	Barbara Scott	The Planning Institute of Jamaica – PIOJ	Deputy Director General	Jamaica	Country remit	Government agency
15	Cherianne Clarke	Caribbean Development Team (CDT)	Gender and Safeguarding Lead; Social Development Advisor, Barbados	Barbados	Caribbean remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
16	Chloe Noble	USAID	General Development Specialist	Guyana	Caribbean remit	Bilateral donor
17	Christian Josz	IMF-CARTAC	Programme Coordinator	Barbados	Caribbean remit	Multilateral donor
18	Colleen Falconer	Governance and Security Team - FCDO	Senior Programme Officer	Jamaica	Caribbean remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
19	Damien King	CAPRI	Executive Director	Jamaica	Caribbean remit	Regional research organisation
20	David Finan	SIDS Hub	Regional Manager	London, UK	Caribbean remit	FCDO / bilateral donor

#	Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Caribbean or country remit	Interviewee type
21	David Simard	Global Affairs Canada	First Secretary - Caribbean Regional Development Program	Barbados	Caribbean remit	Bilateral donor
22	Denise Edwards	Ministry of Finance in the Government of Dominica	Finance Secretary	Dominica	Country remit	Government agency
23	Donneil Cain	CCCC	Senior Project Development Specialist	Belize	Caribbean remit	Regional research organisation
24	Donovan Bogor	NIMOS (National Institute for Environment and Development)	Management Team	Suriname	Country remit	Government agency
25	Dorothee Roy	Global Affairs Canada	First Secretary and Deputy Director for Canada at the Caribbean Development Bank; Global Affairs Canada	Barbados	Regional remit	Bilateral donor
26	Dr. Gerard Jean-Jacques	Ministry of Finance	Chief Development Planner	Dominica	Country remit	Government agency
27	Durwin Humphrey	USAID	Project Management Specialist	Guyana	Regional remit	Bilateral donor
28	Edward Goberdhan	Guyana Forestry Commission	Commissioner	Guyana	Country remit	Government agency
29	Elizabeth Riley	CDEMA	Executive Director	Barbados	Regional remit	Regional organisation
30	Emile Lancelot	Ministry of Public Works (Dominica)	Permanent Secretary	Dominica	Country remit	Government agency
31	Gaulbert Sutherland	UNICEF	WASH & Climate Change Officer and Emergency Focal Point	Guyana	Regional remit	Multilateral donor

#	Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Caribbean or country remit	Interviewee type
32	Genora Joseph	CREAD	Senior Engineer at CREAD (former Chief Physical Planner)	Dominica	Country remit	Government agency
33	Gerardo Noto	UNDP	Resident Representative in Guyana and Suriname	Guyana	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
34	Gillian Smith	FAO	Representative in Guyana	Guyana	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
35	Gina Griffith	Conservation International	Executive Director	Suriname	Regional remit	International NGO
36	Giovanni Leung	Overseas Territories Directorate	Economist	London, UK	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
37	Gloria Joseph	Ministry of Labour, Public Service Reform, Social Partnership, Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development (Dominica)	Permanent Secretary	Dominica	Country remit	Government agency
38	Greg Broomes	IDB	Operations and Financial Coordinator, COMPETE Caribbean	Barbados	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
39	Greg Quinn	FCDO, Guyana	Acting Resident British Commissioner	Guyana	Country remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
40	Hamish Campbell	INDECOM Jamaica	Assistant Commissioner	Jamaica	Country remit	Government agency
41	Hannah Gough	SIDS Hub	Office Administrator	London, UK	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
42	Ian Mills	CDT	Deputy Development Director	Barbados	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor

#	Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Caribbean or country remit	Interviewee type
43	Ingrid Lavine	FCDO	Climate and Disaster Risk Reduction Team	Barbados	Regional Remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
44	Ivan Gaviria	IDB	Chief of Operations, Country Office Guyana	Guyana	Country remit	Multilateral donor
45	Jane Miller	FCDO, Guyana	British High Commissioner to the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, Ambassador of the UK to Suriname and CARICOM	Guyana	Country remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
46	Jeanelle Van Glaanenweygel	Organization of American States	Resident Representative	Washington, D.C.	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
47	Jerry Akum	World Wide Fund for Nature	Sustainable Forest Livelihoods Programme Lead	Suriname	Country remit	International NGO
48	Joan Nadal	EU	First Counselor - Head of Cooperation at EU Delegation to Guyana, Suriname and Caribbean OCTs	Guyana	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
49	Joseph Williams	CDB	Sustainable Energy Lead	Barbados	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
50	Joshua Jones	CDB	Project Assistant	Barbados	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
51	Judith Slater	FCDO	UK High Commissioner to Jamaica	Jamaica	Country remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
52	Kamilah Cardona	Engineer	Project Implementation Unit, Ministry of Works	Belize	Country remit	Government agency
53	Karyll Aitcheson	Global Affairs Canada	Senior International Assistance Officer	Jamaica	Regional remit	Bilateral donor

#	Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Caribbean or country remit	Interviewee type
54	Kate Reynolds	FCDO, Belize	UK Deputy High Commissioner to Belize	Belize	Country remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
55	Kester Craig	CDEMA	Deputy Executive Director	Barbados	Regional remit	Regional organisation
56	Kieron Kern Edward	IDB	Competitiveness, Technology, and Innovation Division (IFD/CTI) Division, COMPETE Caribbean	Barbados	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
57	Kiran Atwal	SIDS Hub	Head of SIDS	London, UK	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
58	Kishan Khoday	UNDP	UNDP Resident Representative – The Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Jamaica, Turks & Caicos.	Jamaica	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
59	Lealou Reballos	PAHO	Health Emergencies Adviser; Lealou is the expert responsible for the SMART Hospitals Initiative.	Barbados	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
60	Liz Brower	Caribbean Development Team (CDT)	Economic Development Team Leader	Barbados	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
61	Lorena Solorzano Salazar	IDB	IDB Representative in Guyana	Guyana	Country remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
62	Lynn Macdonald	FCDO	Results Adviser	Barbados	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
63	Malcolm Geere	Caribbean Development Team (CDT)	Development Director	Barbados	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
64	Marlon Clarke	UNICEF	Emergency Officer	Barbados	Regional remit	Multilateral donor

#	Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Caribbean or country remit	Interviewee type
65	Marsha Lynn Fat	Planning Institute of Jamaica – PIOJ	Senior Economist	Jamaica	Country remit	Government agency
66	Maxime Monsanto	FCDO, Belize	Climate Change Policy Officer	Belize	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
67	Natalie Hutchinson	Global Affairs Canada	Senior Development Officer: Climate and Environment	Barbados	Regional remit	Bilateral donor
68	Nicholas Stokeld	Caribbean Political Lead, Barbados	Caribbean Political Lead	Barbados	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
69	Nicole Davidson	FCDO, Belize	High Commissioner	Belize	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
70	Nikki Hassel	USAID	Project Management Specialist (Resilience)	Barbados	Regional remit	Bilateral donor
71	Oliver Blake	FCDO, Jamaica	Development Team Leader	Jamaica	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
72	Patricia Shako	FCDO	Climate and Disaster Risk Reduction Team	Barbados	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
73	Paul H. Saunders	CBD	DRM Lead	Barbados	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
74	Pradeepa Bholanauth	Ministry of Natural Resources	Senior Director, Climate Change	Guyana	Country remit	Government agency
75	Quantjon Akon	NIMOS (National Institute for Environment and Development)	Management Team	Suriname	Country remit	Government agency
76	Rahi Islam	Overseas Territories Directorate	Economist	London, UK	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
77	Rene Somopawiro	Foundation of Forest Management	Director Department of Research and Development	Suriname	County remit	Government agency

#	Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Caribbean or country remit	Interviewee type
		and Production Control, Suriname				
78	Ria Jharap	USAID Eastern and Southern Caribbean Mission (Suriname)	Development Assistance Specialist on Climate and Energy	Suriname	Regional remit	Bilateral donor
79	Riad Nurmohamed	Ministry of Public Works, the Government of Suriname	Minister of Public Works	Suriname	Country remit	Government agency
80	Richard Carter	Caribbean Development Team (CDT)	Climate and Disaster Risk Finance Team Leader	Barbados	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
81	Rosanne Kadir	FCDO	Program Officer Climate and Disaster Risk Reduction Team	Barbados	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
82	Samuel Carrette	CREAD	Resilience and Development Consultant	Dominica	Country remit	Government agency
83	Scott Fursedonn-Wood	FCDO	High Commissioner to Barbados	Barbados	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
84	Sharon Griffith	CBD	Programme Manager, Infrastructure Partnerships	Barbados	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
85	Simone Banister	FCDO	Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Adviser	Barbados	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
86	Sophie Haldane	Overseas Territories Directorate	Economist	London, UK	Regional remit	FCDO / bilateral donor
87	Steve Dower	MOCA	Senior Adviser	Jamaica	Country remit	Government agency

#	Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Caribbean or country remit	Interviewee type
88	Sylvia Donhert	IDB	Executive Director - Compete Caribbean	Barbados	Regional remit	Bilateral donor
89	Tricia Prose	Global Affairs Canada	Senior Development Officer	Ottawa, Canada	Regional remit	Bilateral donor
90	Valerie Lalji	Ministry of Natural Resources-Energy (Suriname)	Energy Director	Suriname	Country remit	Government agency
91	Virginie Andre	EU	Delegation to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean	Barbados	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
92	Wayner Elliott	IDB	Coordinator- Innovation and Productivity in Caribbean Firms and Clusters	Barbados	Regional remit	Multilateral donor
93	Yesim Oruc	The UN Resident Coordinator Office	United Nations Resident Coordinator in Guyana,	Guyana	Country remit	Multilateral donor
94	Heidi Gillette	Ministry of Public Works /Infrastructure	Assistant Project Manager	Guyana	Country remit	Government Agency
95	Lawrence Latchmansingh	Facilitation Office, Guyana	Officer	Guyana	Country Remit	Technical Assistance
96	Kareem Sabir	CARICOM	Senior Project Officer, Sustainable Development	Guyana	Regional	Regional Organisation.

Annex 4. Documents Reviewed

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- FCDO, 2024. Scoping Report for HMG activities to support Food Security in the Caribbean. Draft for Comments
- FCDO. 2023a. Annual Review - Increasing Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean
- FCDO. 2023b. Annual Review - Youth Skills for Economic Growth in the Eastern Caribbean (SkYE). March 2023. Programme Completion Review Youth Skills for Economic Growth in the Eastern Caribbean (SkYE)
- FCDO. 2023c. Caribbean Economic Development Programme (CEDP)
- FCDO. 2023d. Caribbean Growth and Resilience Diagnostic
- FCDO. 2023e. Central and regional initiatives and programmes supporting action on Adaptation & Resilience and Losses & Damages: SIDS hub
- FCDO. 2023f. Dominican Republic Country Business Plan 2023-2024
- FCDO. 2023g. Guyana Suriname and CARICOM Business Plan
- FCDO. 2023h. Jamaica Business Plan 2023-25
- FCDO. 2023i. Logframe: Increasing renewable energy and energy efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean - targets updated as on 7 Aug 2023
- FCDO. 2023j. Memorandum of Understanding Amendment Letter Project Name: Increasing renewable energy and energy efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean Project Number: 205061 Component Name: Sustainable Energy for the Eastern Caribbean Component Number: 205061-101 and 205061-104
- FCDO. 2023k. [Policy paper UK–Caribbean region development partnership summary, July 2023](#)
- FCDO. 2023l. Political Economy Analysis Of The Caribbean
- FCDO. 2023m. Programme Completion Review - Support for the Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica
- FCDO. 2023n. [UK Jamaica Violence Prevention Partnership Business Case and Summary \(D0003978\) 300973 \(Published – December, 2023\)](#)
- FCDO. 2022a. Annual Review - Increasing Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean
- FCDO. 2022b. Contribution Arrangement Amendment Letter : Oversight of Implementation Support to the Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica (CREAD) and Department for International Development Investments in Dominica
- FCDO. 2022c. [Final evaluation of SMART Health facilities in the Caribbean Phase 2](#)
- FCDO. 2022d. [UK Caribbean Infrastructure Fund: Evaluation baseline report](#)
- FCDO. 2021. Annual Review - Increasing Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean
- FCDO. 2020a. Annual Review - Increasing Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean
- FCDO. 2020b. Strengthening Disaster Recovery and Resilience in the Caribbean - Programme Completion Review

- FCDO. 2020c. Strengthening Disaster Recovery and Resilience in the Caribbean (Logframe)
- FCDO. 2020d. Support for the Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica - Annual review report
- FCDO. 2020e. Support for the Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica. Annual Review Template
- FCDO. 2019a. Annual Review - Increasing Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean
- FCDO. 2019b. Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Center (CARTAC) Subaccount - Letter of Understanding for Contribution by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID)
- FCDO. 2019c. Project Completion Review - Establishing the Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica (CREAD)
- FCDO. 2018. Summative evaluation of DFID's anti-corruption programming in the Caribbean, Final Evaluation Report. ITAD UK
- FCDO. 2017a. Annual Review - Increasing Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean
- FCDO. 2017b. Logframe: March, 2017 (Youth Skills for Economic Growth in the Eastern Caribbean (SkYE))
- FCDO. 2016. Project Completion Review - Emergency assistance to support relief efforts in Dominica as the result of the impact of Tropical Storm Erika
- FCDO. Addendum to Business Case For Scale-Up Cost Extension Summary Information Project Name Increasing renewable energy and energy efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean (205061)
- FCDO. Addendum To Business Case For Time Extension: Increasing renewable energy and energy efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean (205061)
- FCDO. Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean. Business Plan 2022-2025
- FCDO. Belize Country Business Plan 2023-2025
- FCDO. Business Case Summary Sheet Title: Strengthening Disaster Recovery and Resilience in the Caribbean
- FCDO. [Business Case: Summary Sheet, Youth Skills for Economic Growth in the Eastern Caribbean](#)
- FCDO. Caribbean Economic Development Programme - Logframe
- FCDO. Caribbean Humanitarian Assistance - Emergency Cash and Voucher Support in Response to the Volcano Eruption in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Earthquake in Haiti.
- FCDO. Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP3): Annual Review - Summary Sheet
- FCDO. Citizen Security and Justice Programme 3 - Logframe
- FCDO. DFID Business Case Increasing renewable energy and energy efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean 2015 to 2020
- FCDO. Form Of Contribution Arrangement: DFID Project Name: Strengthening Disaster Recovery and Resilience in the Caribbean
- FCDO. Haiti Country Business Plan 2023-2024
- FCDO. Memorandum of Understanding Amendment Letter Project Name: Increasing renewable energy and energy efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean Project Number: 205061 Component Name: Sustainable Energy for the Eastern Caribbean Component Number: 205061-101 and 205061-104

- FCDO. Memorandum Of Understanding With The Government Of The Commonwealth Of Dominica For Non Budget Support Financial Aid Between The Government Of The United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland Acting Through The Department For International Development (“DFID”) And The Government Of The Commonwealth Of Dominica (“The Government”) Support For Operationalisation Of The Climate Resilience Execution Agency Of Dominica (Cread) "
- FCDO. Oversight of Implementation Support to the Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica (CREAD) and Department for International Development Investments in Dominica
- FCDO. Programme Completion Review Title: Strengthening Health Facilities in the Caribbean (‘SMART’ Hospitals Initiative)
- FCDO. Programme Completion Review: Caribbean Humanitarian Assistance - Emergency Cash and Voucher Support in Response to the Volcano Eruption in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Earthquake in Haiti.
- FCDO. [Strengthening Disaster Recovery and Resilience in the Caribbean](#)
- FCDO. Support for the Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica (CREAD) - Business Case Summary Sheet
- FCDO. Support for the Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica (CREAD) - Logframe
- FCDO. [Support to the Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica \(CREAD\)](#)
- FCDO. WFP Cash and Voucher Support in Response to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines La Soufriere Volcano Emergency
- FCDO. WFP cash or voucher support to vulnerable households in earthquake impacted areas following the August 14, 2021 earthquake in Haiti

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Annex 5. Evaluation Team

The technical execution of the assignment was managed by the Team Leader, **Jamie Simpson**, and Project Manager and Resilience Expert, **Pepe Monroy**. To ensure effective communications all technical correspondence were directed to the Team Leader and Project Manager.

Additional Triple Line team members includes **Dr. Richard Slater** (Evaluation Methods Lead), **Bruce Pollock** (Infrastructure and Disaster Risk Management Expert), **Arielle Papa** (Climate Resilience Analyst), **Ekaterina Shaleva** (Evaluator) and **Mahima Mehra** (Evaluation Analyst).

The Triple Line team is complemented by GICSRD experts, including **Dr David Smith** (Caribbean Disaster Risk Management Expert), **Dr Evangeline Inniss-Springer** (Emergency Response Expert) and **Neisha Manickchand** (Stakeholder Engagement Analyst). A breakdown of the team's roles' and their responsibilities is given in the table below.

Name	Position	Responsibilities
Jamie Simpson	Team Leader	Responsible for the overall leadership of the evaluation and delivery of the programme of work. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall lead and point of contact for the client Lead evaluation design, tools, inception and synthesis stages Coordinate the work of the team to ensure working in unison Quality assurance Lead final presentation discussions with the client
Pepe Monroy	Project Manager and Resilience Expert	Implementation of the evaluation, analysis, and report writing, end-to-end project and resource management, contracting.
Dr. Richard Slater	Evaluation Methods Lead	Lead design of Evaluation Framework and Evaluation Questions. Supported case study design and planning, field missions and analysis. Conducted country case studies in Guyana and Suriname
Bruce Pollock	Infrastructure and Disaster Risk Management Expert	Contributed to Inception Report writing and design of thematic framework
Arielle Papa	Climate Resilience Analyst	Contributed to Inception Report writing and design of thematic framework. Supported case study design.
Ekaterina Shaleva	Evaluator	Supported the development of Evaluation Framework, analysis and report writing, EQUALS compliance
Mahima Mehra	Evaluation Analyst	Design of evaluation tools, framework, KII design, lead on document review, portfolio mapping, case study sampling, methodology, stakeholder mapping, note writing
Dr David Smith	Caribbean Disaster Risk Management Expert	Implementation, analysis, and report writing. Supporting Jamaica, Guyana & Suriname case studies
Dr Evangeline Inniss-Springer	Emergency Response Expert	Implementation, analysis, and report writing. Supporting Barbados case study
Neisha Manickchand	Stakeholder Engagement Analyst	Fieldwork and stakeholder engagement support, project management support

Annex 6. Evaluation Framework

Main Evaluation Question	Sub-Questions	Judgement Criteria/ Indicators	Data source
RELEVANCE AND COHERENCE			
EQ1. To what extent is FCDO's programming in the Caribbean both relevant and coherent in terms of building resilience?	1.1 What are the resilience challenges in country? How have these shifted over time? Is FCDO support adapting to shifts in a timely way?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional and country evidence related the different challenges following the eight dimensions of resilience listed in the Caribbean Resilience Framework The extent to which resilience challenges have evolved and evidence that FCDO support is being adaptable (or not) to changes in resilience context 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Country Selection Scorecard FCDO design-level documents (business plans, PEA, country plans) FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) Criteria based desk reviews of development partners documents (World Bank, IDB, CDEMA etc) Portfolio mapping Global KIIs KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors (including multilateral or bilateral implementing partners) KIIs with CDT KIIs with the SIDS Hub and the Overseas Territories Directorate

Main Evaluation Question	Sub-Questions	Judgement Criteria/ Indicators	Data source
	1.2 Is FCDO striking a coherent balance between regional and bilateral programming to address resilience challenges across the Caribbean?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which following a regional programming approach is allowing FCDO to reach resilience building objectives The extent to which following a bilateral programming approach is allowing FCDO to reach resilience building objectives The extent to which interventions are compatible with regional strategies or pathways and other interventions by development partners in the region or sectors The extent to which interventions are compatible with other FCDO interventions at the central level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCDO design-level documents (business plan, PEA, country plans) FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) Criteria based desk reviews of development partners documents (World Bank, IDB, CDEMA etc) Portfolio mapping KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors (including multilateral or bilateral implementing partners) Global KIIs KIIs with CDT KIIs with regional organisations KIIs with government counterparts KIIs with CDT KIIs with the SIDS Hub and the Overseas Territories Directorate
	1.3 To what extent are FCDO programmes designed to have an impact on the resilience and livelihoods of marginalised or vulnerable groups, especially women and girls?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which interventions address the needs of marginalised or vulnerable groups (esp. women and girls) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCDO design-level documents (business plan, PEA, country plans) FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion

Main Evaluation Question	Sub-Questions	Judgement Criteria/ Indicators	Data source
			Reviews and Programme Evaluations) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KIIs with CDT • KIIs with government counterparts • KIIs with the SIDS Hub and the Overseas Territories Directorate
	1.4 How is FCDO programming complementing and creating added value to on-going efforts from development partners in the Caribbean? Is there evidence of FCDO driving resilience-building agendas in the region?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The extent to which CDT efforts are covering a gap in resilience building that is not covered by other donors • The extent to which interventions are compatible with regional strategies or pathways and other interventions by development partners in the region or sectors • The extent to which CDT is working in synergy with other donors or regional organisations (e.g. CDEMA) to avoid duplication of efforts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criteria based desk reviews of development partners documents (World Bank, IDB, CDEMA etc) • Portfolio mapping • Global KIIs • KIIs with CDT • KIIs with regional organisations • KIIs with government counterparts • KIIs with CDT
	1.5 To what extent is the FCDO resilience programming in the Caribbean region compatible with regional resilience frameworks and a global narrative of resilience building?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To extent to which CDT efforts are building / complementing efforts undertaken by regional organisations (e.g. CDEMA) • The extent to which interventions are compatible with other FCDO interventions at the central level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Portfolio mapping • Global KIIs • KIIs with CDT • KIIs with regional organisations • KIIs with government counterparts • KIIs with CDT

Main Evaluation Question	Sub-Questions	Judgement Criteria/ Indicators	Data source
EFFECTIVENESS			
EQ2. To what extent is FCDO's programming in the Caribbean both relevant and coherent in terms of building resilience?	2.1 To what extent has FCDO supported the delivery of enabling reforms that have the potential to or have improved resilience?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which the intervention has achieved its objectives and intended results The extent to which the intervention has set the basis for follow-on / further efforts in resilience-building The extent to which approaches or changes promoted by the intervention were integrated by government(s) Evidence about the quantitative and qualitative progress made towards intended changes Evidence of unintended changes (positive or negative) as a result of FCDO support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) Criteria based desk reviews of development partners documents (World Bank, IDB, CDEMA etc) Portfolio mapping KIIs with CDT KIIs with government counterparts KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors (including multilateral or bilateral implementing partners)
	2.2 How is the choice of delivery partners contributing to programme effectiveness? How could FCDO strengthen partnerships to enhance the effectiveness of programming?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which FCDO is building on partner technical capabilities / geographic scope to widen reach, ensure VFM, obtain government buy-in and implement an intervention addressing a salient regional or in-country resilience need Evidence on where FCDO has added the most value and seen take up by others 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) Criteria based desk reviews of development partners documents (World Bank, IDB, CDEMA etc) Portfolio mapping KIIs with CDT KIIs with government counterparts

Main Evaluation Question	Sub-Questions	Judgement Criteria/ Indicators	Data source
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors (including multilateral or bilateral implementing partners)
	2.3 To what extent is FCDO capitalising on donor coordination / resilience-building (existing) donor structures in the Caribbean?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The extent to which FCDO participates in existing regional coordination mechanisms (e.g. Caribbean Development Partners Group) • The extent to which FCDO builds on existing regional coordination mechanisms (e.g. UN Resident Coordinator) to support the implementation of interventions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) • Portfolio mapping • KIIs with CDT • KIIs with government counterparts • KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors (including multilateral or bilateral implementing partners)
	2.4 To what extent is FCDO capitalising on resilience-building (existing) government structures in the Caribbean? To what extent has FCDO strengthened the capacity of governments to address resilience challenges?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The extent to which FCDO has used existing government structures to support / channel the implementation of interventions • The extent to which the intervention has achieved its objectives and intended results • Evidence about the quantitative and qualitative progress made towards intended changes • The extent to which approaches or changes promoted by the intervention were integrated by government(s) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) • Portfolio mapping • KIIs with CDT • KIIs with government counterparts • KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors (including

Main Evaluation Question	Sub-Questions	Judgement Criteria/ Indicators	Data source
			multilateral or bilateral implementing partners)
	2.5 To what extent has the private sector been meaningfully engaged in implementation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which the private sector has been engaged as part of intervention implementation The extent to which private sector has influence over planning and decision-making 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) Portfolio mapping KIIs with CDT KIIs with government counterparts KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors (including multilateral or bilateral implementing partners)
IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY			
EQ3. What is the evidence illustrating that FCDO programming has built resilience in a sustained and integrated manner? How can FCDO best continue to provide relevant support as Caribbean SIDS progress into graduating from ODA-eligibility?	3.1 What have been the most transformational impacts and why? How should FCDO build on them to sustainably inform future programming priorities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which approaches or changes promoted by the intervention were integrated by government(s) The extent to which the intervention has set the basis for follow-on / further efforts in resilience-building The extent to which best practice has been identified and documented, and a feasible plan for scaling and / or replication has been developed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) Criteria based desk reviews of development partners documents (World Bank, IDB, CDEMA etc) Portfolio mapping

Main Evaluation Question	Sub-Questions	Judgement Criteria/ Indicators	Data source
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which FCDO can further empower regional organisations to achieve transformational change in resilience-building in the Caribbean 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIIs with CDT KIIs with government counterparts KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors (including multilateral or bilateral implementing partners)
	3.2 How should future programming priorities embed graduation from ODA-eligibility? How can FCDO best leverage on available channels to continue supporting non-ODA eligible countries?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which approaches or changes promoted by the intervention were integrated by government(s). The extent to which this can set an effective basis so that countries operate autonomously (i.e. without government support) as they graduate from ODA eligibility The extent to which FCDO is already working / can continue working with implementing partners that do not follow the ODA / non-ODA fault line when providing support (e.g. CDEMA, CARTACT) The extent to which FCDO can further empower regional organisations to achieve transformational change in resilience-building in the Caribbean Evidence of FCDO contribution to shifts in capacities that have increased likelihood of sustained change and reduced dependence on ODA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) Criteria based desk reviews of development partners documents (World Bank, IDB, CDEMA etc) Portfolio mapping KIIs with CDT KIIs with government counterparts KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors (including multilateral or bilateral implementing partners)
	3.3 To what extent has the FCDO programming made a contribution to achieving impact in each of the eight Resilience Thematic Areas?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which interventions have achieved intended impacts Evidence about the quantitative and qualitative progress made towards intended changes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) Criteria based desk reviews of development partners




Main Evaluation Question	Sub-Questions	Judgement Criteria/ Indicators	Data source
			<p>documents (World Bank, IDB, CDEMA etc)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Portfolio mapping • KIIs with CDT • KIIs with government counterparts • KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors (including multilateral or bilateral implementing partners)
	3.4 Is the impact more discernible/sustainable in regional or bilateral efforts?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The extent to which following a regional programming approach is allowing FCDO to reach resilience building objectives • The extent to which following a bilateral programming approach is allowing FCDO to reach resilience building objectives • 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) • Criteria based desk reviews of development partners documents (World Bank, IDB, CDEMA etc) • Portfolio mapping • KIIs with CDT • KIIs with government counterparts • KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors (including multilateral or bilateral implementing partners)
	3.5 What are the considerations for future programming? What, if any, are the opportunities for scaling up for FCDO?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessment regarding the Resilience Thematic Areas where FCDO is working: relevance and value added to resilience building efforts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations)

Main Evaluation Question	Sub-Questions	Judgement Criteria/ Indicators	Data source
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment regarding the implementing partners that FCDO is mobilising to implement interventions: relevance, achievement VFM and technical and geographic synergies for resilience building efforts Available opportunities for FCDO to work better with regional organisations (e.g. CARICOM, CDB etc) The extent to which FCDO can further empower regional organisations to achieve transformational change in resilience-building in the Caribbean 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Criteria based desk reviews of development partners documents (World Bank, IDB, CDEMA etc) Portfolio mapping KIIs with CDT KIIs with government counterparts KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors (including multilateral or bilateral implementing partners)
EFFICIENCY			
EQ4. Is the FCDO footprint in the Caribbean deployed in an appropriate manner to deliver on to the resilience challenges the region faces?	3.1 Is there evidence of good stewardship of resources in the management of FCDO funds to support resilience building activities? What evidence exists to demonstrate that FCDO is delivering interventions in the most efficient and cost-effective way?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which interventions deliver results in an economic and timely way (e.g. through its partnerships) The extent to which there are sufficient resources allocated to admin to support technical delivery Evidence of partnerships, cofinancing and leveraging 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) Criteria based desk reviews of development partners documents (CAPRI, CARICOM, CDEMA etc) Portfolio mapping KIIs with CDT
	3.2 How is FCDO structured in the Caribbean? Is there evidence of sufficient coordination and synergic action to address regional resilience-building efforts between FCDO posts across the Caribbean?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment of distribution of FCDO posts across the Caribbean and reporting lines The extent to which interventions deliver results in an economic and timely way (e.g. through its partnerships) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) Portfolio mapping

Main Evaluation Question	Sub-Questions	Judgement Criteria/ Indicators	Data source
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of effective communication channels across FCDO posts in the Caribbean and efficient contribution to CDT strategic decision-making 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIIs with CDT
	3.3 Is the Caribbean Development Team structured in an appropriate way to address the resilience challenges that the Caribbean faces?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment of FCDO staff's footprint on resilience issues in the Caribbean The extent to which the CDT split across the Caribbean is well-suited to deliver on CDT Caribbean resilience building strategic objectives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) Portfolio mapping KIIs with CDT
	3.4 How is the Caribbean Development Team articulating the development and diplomatic mandates resulting from the DFID / FCO merger? How could the merger be capitalised on to enhance the way the Caribbean Development Team works to support resilience-building efforts in the Caribbean?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which there is a clear CDT strategy articulating how the FCDO development and diplomatic mandate come together and jointly work towards the common objective of building resilience The extent to which the FCDO development and diplomatic mandate is understood by CDT staff and perceived as a strength to work towards the common objective of building resilience 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) Portfolio mapping KIIs with CDT
	3.5 Is there evidence of sufficient coordination and synergic action between FCDO Caribbean posts and relevant FCDO groups at the central level (SIDS Hub, Overseas Territories Directorate)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence regarding the existence of coordination mechanisms and synergies in programme design and implementation between CDT, the SIDS Hub and the Overseas Territories Directorate Evidence regarding the existing of a common goal in resilience building articulated by CDT, the SIDS Hub and the Overseas Territories 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FCDO MEL documents (annual review, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations) Portfolio mapping KIIs with CDT KIIs with the SIDS Hub and the Overseas Territories Directorate

Main Evaluation Question	Sub-Questions	Judgement Criteria/ Indicators	Data source
		<p>Directorate and how this would materialise in the Caribbean</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which there are regular coordination mechanisms between CDT, the SIDS Hub and the Overseas Territories Directorate 	

Annex 7. Assessment of the evidence strength per data source

Data Source	Strength of Evidence	Limitations	Adopted Triangulation Measures and / or Measures to Mitigate Data Limitations
<p>FCDO MEL documents (Annual Reviews, Project Completion Reviews and Programme Evaluations)</p>	 <p>Very strong evidence was produced through the data source. Over 50 FCDO project documents forming part of the CDT resilience portfolio were reviewed. The documents reviewed including a mix of business cases, Annual Reviews and Project Completion Reviews. Mid-Term Evaluation or Final Evaluation Reports were reviewed, whenever available.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It was usually the latest Annual Review the one that was selected for review. This is not considered as a significant limitation as the latest Annual Review includes relevant data gathered from previous years. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence gathered through FCDO MEL document review was triangulated during KIIs with CDT, government agencies and relevant bilateral or multilateral implementing partners.
<p>Criteria based desk reviews of development partners documents (World Bank, IDB, CDEMA etc)</p>	 <p>Very strong evidence was produced through the data source. Over 50 documents developed by development partners working in the Caribbean were reviewed. Emphasis was placed on reviewing documents building an overarching resilience building narrative as well as reviewing documents produced by regional organisations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extensive reviews per Thematic Area listed in the Caribbean Resilience Framework were not undertaken. This is not a significant limitation as the evaluation scope focuses on building an overarching narrative on how different Thematic Areas interlink in resilience building processes (as opposed to gathering an exhaustive understanding of the specifics of each Thematic Area). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence gathered through criteria based desk reviews of development partners documents was triangulated during KIIs with CDT, government agencies and relevant bilateral or multilateral implementing partners.
<p>KIIs with CDT / FCDO Caribbean staff</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Due to the nature of the evaluation, there was stronger emphasis placed on holding 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence obtained through KIIs with CDT / FCDO Caribbean staff

<p>Very strong evidence was produced through the data source. Over 30 KIIs with CDT / FCDO Caribbean staff were undertaken. Staff were consulted across geographic locations in the Caribbean (Jamaica, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, The Bahamas). Engagement was undertaken with staff working across Resilience Thematic Areas.</p> <p>Views from CDT development staff were complemented by gathering views from FCDO diplomatic staff working in the Caribbean.</p>	<p>conversations with CDT staff working in the development space (over the diplomatic space).</p>	<p>was triangulated in a first instance through the review of FCDO MEL documents. Whenever further clarification was needed, subsequent conversations with CDT / FCDO staff were set-up. Conversations with implementing partners (i.e. government agencies or relevant multilateral or bilateral donors) were mobilised to triangulate evidence further.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KIIs with FCDO Caribbean staff with a diplomatic remit were undertaken to answer EQ4 and balance views coming from KIIs with CDT staff.
<p>KIIs with the SIDS Hub and the Overseas Territories Directorate</p> <p>Strong evidence was produced through the data source. 4 KIIs with the SIDS Hub and the Overseas Territories Directorate.</p>	<p>Interaction with the SIDS Hub and the Overseas Territories Directorate was framed in 2 KII phases (an initial phase in March and a subsequent phase in June).</p>	<p>Conversations with the SIDS Hub and the Overseas Territories Directorate were targeted and meant to complement initial insights on synergies highlighted by CDT. The second KII phase was specifically designed to fill existing information gaps.</p>
<p>KIIs with government counterparts</p>	<p>Differing emphasis was placed on conversations had with government counterparts across countries. More extensive engagement with government counterparts was undertaken in Dominica, Jamaica and Guyana.</p>	<p>The differing emphasis placed on conversations with government counterparts across countries reflects the weight given to specific country case studies, i.e. Jamaica, Dominica and Guyana were looked at in more detail than Belize for</p>

Strong evidence was produced through the data source. 20 KIIs with government counterparts were undertaken. Conversations with government agencies working hand-in-hand with FCDO in the implementation of projects that are part of the CDT resilience portfolio were prioritised.

instance given the importance of UKAID expenditure in-country and/or the number of CDT projects in-country.

- Extensive document reviews undertaken of FCDO MEL documents allowed to triangulate KII findings and address identified data gaps in countries where conversations with government counterparts were less extensive.



KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors (including multilateral or bilateral implementing partners)

Very strong evidence was produced through the data source. 35 KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors were undertaken. KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors working hand-in-hand with FCDO in the implementation of projects that are part of the CDT resilience portfolio were prioritised. This meant having conversations with multilateral or bilateral partners working across differing geographic scopes in the region and across the 8 Resilience Thematic Areas listed in the Caribbean Resilience Framework.

Additional KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors who are not FCDO implementing partners but that do have a stake in Caribbean resilience building allowed to obtain strategic insights as related to:

- Given the number of KIIs conducted with multilateral and bilateral donors, the evidence developed could be biased and disproportionately represent the views of the donor community working in resilience building in the Caribbean.
- Evidence obtained through KIIs with multilateral and bilateral donors was triangulated by mobilising insights from KIIs with CDT / FCDO staff.
- Any potential evidence bias coming from multilateral and bilateral donors was sensed checked through KIIs with CDT staff, KIIs with government counterparts and KIIs with regional research organisations and regional organisations.

- Lessons regarding the appropriate balance between regional and bilateral programming that FCDO could consider
- Resilience Thematic Areas to work in and how FCDO is addressing needs and gaps
- The choice of implementing partners
- Lessons regarding working with regional organisations (e.g. CDEMA) that FCDO could take into account

KIIs with regional research organisations / international NGO



Moderate evidence was produced through the data source. 5 KIIs with regional research organisations / international NGOs were undertaken.

- The number of KIIs conducted is limited and targeted.
- Given the evaluation scope, KIIs with regional research organisations / international NGOs were targeted. They focused on sense checking and triangulating specific evidence points gathered from document reviews or KIIs with CDT / FCDO.
- KIIs with regional research organisations / international NGOs were mobilised to complement evidence insights gathered from document reviews and KIIs.

KIIs with Regional Organisations



- The number of KIIs conducted is limited and targeted.
- Given the evaluation scope, KIIs with regional research organisations focused on complementing evidence insights obtained from document reviews and KIIs undertaken with other informant categories.

Limited evidence was produced through the data source. 2 KIs with Regional Organisations were undertaken.

- Insights from Regional Organisations were captured and triangulated through the extensive criteria based desk reviews of development partners documents undertaken.
-

The process for methodological triangulation

		Data source	FCDO MEL document review	KIIs with CDT / FCDO staff	KIIs with staff in government agencies	KIIs with staff in multilateral and bilateral donors
Triangulation Measure Implemented	Inception		Initial review undertaken during the Inception Phase and pursued through the Data Collection and Analysis Phase.	Initial KIIs during the Inception Phase allowed to develop an initial baseline.		Initial KIIs during the Inception Phase allowed to develop an initial baseline and triangulate evidence obtained from FCDO MEL document analysis and KIIs with CDT / FCDO staff.
	Data Collection & Analysis Phase Interim Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initial findings were triangulated through KIIs with CDT / FCDO staff as well as KIIs with government agencies. Evidence from this triangulation step was incorporated into the Interim Report. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The baseline built at Inception was augmented during the Data Collection and Analysis Phase. Emerging findings from the FCDO MEL document review were triangulated through KIIs with CDT / FCDO staff. Evidence from this triangulation step was incorporated into the Interim Report. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> During the Data Collection and Analysis Phase, KIIs with government agencies allowed to triangulate emerging findings from FCDO MEL document analysis and KIIs with CDT / FCDO staff. Evidence from this triangulation step was incorporated into the Interim Report. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> During the Data Collection and Analysis Phase, KIIs with staff in multilateral and bilateral donors allowed to further triangulate emerging findings from FCDO MEL document analysis and KIIs with CDT / FCDO staff and government agencies. Evidence from this triangulation step was incorporated into the Interim Report.
	Data Collection & Analysis Phase Final Report		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Additional FCDO MEL document analysis was undertaken to address feedback from the Interim Report. Updated findings were further triangulated through KIIs with CDT / FCDO staff as well as KIIs with government agencies and evidence from country case studies undertaken in May (Belize). Updated findings were incorporated into the Final Report. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Follow-up KIIs with CDT / FCDO staff were undertaken to address feedback from the Interim Report. Evidence from supplementary KIIs were merged and triangulated through additional analysis of FCDO MEL documents. Updated findings were incorporated into the Final Report. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Follow-up KIIs with government agencies were undertaken to address feedback from the Interim Report. KIIs with government agencies in Belize were also integrated at this stage. Evidence from follow-up KIIs was used to triangulate findings from additional FCDO MEL document analysis and KIIs with CDT / FCDO staff. Updated findings were incorporated into the Final Report. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Follow-up KIIs with staff in multilateral and bilateral donors were undertaken to address feedback from the Interim Report. Evidence from follow-up KIIs was used to triangulate findings from additional FCDO MEL document analysis and KIIs with CDT / FCDO staff and government agencies. Updated findings were incorporated into the Final Report.

Annex 8. Use and Influence Plan

Products	Activity	Audience	Timeline	Intended Impact
Inception Report and Inception Presentation	<p>Sharing insights of inception period, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initial presentation of Caribbean Resilience Framework and TOC Country selection methodology and finalisation of countries for field work and case study Agreeing on evaluation timeline and phasing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDT High Commissioners and FCDO diplomatic staff in the Caribbean 	February 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Obtaining buy-in from CDT regarding the selection and approach to country case studies Obtaining feedback to refine Caribbean Resilience Framework and TOC
Interim Report and Interim Presentation	<p>Sharing initial evaluation findings, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Insights from country case studies (Belize excepted), document review and KILs Initial responses to EQ1, EQ2 and EQ3 Initial conclusions and recommendations for EQ1, EQ2 and EQ3 Present updated version of Caribbean Resilience Framework and TOC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDT High Commissioners and FCDO diplomatic staff in the Caribbean SIDS Hub Overseas Territories Department EMG 	May 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDT is familiar with initial evaluation findings and provides feedback regarding how to orient subsequent phases of data collection CDT and EMG provide feedback regarding how to strengthen the evaluation approach and additional aspects to integrate as part of conclusions and recommendations SIDS Hub and Overseas Territories Department identify initial opportunities to strengthen synergies and collaboration with CDT
EQ4 Workshop	<p>Sharing initial EQ4 findings, including:</p>	CDT Senior Management	June 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Awareness raising among CDT Senior Management regarding

Products	Activity	Audience	Timeline	Intended Impact
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emerging evidence regarding FCDO “ways of working” in the Caribbean covering communication among FCDO posts, effective use of resources and integration between development and diplomatic mandates Agreeing a way forwards to collect further evidence to answer EQ4 	including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDT Development Director CDT Deputy Development Director CDT Results Adviser CDT Team Leaders (Infrastructure, Economic Development, Climate Change, Governance) 		EQ4 findings and FCDO “ways of working” in the Caribbean <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDT Senior Management provides feedback and advice on next steps to finalise analysis to answer EQ4
Final Report and Final Presentation	Sharing evaluation findings, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Insights from all country case studies, document review and KIs Responses to all EQs Conclusions and recommendations Updated version of Caribbean Resilience Framework and TOC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDT High Commissioners and FCDO diplomatic staff in the Caribbean Wider FCDO economic development, climate change and evaluation cadres SIDS Hub Overseas Territories Department EMG Additional HMG departments 	August 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDT disseminates evaluation findings beyond the Caribbean / SIDS remit Additional sections across FCDO and HMG are aware of the evaluation scope and findings and identify opportunities for further dissemination and synergy
Dissemination Paper	Sharing key insights regarding the evaluation scope, methodology and findings.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDT 	August 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDT disseminates evaluation findings beyond the Caribbean / SIDS remit


Products	Activity	Audience	Timeline	Intended Impact
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High Commissioners and FCDO diplomatic staff in the Caribbean • Wider FCDO economic development, climate change and evaluation cadres • SIDS Hub • Overseas Territories Department • EMG • Additional HMG departments 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Additional sections across FCDO and HMG are aware of the evaluation scope and findings and identify opportunities for further dissemination and synergy

Annex 9. Overview of Caribbean Resilience Challenges

6.1 Heterogeneity and Caribbean Resilience Building

There are various interpretations of what comprises the Caribbean Region. It is often taken to encompass the islands of the Greater and Lesser Antilles and sometimes the coastal areas surrounding the Caribbean Sea. It can also be considered as the region between Florida in the United States of America and the Northern Coast of South America. **As many as 43.5 million individuals reside on a total of 28 different island nations in the West Indies, each of which possesses unique characteristics.** This project focuses mainly on the 18 million inhabitants of the 15 full members of CARICOM¹⁶ of which seven are English-speaking ODA-eligible countries with a total population of approximately 4.4 million, of which nearly two-thirds reside in Jamaica. **The countries for this study include mainly CARICOM members,** except Montserrat which, due to its ongoing volcanic activity isolating half the island, remains a UK Overseas Territory with its annual government budget received directly from FCDO. All countries in this region are considered SIDS, although not all are ODA-eligible.

Figure 8. Map of the Caribbean



The islands and mainland were colonised between the 15th to 19th centuries by various European powers with initial contact wiping out indigenous populations through a combination of slavery, other cruelties, disease and neglect. This led to the importation of slaves to work on what were lucrative plantations for their colonial owners mainly producing sugarcane, bananas, coffee and tobacco, with many islands being captured, recaptured or traded during various colonial wars.

Despite this similar shared history and some similarities in their economies, with independence or autonomy, the region's countries are quite distinct in character. Much of this heterogeneity stems from the region being carved up amongst colonial powers with interactions between countries based more on common language than proximity. The sheer size of the region with the distance between Guyana and Belize being around 3,600 km – more than the distance between London and Cairo – supports and maintains these differences.

Part of the Caribbean's heterogeneity also arises from the countries being quite different in levels of economic development as measured by standard economic parameters. Gross Domestic Product

¹⁶ Note that CARICOM has members which are not islands

(GDP) per capita ranges from over USD 32,000 in the Bahamas to around USD 6,000 in Jamaica, with Haiti's less than USD 2,000.

Table 5. Basic Demographic and Economic Indicators for the Study Countries (World Bank)

Country	Population (2022 Est)	Population Growth (annual % 2022)	GDP per capita (USD)	GDP Growth (Annual % 2022)	Debt Service (% of GNI 2022)	Govt Revenue % of GDP
Belize	400,000	1.3	7,000	11.4	26	23
Dominica	72,000	0.4	9,100	6.0	4	6
Grenada	125,000	0.7	11,000	6/0	5	30
Guyana	805,000	0.5	21,000	62.3	1	18
Jamaica	2,828,000	0.0	6,000	4.0	10	29
Saint Lucia	180,000	0.1	12,000	14.9	3	22
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines	104,000	-0.4	11,000	5.3	3	29
Antigua & Barbuda	93,000	0.6	18,000	6.4	0	20
The Bahamas	408,000	0.5	38,000	11.0	0	21
Barbados	281,000	0.2	21,000	10.0	0	29
Haiti	11,600,000	1.19	2,000	-1.7	0.2	9
Saint Kitts & Nevis	48,000	0.1	19,000	9.0	0	44
Suriname	618,000	0.8	6,000	2.3	0	28
Trinidad & Tobago	1,526,000	0.4	24,000	2.5	0	27
Dominican Republic	11,230,000	1.0	10,000	19.4	3.7	15

Variation across Caribbean countries is reflected in socio-economic indicators (Table 5). The Bahamas and Trinidad & Tobago have very high Human Development Indexes (HDIs), the bulk of the CARICOM countries have high HDIs, with Belize rated as medium and Haiti as low, although St Kitts & Nevis, Guyana, Barbados, and Antigua and Barbuda all have similar per capita GDP to Trinidad and Tobago. This anomaly highlights the various human development issues in the region, considered acute in Belize, Guyana, Haiti and Jamaica, and the relatively large out-migration from the region, ironically reflecting the relatively good education and high literacy rates of some of these countries and the better employment opportunities in migrant recipient countries than in the region.

Understanding Caribbean heterogeneity is important to approaching resilience building in the region. The intricacies and subtleties between levels of development across countries may not only guide a contextualised response to challenges but also affect the way resilience programming is to be framed following regional differences.

6.2 Systemic and intertwined challenges framing vulnerability in the Caribbean

The Caribbean is highly vulnerable and has a history of dealing with shocks. It is characterised by systemic constraints that frequently intertwine to frame vulnerability in the region. Systemic constraints have not necessarily stopped Caribbean countries from achieving relatively high levels of prosperity as well as reaching resilience levels allowing them to maintain economic development, although the pace and cost of achieving development gains undoubtedly impeded – see World Bank, 2021 for an analysis of Caribbean development progress. To truly build long-term resilience, structural and interconnected challenges must be understood and addressed. The proposed Caribbean Resilience Framework (Section Developing a Caribbean Resilience Framework) provides an initial entry point to approach resilience in a holistic manner across the region; an overview of systemic and intertwined challenges is summarised as follows:

- **As a region, the Caribbean is marked by frequent exposure to a range of natural hazards (hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanoes), which constantly impact on the economic and physical structures that drive growth.** In particular, the impacts of climate change emerge as an existential challenge for the long-term prosperity of Caribbean SIDS. Their perpetual exposure to climate and natural hazards results in systemic vulnerability due to their impact on infrastructure (many infrastructural assets are vulnerable to climate impacts¹⁷) and economic structures, strongly based on tourism. With the recurrence of climate-related and other natural hazards, the infrastructure and economic bases that sustain long-term growth are frequently affected, creating an intertwined and systemic resilience building challenge.
- **The lack of economic diversification (over-reliance on tourism) limits the room to act when shocks hit, thereby compounding vulnerability.** When a disaster or crisis takes place, the lack of diversified economic activities means that Caribbean countries frequently resort to borrowing to cope with the aftermath of shocks. In turn, high levels of debt restrict the fiscal space that Caribbean countries have at their disposal to manage recovery and reconstruction. The lack of economic diversification, strong climate vulnerability and fiscal fragility intertwine to result in a negative cycle perpetuating vulnerability.
- **Low capacity and small scale constrain development prospects in Caribbean SIDS and drive vulnerability dynamics.** Small size determines capacities: with a limited workforce, shortages in technical capacity and a constrained private sector, the space for innovative action and room to push new efforts ahead is restricted. Isolation and high costs of interconnectivity exacerbate capacity limitations.
- **Governance traits such as widespread violence, high levels of corruption and dearth of accountability impact the ability of institutional structures to sustain long-term prosperity, foster social cohesion and enact effective responses when shocks hit.** These social and democratic challenges are interconnected and constrain governments' ability to implement transparent processes that build trust and set the bases for long-term growth and improved well-being. Without such bases, prosperity and well-being will be restricted by the systemic challenge of inequality, social degradation and poor accountability.

The following sections present an overview of the systemic and interconnected challenges that frame resilience building in the Caribbean. Rather than giving a comprehensive overview, the sections build on the Caribbean Growth and Resilience Diagnostic and Caribbean Resilience Framework to detail the interconnected nature of challenges and the need for a holistic approach to building resilience.

6.2.1 The persistence of climate change impacts and natural hazards as factors compounding vulnerability and resilience prospects

Having experienced over 400 disasters since 1950, the Caribbean is prone to hazards such as hurricanes, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Much of the region lies in the path of the seasonal cyclones of the North Atlantic. Many of its islands have been formed by, or around, volcanoes. Most

¹⁷ E.g. the electricity transmission network is highly vulnerable to damage from cyclones

Caribbean capitals have been significantly damaged by earthquakes at some point in their history. These natural hazards are now compounded with increased climate-related hazards: climate change contributes to stronger cyclones, increased sea level rise, with shorter wet seasons, increased drought and coastal erosion, and more extreme and damaging rainfall.

The frequency and damage caused by climate and natural events is well documented. Natural disasters in the Caribbean occur 10 times more frequently than the global average and the economic impact associated with disasters is about 20 times higher (IMF, 2022). As projected, storms and hurricanes are becoming more frequent with data illustrating that in 2023, the 30-year average for the Atlantic Hurricane season increased to 14 named storms, 7 hurricanes and 3 major hurricanes (contrasting to the 1881-2010 averages which included 12 storms, 6 hurricanes and 3 major hurricanes). As a result, three out of every 10 people across Latin America and the Caribbean were affected by a hurricane since the year 2000 (UN-OCHA, 2023).

In the Caribbean, it is estimated that 3 percent of yearly GDP is lost on average to climate-related disasters. In the period 2015-2023, which this evaluation considers, the Caribbean experienced two devastating hurricanes (Hurricane Irma and Maria) in 2017, with Maria causing damage amounting to 226% of Dominica's GDP (IMF, 2022) and category five Hurricane Dorian affecting The Bahamas in 2019 (25% of GDP, IDB 2020). In addition, two Tropical Storms – Tropical Storm Erika (2015) and Tropical Storm Lisa (2023) caused significant impacts in Dominica, Belize and Central America. In 2021 the Caribbean experienced the volcanic eruption of La Soufriere in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as well as a 7.2 magnitude earthquake in Haiti, which resulted in significant disruption in the affected countries: the volcanic eruption resulted in the displacement of around 20,000 people and exacerbated the Covid-19-related challenges Saint Vincent was experiencing, while the earthquake in Haiti caused 2,200 fatalities, injured 12,268 people and over 115,000 homes were damaged or destroyed (FCDO, 2021).

Climate Change affects all Caribbean SIDS, but two factors are worth noting. Firstly, Caribbean *Islands* will experience new climate regimes earlier than countries on the mainland and long before higher latitude countries (Mora et al., 2013); climate change effects on continental systems in South America (and Trinidad) are mainly related to flooding, high temperatures and drought, while in the islands and Belize, tropical cyclones are the primary concern, followed by flash floods, drought, sea level rise and high temperatures. Secondly, unlike the islands, Guyana and Suriname (and to a lesser extent, Belize) contain large expanses of high-quality tropical forest that are important globally in *mitigating* climate change.

Guyana and Suriname both are over 80% forested, making them among the most forested countries on the planet. Together they protect millions¹⁸ of hectares of tropical forest and loss of these areas would have dire consequences for the planet's biodiversity, water supplies and climate. The eastern Guiana Shield is globally important for its biodiversity¹⁹ and it is estimated that some 40% of species are endemic and 90% of the area is yet to be fully assessed (Snyder, 2018). Belize is 62% forested and protects meso-American forest.

Natural hazards are not the only risks that threaten the Caribbean: there are other risks and shocks that affect the residents of the region. These can possibly be divided into *internal* and *external* shocks, although not all are mutually exclusive. The main difference being that internal shocks tend to stem from internal constraints, and weak application of institutional and legal systems and processes. External shocks are those which little can be done to avoid except adapt where possible and build resilience to these shocks mainly through anticipation, planning and response.

A recent example of an external shock is the increased food prices due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This event increased food insecurity globally and hit the Caribbean pushing up the price of staple foods. As always, such events impact more severely on poor and already vulnerable groups.

Prior to the arrival of Covid 19, natural hazards were probably the most addressed risk when discussing resilience, and they may remain the most prominent risk. While climate change tends to

¹⁸ 18 million ha in Guyana

¹⁹ <https://www.amazonteam.org/maps/guiana-shield/> and <https://naturalhistory.si.edu/research/botany/research/biological-diversity-guiana-shield/publications>

be uniform across the region (though with some differences between countries), hazards can affect individual countries and cause disasters which are precipitated or exacerbated by climate change.

There has been some progress in adaptation planning and assessments as well as the introduction of early warning systems for disasters. This has been accompanied by the adoption of improved ecosystem-based protection to reduce potential flooding and landslides. Buildings and other structures have been strengthened to increase their seismic resistance. Other actions such as integrated water management, coastal zone protection, renewable energy and disaster risk financing have also been considered with varied implementation.

Vulnerability itself is increasing in that the relatively small size of most CARICOM countries inhibits response and recovery, invariably requiring external assistance. However, there is still a need for in-country capacities to be strengthened to respond to disasters and minimise human impacts. A few countries have developed disaster contingency plans, but only four have a disaster reserve fund.

The region's countries are also characterised by their large ocean biodiversity. Ocean diversity is threatened by development and climate change. Given the major role that the ocean (and particularly coral reefs) plays in tourism, the economic mainstay of the Caribbean, this is a high risk. Other SIDS' regions face similar challenges and may lack adaptation and resilience plans. Maintaining their oceanic assets would improve the resilience of the Caribbean's tourism product and competitive advantage. However, to date, only four countries have prepared a marine economy plan, and it is unclear how much of a priority is provided to this aspect.

Climate change issues should be addressed more cohesively and comprehensively. As early as 2012, CARICOM estimated that the costs of inaction in just three categories – increased hurricane damage, loss of tourism revenue, and infrastructural damage – projected annual damage costs totalling \$10.7 billion annually by 2025, \$22 billion by 2050 and \$46 billion by 2100 (CARICOM, 2020). These costs represent 5 percent, 10 percent and 22 percent respectively, of the current Caribbean economy (2004 GDP) and would have serious negative impacts on further development and wealth creation in the region. The net effect of costs on this scale would be equivalent to a perpetual economic recession in each CARICOM member state.

6.2.2 Economic vulnerability stems from the lack of diversification, lack of opportunity and fiscal pressures that exacerbate climate and disaster vulnerability

The lack of economic diversification and strategies to diversify the economy leaves the Caribbean economically vulnerable and compounds vulnerability to climate and natural hazards. Since their climate and location provide a strong competitive advantage, Caribbean countries have developed thriving beach tourism industries and are heavily dependent upon it. The Caribbean is the world's most dependent region on tourism, although high levels of variability can be observed between countries: data illustrated that in 2022 tourism revenue accounted for 93.3 percent of GDP in Antigua and Barbuda, 56.1 percent in Saint Lucia, 23.8 percent in Barbados and 2.4 percent in Suriname (FCDO, 2023d). Tourism is an extremely fickle sector and highly susceptible to external shocks. Economic vulnerability was strongly demonstrated when the region took the largest hit from Covid with an average shrinking of countries' economies by around 15 percent.

Constraints to economic diversification are interlinked with the small size and relative isolation of the islands. Large scale commercial agriculture in the islands is limited, or even prevented, by natural conditions, generally mountainous terrain and poor soils, but maybe more so due to lack of any economies of scale. In addition, the history of commercial agriculture in the Caribbean and Central America with its focus on single export cash crops, hindered diversification, increased economic vulnerability and was not beneficial to the people of the producer countries. This factor, while not necessarily a deterrent, could reduce the priority of agriculture. The situation means that much foodstuff and most non-food products are imported, leaving the SIDS vulnerable to production, trade and transport risks.

The populations of Caribbean countries are often too small to benefit from economies of scale. Migration, particularly of higher educated people, may also tend to restrict diversification into more value-added service industries. Combined with outward migration, human capital constraints restrict local production, all exacerbated by skills shortages, high energy costs and reliance on imports funded by a narrow range of exports. Their small-scale leads to relatively high per capita costs for

public spending, and inadequate government capacity is a common challenge. The cost of the minimum set of essential institutions leads to relatively large public sectors (in terms of employment and for government expenditure as a percentage of GDP) with limited capacity and despite large relative sizes their small absolute size means they suffer from diseconomies of scale.

Economic vulnerability resulting from low diversification, small size, skills shortages and fiscal pressures leaves the doors open to accusations of questionable and harmful practices. This materialises in the form of policy deviation and corruption, lack of due diligence on climate, environmental and social safeguards, and investment citizenship. Dominica’s “Citizenship By Investment (CBI)” scheme, has been ranked as the “best CBI scheme” but lacks clarity on the character and integrity of its new citizens. Much of this is reflected in the “Ease of doing business” indicators with Jamaica the highest ranked country at 71st globally, with most other countries ranking much lower below 100. The causes of weak Ease of Doing Business performance is also likely to reflect historic government processes and procedures that are not automated and digitised.

6.2.3 Shortages in infrastructure investment and reliance on fossil fuel imports impact economic vulnerability and compound regional long-term growth prospects

Infrastructure investment backlogs (roads, ports, water, energy and wastewater) further constrain economic growth. For instance, the IDB considers that among the 8 CARICOM members where it operates, there is an infrastructure investment gap of USD 19.6 billion (IDB, 2021). This is important, as adequate and resilient infrastructure is an important base to support economic growth, enhance connectivity and foster diversification – thereby sustaining long-term prosperity (World Bank, 2021). Without appropriate infrastructure, the Caribbean may not fulfil its economic potential.

Caribbean infrastructure assets are highly exposed to climate and natural events, which determines the dynamics of reconstruction and recovery when hazards hit, and prospects for long-term resilience building. Assessments undertaken to evaluate the exposure of infrastructure assets illustrate that a large share of the Caribbean’s assets is exposed to hurricane winds and landslides, combined with the exposure of a smaller but sizable proportion of assets to floods and earthquakes (World Bank, 2021).

In the region, housing and transport infrastructure have tended to be the sectors most impacted by natural hazards. Data on historic damage resulting from tropical storms, hurricanes, earthquakes and floods illustrates that the housing and infrastructure sector is the most affected; for instance, it accounted for 71-81 percent of total damages in Dominica following Tropical Storm Erika and Hurricane Maria. When it comes to transportation assets (roads, bridges), data illustrates that they are frequently marked by the most impactful damage within the infrastructure sector: damage to transport assets accounted for 66-84 percent of infrastructure damage in Dominica, 97 percent in Saint Lucia and 89 percent in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (World Bank, 2021).

Interestingly, impacts to physical infrastructure experienced by Caribbean countries resulting from natural hazards (notably in housing and transport infrastructure) may not significantly impact longer-term economic growth outlooks. The World Bank (2021) highlights that the various mechanisms in place enabling economic structures (in general and infrastructure related) to recover swiftly, limits the negative impact of shocks and disasters on economic growth. However, the negative effects of disasters on poverty, social inequality and human capital have a strong impact on long-term growth.

A positive aspect is that generally service provision is adequate with universal access to basic services such as water supply, electricity and waste management, albeit not in all countries. However, even without the pressures of climate change much infrastructure should be upgraded, particularly to provide more cost-effective services and improve foundations for economic diversification. Critically much infrastructure needs to be stress tested for climate resilience, such as drainage and water resources. Structures also need to be tested for increased wind velocities.²⁰

²⁰ Puerto Rico, with access to much greater resources and technical skills, took a long time to restore the electricity network functionality post Maria. Note also the amount of time being taken to restore electricity to all of Jamaica following Beryl. Still not completed six weeks after the impact. <https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/2024/08/19/vaz-requests-probe-jps-electricity-bill-spike/>

Until recently, most settlements in the region have developed without substantive urban planning, driven more by short-term commercial and export interests. With many settlements in low-lying coastal areas, sea level rise is an issue also impacting negatively upon tourism and resilience of coastal urban areas such as Georgetown in Guyana and Belize City. More resilient, integrated settlement planning could reduce overall carbon footprints, while providing greener, more resilient services, housing and other facilities.

Water resources could pose a major constraint, particularly given higher tourism demands. With tourism playing such a major economic role and given the high volumes required, resorts and hotels often provide their own infrastructure and services but may compete with nearby communities.

Seven of the world's top 36 water-stressed countries are in the Caribbean with Barbados in the top ten. Antigua and Barbuda is also categorized as “water-scarce,” with less than 1,000 m³ freshwater resources per capita.³ Guyana and Suriname, unlike the Caribbean Islands, have ample water resources as they lie in part of the Amazon Basin. Droughts are increasing and can impact on agriculture and produce bush fires. Climate change will exacerbate these issues. Investment in capturing rainwater at city, street and household levels as well as investment in improving wastewater treatment, particularly introducing additional final treatment to “polish” effluent so that it can be used for irrigation or other non-domestic uses, would help address resource shortages.

Power supply is heavily driven by fossil fuels with slow progress towards renewable energy. In 2021, around 86 percent of the energy mix in the English-speaking Caribbean was fossil fuel-based; countries are reliant on importing fossil fuels to secure energy needs, which brings about significant costs – currently fossil fuel imports account to about 13% of total GDP (FCDO, 2023d).

Dependence on fossil fuels is a reality in a context where solar and wind power have a clear potential. It is estimated that the CARICOM potential for solar PV alone is over 500TW; this is complemented by biomass (~60 GW), wind (~30 GW), hydropower (~10 GW) and geothermal (~6 GW). Estimations also highlight that it will require an investment amounting to more than US\$ 1.25 billion per year to meet CARICOM'S 48 percent renewable energy target by 2030. Distribution networks in most islands will require improvements and upgrades to handle the coming on stream of solar and wind.²¹

Even though the region contributes to less than 1 percent of global total emissions, the energy transition remains vital to ensure long-term economic stability. Transportation remains fossil fuel based and while a transfer to electric vehicles would reduce localised pollution, without a parallel transfer to renewable energy, this would only increase fossil fuel power generation.

6.2.4 Although Caribbean countries are democracies, governance traits in the form of inequality, violence, corruption and a lack of accountability create an environment negatively impacting on social cohesion and development

Although all countries looked at by the evaluation are democracies and relatively politically stable, they are also tempered, to various degrees, by widespread violence, persisting inequality, strong perceptions of corruption and accountability challenges. This democratic and social environment in turn impacts on the prospect of achieving long-term resilience efforts supported by social cohesion and institutional strength.

Although there are challenges in data accuracy, the evidence points to Caribbean countries being marked by strong levels of social inequality, even though social inequality is more significant in some countries than others. Some Caribbean countries are classed among the most unequal in the world (e.g. Haiti) while in others, inequality is more balanced (e.g. Guyana or Belize). Regional wealth inequality is partly a reflection of historic structures resulting from slavery and the colonial period which resulted in unequal patterns in the distribution of property and economic resources.

In addition to social inequality, the lack of social cohesion is reflected in widespread violence, which frequently exceed global averages and places some Caribbean countries (e.g. Jamaica) among the most violent in the world. Widespread violence is driven by social norms, gang activity and the availability of illegal firearms. Generally low educational performance, family and community violence, coupled with the social underperformance and very poor educational outcomes of young males,

²¹ Further RE potential exists in Suriname and Guyana hydropower.

creates an environment which fosters boys' entry into gangs and crime. Social acceptance of violence against women and girls increases their marginalisation. Widespread violence not only results in social deterioration, but also comes with significant costs; estimates point to direct and indirect costs associated with violence accounting for 3.5 percent of regional GDP in 2014 (IDB, 2017).

Compounding widespread violence, serious crime and organised crime thrives in the Caribbean, with justice and legal systems frequently unable to respond. The Caribbean is located within proximity to drug supply routes serving both North America and Europe, and due to limited resources for control, the illicit movement of financial capital and drugs is widespread. Governments have frequently opted to mount responses that do not address the underlying causes behind serious and organised crime; in addition, despite best efforts, capacity and financial resources are often insufficient to tackle the scale of the challenge. Political and economic elites can be reluctant to act as they are regularly linked to groups operating serious and organised crime.

Corruption continues to be prevalent across the Caribbean, although data points to perceptions of corruption having stayed consistently stable over the past decade. Corruption in the region hinders growth and development prospects as it negatively impacts on accountability, the rule of law and the strength of institutions. There is a link between corruption and organised crime, with government or public officials being vulnerable to organised criminal groups.

6.3 How are Caribbean resilience challenges evolving? Are there new entry points to consider

Building on Section How should future programming priorities embed graduation from ODA-eligibility? How can FCDO best leverage on available channels to continue supporting non-ODA eligible countries?, this Section adopts a forward-looking lens; rather than listing all of the challenges that Caribbean countries face when it comes to building resilience. It introduces a discussion of emerging issues that could pose a challenge to resilience-building efforts. The intention is to present priority entry points that FCDO (and other donors) could consider in programming.

6.3.1 The UN Multidimensional Vulnerability Index as a tool to frame vulnerability in the Caribbean

Resilience is defined in the United Nations' Multidimensional Vulnerability Index as "a country's ability and capacity to mitigate the impact of shocks or stressors, recover swiftly from them, and adapt flexibly in response to stressors." (UN, 2024).

Vulnerability has received more attention with the February 2024 publication of the UN Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI) (UN, 2024), previous work on Multidimensional Vulnerability by the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB, 2019) and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network – SDSN (Sachs et al. 2021) and the trialling of a Recovery Duration Adjuster by the CDB (2022). Since MVI scores do not correlate with income it is suggested that they be used as a complement to Gross National Income (GNI) in understanding a country's requirement for concessional financing (UN, 2024). The most vulnerable Caribbean countries are St Lucia (9th most vulnerable in the world) and Haiti (10th most vulnerable) while the least is Suriname (ranked 122nd).

Most Caribbean countries are in the most vulnerable half of world rankings. Some high *per capita* GNI SIDS are highly vulnerable. St Lucia, like several other Caribbean SIDS is likely to graduate from ODA status in 3 to 4 years (FCDO, 2023d). It will still be vulnerable but may not be eligible for concessional help even after a disaster. Although *per capita* GDP in SIDS is often high, this does not mean that citizens are prosperous or rich since GDP does not measure wellbeing (Sen, Fitoussi, and Stiglitz 2010) or inequality. In any case, the per capita cost of damage and loss after an extreme event can easily exceed the GDP per capita (e.g. per capita DALYs caused by Ivan in the Cayman Islands 2004 was US\$75,000 per capita).

The SDSN indicated that structural, social and environmental vulnerabilities constrain SIDS from achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Sachs et al. 2021). SDG Index scores for SIDS are below the world average and progress on most of the goals faces major or significant challenges. SDG index scores for Caribbean countries range from 76.74 (world ranking 39) for Cuba down to 52.68 (world ranking 151) for Haiti, while the mean for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is

70.2. SDG Index scores for CARICOM countries are below the mean for LAC, however, none of the OECS countries are included in this statistic due to lack of data (Sachs, J.D. et al. 2023).

6.3.2 An outlook to new challenges in Caribbean resilience

Managing oil and gas reserves in Guyana and Suriname

Guyana and Suriname face new challenges related to their newly discovered oil and gas reserves. Suriname ranks 124 in terms of Human Development Index (HDI) while Guyana is 95 (United Nations Development Programme 2024). The discoveries are offshore and provide a potential source of income to the government that could be used to drive development. However, careful management of the economy is required to avoid the resource curse. While Guyana has begun production from the new reserves, Suriname has not yet awarded a concession. In the case of Guyana, per capita GDP has increased faster than any economy in the world, but this has been accompanied by increased prices for consumer goods, services and other commodities.

Both countries will have to manage carefully the vastly increased size of the economy and take measures to ensure that inflation and inequality do not increase, and that the wellbeing of citizens increases. The Government of Guyana has produced a *Low Carbon Development Strategy* to address these issues (Gov Guyana, 2024). The challenge will be to avoid increasing inequality and ensuring that all communities become part of increased development and the new economy, and that wellbeing, particularly in the hinterland and Amerindian communities increases. To avoid the resource curse, Governments will have to ensure there is sufficient focus on developing non-oil sections of the economy while the oil economy continues to grow rapidly.

Increased government funds allow for the construction, maintenance and repair of infrastructure. Again, care must be taken to ensure that inequality is reduced by access to new transportation routes rather than amplified. With increased access to the forest, there will be increased opportunity for gold mining and timber extraction. Managing these activities to maintain forest ecosystem services, carbon sinks, forest cover and reduce the degradation of biodiversity and forest will be a challenge for Suriname and Guyana.

The impacts of increased ocean tourism on tourism, biodiversity and settlements

The economies of most of the islands are highly vulnerable because of an “overdependence” on beach tourism (Baldacchino, 2021). Several authors recommend that Caribbean countries diversify their economies to reduce this vulnerability (Gounder and Cox, 2022; Mooney and Zegarra, 2020). This is becoming increasingly important as scientists project that increased ocean temperatures will lead to a “tipping point” for damage to coral reefs (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019; McKay et al., 2022; Frieler et al., 2013) a key resource for beach tourism.²² The IPCC projection is that if temperatures reach 1.5°C above historical values, then 70 to 90 percent of corals worldwide will die within ten years. It should be noted that the world’s second largest barrier reef is off the coast of Belize.

Damage and death of coral reefs, which protects vital coastline assets, will affect coastal communities that depend on them for food and fishing, affect prospects for blue economy expansion, and could have highly deleterious effects on the beach tourism industry, the mainstay of Caribbean Island economies (a lot of the white sand on Caribbean beaches is derived from coral reefs). Ocean temperatures continue to increase and damage to Caribbean coral reefs due to record high ocean temperatures was recorded in 2023 (Royal Meteorological Society, 2023; Latijnhouwers, 2024). Current projections are that such events will become more frequent.

Increased ocean temperatures will also increase the incidence of major hurricanes and cause tropical cyclones to carry higher levels of moisture, thus increasing flood and landslide risk. All countries in the Caribbean will need to address increased flood risk in urban centres and for those that may be below sea level (e.g. Paramaribo, Georgetown & Belize City) or on the coast, the need is greater. Care should also be taken to protect important civil infrastructure such as roads and airport runways that are adjacent to the sea. Sea level rise will be an increased threat to these, and it should be noted that 25 of 47 Caribbean airport runways are at elevations below 5m, while 29 are below 10m.

²² Corals produce white sand which makes up many Caribbean beaches and protect the beaches from erosion.

Migration as a response to disasters

In 2017 the population of Puerto Rico fell in response to the island being hit by two category five hurricanes. There are few barriers to migrating to the United States for Puerto Ricans. However, while there are higher barriers to movement into the USA for other Caribbean citizens, Caribbean countries have seen population movement after major hurricanes. Normally this is a temporary measure to earn some money to replace what was lost, however, in the case of Dominica it is likely migrants have not returned and the population has fallen following Tropical Storm Erica in 2015 and Hurricane Maria in 2017.

The effects of climate change on agricultural production and health

The effects of climate change on agricultural production are concerning and they will vary between the islands and the mainland. Tropical cyclones will cause periodic damage to crops and infrastructure, but the effect of drought cannot be ignored. The CIMH creates monthly bulletins indicating the likely effect of weather and climate on the sector. The sector needs to reform cultural methods and increase the pace of transformation to modern methods of agriculture especially within small scale farms, paying special attention to efficient use of water. This should be supported in the context of the CARICOM's desire to reduce food import bills by 25% by 2025. Many of the islands have very small amounts of agricultural land so the focus would be on increasing efficient, resilient production on the mainland and improving transportation of products while addressing production in the larger islands.

The effects of climate change on health include the increased transmission of vector-borne diseases (e.g. Zika, Dengue, Chikungunya, Malaria), and it should be noted that the economic cost of dengue can far surpass the direct medical costs (Marczell, K, et al. 2024). It is possible that increased temperatures could reduce the comfort (and number) of tourists (Gomez-Martin, M. et.al 2020). Additionally, the effects of increased temperature on vulnerable persons, such as older citizens and young children are increasingly being investigated in the Caribbean. The Lancet medical journal reports regularly on this through its Countdown on Health and Climate Change (see Lancet, 2023 and Romanello et al., 2023). Concerns include increased climate effects on vulnerable members of the population, persons with asthma, effects on persons with non-communicable diseases and effects on persons working outdoors (Allen et al. 2021), however, more research is needed in this area.

6.3.3 New potential entry points

- **Improving the resilience of Caribbean countries means diversifying their economies** and supporting the transition of economies from ones based almost entirely on the use of natural resources (beach tourism, mining, oil and gas) to ones that include activities based on human capital (valued-added products, manufactured goods, digital and other services) as well. This will require increasing human capital and the amount of renewable and low carbon energy sources (e.g. geothermal or solar).
- **Many Caribbean countries suffer from a shortage of data relating to important social and economic parameters.** As a result, it is difficult to track progress towards the SDGs or other development targets and they are often missing from global reports. FCDO should consider supporting improved collection and management of development-related data; increased access to high quality science information relevant to policy; increasing open access to data; building open data policies; improving the Science-Policy Interface and enhancing evidence-based decision making.
- **Caribbean countries need more technically trained persons.** This is sometimes because training may not keep up with demand for trained persons and because some categories of trained professionals are in great demand abroad (e.g. Teachers and Nurses) leading to increased migration of those people to higher paying markets. For example, a qualified teacher in Jamaica could earn two to three times their PPP-adjusted salary in Canada or the United States and more than 150% of their salary in the UK (George et al., 2021). While increasing training may not reduce migration, that should not be a disincentive for training. A country will do better with increased human capital even if there is higher migration than with lower human capital and low migration. Efforts should also be made to support regional efforts to address the issue since individual country disparities in income can fuel inter-regional migration (George et al., 2021).

Support to the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) to increase the ease of movement of labour and skilled or trained persons around the Caribbean region (within CARICOM/CARIFORUM and without) as well as inter-country exchanges of skills (both long-term and short-term) and taking advantage of digital technology to facilitate remote use of skills between countries may also be effective.

- **Increased attention to the relationship between climate and health** considering the new climate regimes being experienced is important, especially for the wellbeing of vulnerable populations (e.g. children, the aged and those doing physical labour outdoors). Support for medical research in this area and equipping the health systems for increased patient load and emergency events is important. A policy brief on the subject as it affects SIDS has been put out under the Lancet Countdown (Parker, Gordon-Strachan, and Parchment 2022) and a full report will be released in 2024.
- **Guyana has been successful in forest management and has been able to create carbon credits for the international market.** Guyana's programme in forestry is internationally credible and was in part supported by UK funding. In contrast, Suriname has not been able to sell carbon credits and is still trying to build credibility in the international market. Technical assistance to Suriname or technical support from Guyana to Suriname could help Suriname reach the point where they could get international income for carbon sequestration.
- **Since many of the islands are not far apart, as the number of major hurricanes increases, multiple-island and multiple hazard impacts to both ODA and non-ODA countries will become more likely, and countries will experience loss and damage equivalent to catastrophic proportions of their GDP.** Since increasing GNI does not mean that vulnerability is decreased, loss and damage due to cyclones within the Caribbean is likely to increase and non-ODA countries will be affected. Therefore, it will become more important to work with IFIs and regional entities such as the Caribbean Development Bank to develop ways to fund at concessional rates, building resilience *prior* to events and rebuilding after events for *non-ODA* countries. This is also relevant for countries affected by additional events while they are still recovering.²³
- **Developing Early Warning Systems for climate-related events with resolution applicable to the community level will be increasingly relevant.** Such systems will build on existing data but require more research as to the effects and increased support to technical agencies will be needed to develop and maintain such systems.
- **As the climate continues to change (climate change may increase extreme rainfall in hurricanes between 8 percent & 11 percent), methods to be able to attribute the proportion of Loss and Damage due to climate change will become more relevant.** Research on climate change attribution is being carried out in the USA, Europe and South Africa, but such research needs to be supported in the Caribbean so that Caribbean countries can access loss and damage financing and make projections as to likely risk.
- **Root causes, drivers and social construction of risk.** This includes narrow economies, low levels of human capital (possibly related to the effectiveness of education systems), and small economies (which could be improved by common market and labour movement agreements by CARICOM with the rest of Latin America). These are not new issues but are part of broader issues which will need to be addressed to remove systemic aspects of vulnerability.
- **Migration, Security and inequality issues within Latin America and the Caribbean (e.g. Influence of Haiti).** There are high levels of migration in the region, particularly to the USA. Caribbean countries rank highly in terms of the numbers of persons awarded legal residence in the USA. Jamaica, Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic were in the top 20 in 2021-2022. There are anecdotal reports of Haitian migration to Guyana and Suriname, mainly to try to transit to French Guiana or the Netherlands so to access the Schengen area. There are anecdotal reports that Venezuelan migration into Guyana has increased. Of importance as well is the Venezuelan claim regarding the border with Guyana.

²³ Note that this period could be as long as a decade or longer.

- **Oil and mineral discoveries and implications for development & climate.** Suriname and Guyana are likely to be able to net the emissions from new oil against their forest estate. A question that is more relevant will be how can they avoid the resource curse given their small size. Both countries will likely need to increase technical resources at their disposal to build governance capacity and ensure public policies regarding development, building infrastructure and addressing social issues are pursued successfully.
- **Systemic aspects of resilience.** Relates to inequality, economic breadth and other matters looked at in the MVI but also covered by the R-STAG²⁴ at UNDRR²⁵. Addressing systemic aspects of resilience also relates to increasing the effectiveness of the CSME, since this is within the control of CARICOM and could be done as a counterpart action to support bilateral actions taking place within the region.
- **Education, skills development and diversification of the economies** (less relevant to Guyana, Trinidad and Suriname, more relevant to the tourism destinations.) Also relevant to regional initiatives such as CSME.
- **Food Security could be improved by agreements within the region or within CARICOM since Guyana and Suriname are potentially large food producers and not exposed to cyclones.** Movement towards this has already been started by Barbados which has arrangements with Guyana²⁶ and Suriname²⁷ which could be relevant to other countries. Coupled with these types of arrangements, activities supporting resilient agriculture in the mainland countries could positively influence food security in the remainder of CARICOM.
- **Implementation of disaster risk reduction including natural or ecosystem-based solutions.** Research and trials on the use of mangroves and other nature-based solutions are taking place in several Caribbean countries (e.g. Guyana & Jamaica).²⁸ This may be valuable in mitigating the effects of sea level rise and other coastal hazards.
- **Given the recent decision at the Climate Change COP to address Loss and Damage, the need to attribute the proportion of loss and damage caused by climate change for specific events has become important.** Building the capacity within the Caribbean to do this will require support, possibly through the 5Cs and the UWI. This will be one aspect of improving access to disaster risk financing and should be coupled with support to improving access to funding to reduce disaster risk.

6.4 How is the UK approaching development in the Caribbean?

6.4.1 The framework set by the 2022 International Development Strategy (IDS) and relevance for the Caribbean

The IDS sets a new perspective for the UK to deliver international development integrating development efforts with diplomatic activities

- **Released in 2022, the IDS revisits the UK's approach to international development.** In a post-Brexit context and following the merger between the DFID and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in 2020, the IDS advances the rationale that combining diplomacy and development will enhance outcomes and safeguard British interests and values overseas. It frames as foremost that defence, diplomacy, and development efforts are mutually supportive wherever it is consequential for international development; in line with this rationale, it seeks to foster cross-departmental coordination.

²⁴ Science & Technical Advisory Group

²⁵ UN Disaster Risk Reduction

²⁶ <https://guyanachronicle.com/2022/05/28/guyana-barbados-cooperation-a-model-for-the-region/>

²⁷ <https://www.foreign.gov.bb/barbados-signs-new-cooperation-agreements-with-guyana-suriname/>

²⁸ For example, <https://nbs-engrossed.com/research-activities/>

- The IDS sets four key priorities that will drive UK international development efforts:
 - Deliver honest and reliable investment, building on the UK’s financial expertise and the strengths of the City of London
 - Provide women and girls with the freedom they need to succeed
 - Provide life-saving humanitarian assistance
 - Take forward our work on climate change, nature and global health

Relevant entry points for the Caribbean to consider as set in the IDS

The IDS advances relevant points to consider when framing development programming in the Caribbean:

The IDS and entry points to frame support to Caribbean middle-income SIDS

- **The IDS makes specific mention of SIDS and the vision that the UK sees for them in the 2030 horizon.** The UK wants to support SIDS so they are not only able to graduate from ODA eligibility, but to successfully withstand economic and climate shocks through sound economic and climate resilience. As part of this, there is an acknowledgement on how to continue to reform the international financial system so that it is adapted to SIDS needs.
- **Although associated with Latin America, the IDS frames how the UK will keep working in the Caribbean – including Commonwealth partners – in addressing what is framed as “key global challenges”.** Key global challenges incorporate progressing climate change adaptation, protecting biodiversity and deforestation, as well as advancing infrastructure development and growth. These efforts are part of wider action to promote freedom, democracy and peace.
- **It is also important to note that the IDS places working with middle-income countries (MICs) – a category under which Caribbean SIDS fall – as cornerstone to the achievement of UK global commitments.** In the context of MICs, the IDS seeks to combine efforts across investment, trade, expertise, technology, science and diplomacy to foster long-term change.

The IDS and thematic areas of relevance to Caribbean SIDS

- **Taking forward efforts in climate change and nature are placed as priorities within the IDS – and are of strong relevance to the Caribbean region.** The IDS mentions how by doubling the ICF contribution, the UK intends to lead the way in creating solutions to progress climate commitments. Particularly, the UK will work to foster systemic shifts required to meet Paris Agreement goals, including ensuring that all new bilateral ODA are in alignment with the Paris Agreement. The importance the IDS gives to providing affordable, reliable, and clean energy in the Caribbean context, where energy security is a major challenge to resilience, is of major relevance.
- **The IDS advances the importance of mobilising innovative finance mechanisms to unlock infrastructure investment in low and middle-income countries, which is also an area of consequence to the Caribbean region.** Low and middle-income countries are marked with the need to expand infrastructure investment seven-fold. In this context, the IDS presents various mechanisms that the UK could build upon to leverage its expertise as a global financial centre with the aim of supporting concessional grants for infrastructure development. In particular, the IDS illustrates how countries worldwide, including Caribbean SIDS, could benefit from British International Investment (BII) as the UK development finance institution to deliver investments across varied sectors, ranging from renewable energy to infrastructure development.

Important considerations set by the IDS for the delivery of UK support in the Caribbean

- **The IDS privileges bilateral engagement as a channel to deliver UK support.** Bilateral engagement is placed as an effective way to assist countries to succeed as open, free nations. In line with this rationale, FCDO will seek to considerably realign ODA efforts from multilateral towards bilateral mechanisms.
- **In line with the integration of development efforts with diplomatic action, Ambassadors and High Commissioners become the key agents to implement and track development work.**

Ambassadors and High Commissioners are responsible to establish a common thread across development and diplomatic work and are accountable to deliver on cross-government objectives in their post.

6.4.2 Alignment between the 2022 International Development Strategy and the 2023 UK-Caribbean Region Development Partnership Summary

- **The 2023 UK-Caribbean Region Development Partnership Summary illustrates how the IDS will be implemented in the Caribbean.** The Partnership Summary illustrates the vision it seeks for the Caribbean as a region that will become “resilient, prosperous, inclusive and safe”.
- **The importance of the Caribbean to the UK is acknowledged.** There is mention of the common history, values and Commonwealth links – including the salience of the Caribbean diaspora in the UK and the importance of British citizens that visit and live in the region. The Partnership Summary also advances that the UK and the Caribbean share common interests which include addressing climate change, fighting crime and violence as well as enhancing inclusive trade and economic development. Although Caribbean countries are SIDS marked by small size and population, the UK recognises that they are vocal on global issues and within international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN).
- **The UK’s development programme with the Caribbean is marked by close collaboration, coalition building and engagement with like-minded development partners with a regional footprint in the Caribbean.** In addition to coordination with bilateral donors in the region with whom British objectives may align such as Canada, the US and the EU, the Partnership Summary suggests working with and through multilateral development banks of which the UK is a shareholder (CDB, the World Bank and the IDB). The UK will also seek to empower regional organisations such as CARICOM and the OECS in tackling common challenges at the Caribbean scale. Also important is leveraging the diplomatic footprint in the region, which is the largest, and efficiently mobilising development expertise across Barbados, Belize, Guyana and Jamaica.
- **As the lead bilateral donor to the English-speaking ODA-eligible Commonwealth countries, the Partnership Strategy specifies particular priority areas of support in the period 2023-2025.** These include:
 - Building critical climate resilient, socially inclusive, economic infrastructure
 - Supporting countries in the region with sustainable debt management
 - Accelerating the transition towards renewable energy
 - Assisting governments and locally accredited bodies to access more climate finance from global funds
 - Helping countries in the region better prepare for natural hazards
 - Continuing to lead global efforts to crack down on lost and stolen money and help counter corruption and illicit finance
 - Addressing key challenges facing women and girls
- **The Partnership Summary acknowledges the need for the UK’s development offer with the Caribbean to remain flexible and responsive.** Two specific challenges are advanced:
 - The degrading situation in Haiti and the regional impacts it could bring.
 - Identifying entry points that the UK could build on to address the growing challenge resulting from food insecurity in the region.

6.4.3 The UK Government definition of resilience and its relevance to the Caribbean

- **In the 2016 *What is resilience* paper, UK Government frames how it understands resilience and how the term is intended to be used in international development efforts.** While acknowledging that there is no common definition of resilience, the paper sets resilience as a multi-sectoral effort and as an agenda shared by actors with a stake in development –

whether this stake is driven by financial, political, disaster or climate concerns. The recent prominence of resilience in developing jargon results from rising considerations regarding the relevance of persistent humanitarian support as a response to systemic vulnerabilities and the need to enable a thinking shift towards building systems fostering enduring change.

- **While acknowledging that development actors have developed different definitions of resilience, the paper identifies common threads across them.** This includes:
 - How all definitions can be applied at different scales or layers of risk, i.e. individual, household, community, states and institutions.
 - How all definitions call to interrogate: resilience of who and to what.
 - How all definitions require to consider the capacity to respond as well as response timings.
 - How all definitions call to identify the specific stresses and shocks that require a response to.
- **Within a global international development context, the paper places the 2011 DFID definition of resilience – which is: “The ability of countries, communities and households to manage change by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses without compromising their long-term prospects”.** From this definition, the paper clearly sets what it is understood by shocks and stresses:
 - Shocks are defined as events that cause immediate and damaging impact. Covariate shocks including disasters or food price rises can impact on multiple households, communities or regions.
 - Stresses are less severe as compared to shocks but frequently result in longer-term impacts and hinder existing systems over time.
 - Shocks can result by long-term or repeated stresses that lead a system to a “breaking point” over time.
- **The paper places particular emphasis on the importance of defining what resilient infrastructure is and how it supports the delivery of UN SDGs.** Goal 9 of the UN SDGs is to “Build resilient infrastructure to promote sustainable industrialization and foster innovation” e.g. through investment in transport, irrigation, energy, communications, water and sanitation infrastructure. Goal 11 is also linked – “Making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable”. In the context of the SDGs, there are two further aspects to consider regarding resilient infrastructure:
 - The resilience of infrastructure itself – and how this supports the materialisation of wider economic benefits;
 - How infrastructure enhances resilience, i.e. how it impacts on other infrastructure systems, and how it can shape the resilience and livelihood options of individuals, households and communities.

Considerations for the Caribbean

Taking into consideration the *What is resilience* paper, there are a number of entry points that are highly relevant for the Caribbean – and for the purposes of this assignment:

- 1. Resilience is framed as a multi-dimensional effort.** This is very much in line with the way resilience has been understood and set as part of the methodology for this assignment (please refer to Caribbean Resilience Framework, [Figure 3](#)).
- 2. Resilience is a concerted effort between development partners.** This is highly relevant for the Caribbean context marked by a multiplicity of bilateral donors, multi-lateral development banks (MDBs) and regional organisations (e.g. CARICOM) engaged in resilience-building efforts.
- 3. There is specific recognition of the importance of climate resilient infrastructure.** The UK Government paper frames infrastructure resilience in relation to climate change and climate impacts by establishing a link to the 2011 UNDP paper “Paving the Way for Climate Resilient Infrastructure”. This is an important point to consider due to the recurrence of climate impacts in the Caribbean and the salience of the UKCIF programme as part of the CDT portfolio;

infrastructure resilience is also incorporated as a specific Resilience Theme in the Caribbean Resilience Framework.

Annex 10.

Annex 11. CDT resilience portfolio: summary of available documentation in Devtracker

No.	Programme	Project Preparatory Documents				
		Business Case	Addendum 1	Addendum 2	Addendum 3	Logical Framework
1	UK Caribbean Infrastructure Fund - UK CIF	Yes	2019 addendum	2023 addendum		Yes
2	Increasing Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean	Yes	2018 addendum	2021 addendum		Yes
3	Strengthening Health Facilities in the Caribbean - SMART Hospitals	Yes	2017 addendum	2019 addendum	2019 addendum	Yes
4	Caribbean Economic Development Programme	Yes				Yes
5	UK Jamaica Violence Prevention Partnership	Yes				
6	Caribbean Anti-Corruption Programme	Yes				Yes
7	Citizen Security and Justice Programme 3	Yes				Yes
8	Strengthening Disaster Recovery and Resilience in the Caribbean Programme	Yes				Yes
9	Youth Skills for Economic Growth in the Eastern Caribbean	Yes				Yes
10	Caribbean Humanitarian Assistance in SVG and Haiti	Yes				Yes
11	Emergency Assistance for the Relief Effort in Dominica as a Result of Tropical Storm Erika	Yes				
12	Support for the Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica	Yes				Yes
13	Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica (CREAD)	Yes				Yes
14	Serious Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Programme 2020-2025	Yes				
15	UK Humanitarian Support to Belize Following Hurricane Lisa	Yes				

	Programme	Annual Reviews
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1	UK Caribbean Infrastructure Fund - UK CIF	2017, 2019-2023
2	Increasing Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean	2016-17; 2019-2023
3	Strengthening Health Facilities in the Caribbean - SMART Hospitals	2016; 2019-2023
4	Caribbean Economic Development Programme	2017-2023
5	UK Jamaica Violence Prevention Partnership	No
6	Caribbean Anti-Corruption Programme	No
7	Citizen Security and Justice Programme 3	2017, 2019, 2021
8	Strengthening Disaster Recovery and Resilience in the Caribbean Programme	2020-2022
9	Youth Skills for Economic Growth in the Eastern Caribbean	2017-2023
10	Caribbean Humanitarian Assistance in SVG and Haiti	No
11	Emergency Assistance for the Relief Effort in Dominica as a Result of Tropical Storm Erika	No
12	Support for the Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica	2020-2022
13	Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica (CREAD)	No
14	Serious Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Programme 2020-2025	2021-2023
15	UK Humanitarian Support to Belize Following Hurricane Lisa	No

		Final Evaluation Documents				
No.	Programme	Evaluation Inception Report	Mid-Term Review	Evaluation Report	Social Development Approach	Project Completion Review
1	UK Caribbean Infrastructure Fund - UK CIF	Yes		Yes	Yes	
2	Increasing Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in the Eastern Caribbean		Yes			
3	Strengthening Health Facilities in the Caribbean - SMART Hospitals		Yes	Yes		Yes
4	Caribbean Economic Development Programme					
5	UK Jamaica Violence Prevention Partnership					
6	Caribbean Anti-Corruption Programme			Yes		
7	Citizen Security and Justice Programme 3					
8	Strengthening Disaster Recovery and Resilience in the Caribbean					Yes
9	Youth Skills for Economic Growth in the Eastern Caribbean					Yes
10	Caribbean Humanitarian Assistance in SVG and Haiti					Yes
11	Emergency Assistance for the Relief Effort in Dominica as a Result of Tropical Storm Erika					Yes
12	Support for the Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica					Yes
13	Climate Resilience Execution Agency of Dominica (CREAD)					Yes
14	Serious Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Programme 2020-2025					Yes
15	UK Humanitarian Support to Belize Following Hurricane Lisa					Yes

Annex 12. Terms of Reference: Evaluation Management Group

n **Evaluation Management Group (EMG)** will be set up comprising staff from FCDO, and Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)'s Office of Independent Evaluation (OIE). The EMG will have decision-making powers on a range of issues including advising on field work, commenting on draft reports and communication/dissemination. Ultimately, the ERG will be responsible for oversight of the Resilience thematic evaluation and quality control of evaluation activities.

Personnel: The EMG will be made up of 3 FCDO Staff and 1 CDB and 1 CREAD member. The FCDO Staff should be the Caribbean M&E Adviser (Chair) and FCDO Climate change and Economic advisers. The CDB Staff should be one representative from the Office of Independent Evaluation (OIE) and READ should have one representative.

The EMG will have the following specific responsibilities:

- A. Overseeing the evaluation contract including supporting the evaluation provider with logistics;
- B. Ad hoc advice relating to the core evaluation questions and technical queries;
- C. Review and comment on the interim evaluation report (end April).
- D. Supporting the evaluation provider to frame the evaluation recommendations
- E. Review and comment on the final evaluation report (June)
- F. Facilitating internal and public dissemination of the theory of change and evaluation findings to inform decision-makers on learning generated by the evaluation.

Note – Decisions with financial implications will ultimately be made by FCDO since FCDO is funding the evaluation, although advice will be taken from the EMG.

Frequency and time frame: The EMG will meet with consultants in May and late June. The May meeting will allow the EMG to discuss initial findings and to help frame any recommendations for the interim report. The June meeting will be to review and comment on the draft final evaluation report.

Processes: This group will be the arbitrator of overall quality in the evaluation, in addition to using FCDO's Standard Evaluation Quality Assurance and Learning Service (EQUALS).

The Interim report will not be quality assured by EQUALS. Thus the EMT will have sole responsibility for ensuring the initial findings from case studies address the EQs and make sense.

Equals will review the draft final evaluation report. Generally, EQUALS needs 2 weeks (10 working days) to be able to review a document. Then, depending on the feedback they give, revisions may be needed to the documents so another 1-2 weeks should be factored in for this to be done by the evaluation provider (to be agreed with the Evaluation Provider).

Annex 13. Annex 11

Annex 14.

Annex 15. Evaluation of FCDO Support to Improve resilience in the Caribbean through a range of programmes and wider initiatives

Country Selection Methodology Note

6.5

6.6 Purpose of the note

The purpose of this note is two fold:

1. To provide an explanation of the methodology that was used to select countries where to go deeper into the evidence. The methodology was based around the design of a Country Selection Scorecard.
2. To present the findings resulting from the application of the methodology and suggestions of priority countries that could be selected for case study. This sets the basis for a further discussion with FCDO to agree on a final case study selection.

6.7 Scorecard methodology

6.7.1 Developing a Caribbean resilience framework

In line with our multi-dimensional resilience thinking and in order to grasp the diversity of resilience challenges Caribbean countries face, we developed a composite framework to frame resilience in the region (Figure 1). This framework is structured around 7 Resilience “Thematic Areas” that encapsulate the multiplicity of challenges that mark the pace of resilience-building in the Caribbean region.

6.7.2 Why a Country Selection Scorecard?

The purpose of the Scorecard is to provide guidance to FCDO on where it would be relevant to go further into the evidence, and why, as part of the evaluation. A Scorecard is a valuable data-driven, evidence-based tool that allows comparisons across the group of 15 countries forming part of CARICOM (the 7 English-speaking ODA eligible²⁹ countries and the country group constituted by English-speaking non-ODA eligible,³⁰ Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Suriname). These are the countries that are being looked at by the evaluation. To draw comparisons between countries, we built a scorecard around 4 components:

- **Component 1: Country vulnerability profile.** In line with the Caribbean resilience framework and the 7 Resilience Thematic Areas, this component builds an understanding of the various socio-economic variables at play that contribute to country vulnerability in the Caribbean – see Figure 1.
- **Component 2: Geographic representation and ODA-eligibility.** This component considers geographic dispersion (mainland states and island-countries) crossing with ODA / non-ODA eligibility.

²⁹ Belize, Guyana, Grenada, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Jamaica and Dominica.

³⁰ Trinidad and Tobago, St Kitts & Nevis, The Bahamas, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda.

- **Component 3: FCDO programming in the country.** By looking at the 15 programmes that form part of the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio, this component builds an understanding of how UKAID flows are being directed among the 15 country group, the countries where the programmes constituting the portfolio are intervening and where data from Final Evaluations is available.
- **Component 4: Presence of existing development partner interventions in the resilience space.** This component considers the extent of existing investments and efforts by other development partners to support the country in resilience building.

Under each component, a specific set of criteria was chosen; in turn, each criteria has a particular data source attached to it. Details on data sources used are available on Figure 2.

6.7.3 How was the Scorecard completed?

To complete the Scorecard, a **Scorecard Guidance Framework** was developed. This excel file is to be read with the scorecard. In the Scorecard Guidance, each Scorecard component criteria has a dedicated sheet. The Scorecard Guidance assists in completing the Scorecard through the following steps:

4. In the Scorecard, each of the 15 countries has a dedicated sheet. Each sheet was filled following the specific component criteria sheet available in the Scorecard Guidance, which allowed to establish comparisons between countries.
5. Once a country scorecard sheet for each of the 15 countries was completed, a Summary sheet for the 7 English-speaking ODA countries and a Summary sheet for the country group constituted by English-speaking non-ODA eligible, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Suriname was developed.
6. Once the Summary sheets were completed, a qualitative judgement was made to establish an order of priority for case study country selection (i.e. why would it be interesting or not to do a case study on the country and go more deeply into the evidence on the basis of what the Scorecard summary evidence is illustrating).

A recommendation on the basis of the following categorisation was made for each of the 15 countries.

High priority for case study	The country emerges as a priority in the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio and there is a medium or low level of data regarding the impact of programmes in the country (programmes with Final Evaluations available). In addition, a case study on the country could help answer crucial questions regarding synergy with donors in regional resilience-building action, document a Caribbean success story in resilience-building, and / or support geographic diversity and representation (countries with small populations, Caribbean SIDS in the mainland).
Medium priority for case study	The country emerges as a medium priority in the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio and there is a high to medium level of data regarding the impact of programmes in the country (programmes with Final Evaluations available). In addition, a case study on the country could help answer some questions regarding synergy with donors in regional resilience-building action and / or support geographic diversity and representation (countries with small populations, Caribbean SIDS in the mainland).
Low priority for case study	The country is a low priority for FCDO (low UKAID expenditure and / or low presence of programmes from the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio). There is good Final Evaluation data availability for the programmes from the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio that operate in the country. Selecting the country as a case study would not support answering crucial questions regarding donor synergy in Caribbean resilience-building or document success stories in regional resilience building.

Scorecard findings to point to a sample of countries that could be selected for case study. The summary of findings is in Table 1. Our intention is for this table to serve as a basis for further discussion with FCDO to finalise the countries that will be selected for case study.

Table 1. Recommendations on country sample for case study

	7 English-speaking ODA eligible countries	English-speaking non-ODA eligible countries, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Haiti
High priority for case study	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Belize ▪ Dominica ▪ Jamaica 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Barbados ▪ Antigua & Barbuda
Medium priority for case study	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Guyana ▪ Grenada ▪ St Lucia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Suriname ▪ The Bahamas ▪ Dominican Republic
Low priority for case study	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ St Vincent & the Grenadines 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Haiti ▪ St Kitts & Nevis ▪ Trinidad and Tobago

Tables 2 and 3 provide further detail on the recommendations for country case study.

Figure 1. Caribbean resilience framework

Resilience can be defined as the overall ability of a country – including the ability of its institutions, systems, businesses and population – to survive, adapt and thrive no matter what kinds of chronic stresses or acute shocks it experiences

Economic resilience

Caribbean countries are characterised by a high dependence on tourism and a lack of economic diversification. This results in high economic vulnerability, particularly when external shocks hit.

Fiscal resilience

High levels of debt frequently represent a high proportion of GDP in Caribbean countries. This limits their ability to sustain growth and their room to act when shocks hit. External shocks can also lead to borrowing and higher levels of debt, thereby perpetuating a negative systemic cycle. High inflation levels have recently caused food insecurity challenges.

Workforce resilience

Caribbean SIDS have limited human capacity to effectively respond to all the requirements of a functioning government. Although populations in Caribbean countries are young and benefit from high levels of education, the private sector is limited and there is a mismatch between skills and economic sectors, which hinders on sustainable growth. Brain drain further impacts on workforce strengths.

Social and democratic resilience

There are persistent high levels of inequality despite relatively low poverty levels. Violence and organised crime are widespread, which undermine social cohesion, particularly among the youth. Pervasive high levels of corruption hinder on the rule of law and the strength of institutions. High levels of child malnutrition and stunting pose long-term human and social challenges in some countries.

Climate and disaster resilience

Caribbean countries are some of the most exposed countries in the world to the effects of climate change and natural disasters. Although the emphasis is to be placed on the reduction of climate and disaster vulnerability, effective emergency response systems are needed to cope with emergencies. Given the relatively small contribution of the Caribbean to climate emissions, adaptation (and not mitigation) emerges as the salient priority.

Infrastructure, settlement and energy resilience

Poor quality infrastructure acts as a barrier to sustained growth, and more than half of the Caribbean population live in urban areas, which are concentrated in the vulnerable low-lying coastal zone. Despite some exceptions, Caribbean countries are heavily reliant on fossil fuel imports and few have significantly invested in renewable energy infrastructure.

Regional integration resilience

Caribbean SIDS face significant intra-regional connectivity challenges which hinder on growth and resilience. While organisations promoting regional integration have emerged and Caribbean integration and coordination bodies (CDEMA, CCCCC) have driven action in climate and disaster management, economic integration has been slow to take off.




Figure 2. Country Selection Scorecard Data Sources

Component	Criteria	Information Source	Component	Criteria	Information Source
Component 1: Country vulnerability profile	Population	World Bank website	Component 3: Salience of FCDO programmatic priorities	FCDO post in-country	FCDO website
	Income status	ND Gain Country Index website (University of Notre Dame)		FCDO programmatic priorities in-country	FCDO Country Business Plans & Triple Line Analysis: tab "FCDO priorities in-country"
	Economic reliance on tourism (i.e. tourism as a proportion of GDP)	Travel & Tourism in the Caribbean, Prospects for Growth. World Travel & Tourism Council		UKAID expenditure in-country	DevTracker
	ND-Gain Country Index	ND Gain Country Index website (University of Notre Dame)		No. of programmes in-country from Caribbean resilience portfolio	Triple Line Analysis. Tab "FCDO Caribbean Portfolio"
	Homicide rate	Global Study on Homicide 2023, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime		Key FCDO programmes in-country	Triple Line Analysis. Tab "FCDO Resilience Portfolio"
	Corruption Perception Index	Transparency International website		Availability of Final Evaluation data on FCDO programming - number of FCDO programmes from Caribbean resilience portfolio in-country with a Final Evaluation available	Triple Line Analysis. Tab "FCDO Data Availability"
	Debt to GDP ratio	FCDO Caribbean Growth and Resilience Diagnostic		FCDO programmatic diversity - number of FCDO programmes from Caribbean resilience portfolio working across 2+ Resilience Thematic	Triple Line Analysis. Tab "FCDO Programmatic Diversity"
	Progress in establishing a climate resilience / DRM framework Tracks the level of progress in-country in the preparation of the following documents: ~ Updated NDC ~ Climate Finance Strategy ~ Implementation Plan or NDC Road Map ~ National Adaptation Plan or similar ~ Climate Change Law ~ Comprehensive Disaster Management Plan	USAID Climate Resilience and Disaster Recovery Capacity Assessment for the Caribbean Region: Gaps and Opportunities Assessment Report			
Component 2: Geographic representation and ODA-eligibility	SIDS country	UN SIDS list	Component 4: Presence of existing development partner interventions in the resilience space	Official development flows in-country	OECD Aid Statistics
	Caribbean mainland country	Google Maps		No. of donor resilience programmes in-country. 25 regional resilience programmes supported by donors (USAID, IADB, EU, Global Affairs Canada, GIZ, GFDRR) were mapped for the period 2017-2023.	Triple Line Analysis. Tab "Donor resilience prog"
	ODA eligible country	OECD DAC list of ODA recipients		Presence of donor post in country (UN Resident Coordinator, USAID, EU)	Triple Line Analysis. Tab "Donor post in-country"
	Non-ODA eligible country	OECD DAC list of ODA recipients			

Table 2. Summary of case study recommendations for the 7 English-speaking ODA-eligible countries

	Belize	Guyana	Grenada	Dominica	St Lucia	St Vincent & the Grenadines	Jamaica
Case Study Recommendation (high, medium, low priority)	High priority	Medium priority	Medium priority	High priority	Medium priority	Low priority	High priority
What is the relevance (or not) of going deeper into the evidence in the country?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Generating further evidence on FCDO's Caribbean resilience portfolio as there is medium Final Evaluation data availability of programmes working in Belize (3 out of 5 programmes operating in the country have Final Evaluations available). The above could be particularly salient as there is high programmatic diversity: 4 out of 5 programmes working in Belize work in 2+ Resilience Thematic Areas. Responding to a geographic representation consideration by adding a SIDS in the Caribbean mainland into the case study mix. Belize displays a high 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Guyana displays salient levels of UKAID expenditure: £800k yearly average expenditure in FY2019-2023, the third highest average in the 15 countries looked at. In addition, there is a medium level (4 programmes) of programmes from the FCDO resilience portfolio operating in the country. The level of programmatic diversity is very high (3 out of the 4 programmes work across 2+ Resilience Thematic Areas). A case study on Guyana could add diversity as the country is in the Caribbean mainland and not 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Although there is a high level of programmes (7 programmes) from the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio operating in Grenada, there is a medium level of UKAID expenditure in the country (£258k as yearly average in FY2019-2023), the lowest level among the 7 English-speaking ODA eligible countries looked at. There is also very high FCDO data availability as 5 out of the 7 programmes operating in Grenada have Final Evaluations available. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dominica emerges as a priority country for FCDO. The country displays high levels of UKAID expenditure in the period FY2019-2023 (£1m yearly average expenditure), the second highest level of expenditure among the 15 countries looked at after Jamaica. There is also a very high level of programmes from the FCDO resilience portfolio (10 programmes) operating in the country. Although there is high FCDO data availability (7 out of the 10 programmes have Final Evaluation data available), Dominica is seen as a regional 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Although there is a high level of programmes (7 programmes) operating in St Lucia from the FCDO resilience portfolio, UKAID yearly average expenditure is £321k for the period FY2019-2023, the second lowest among the 7 English speaking ODA eligible countries. There is also a high level of FCDO data availability: 5 out of the 7 programmes operating in St Lucia have Final Evaluations available. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> While there is a high number of programmes (8 programmes) from the FCDO resilience portfolio in country, there is, comparatively, a high level of data availability: 6 out of 8 programmes have Final Evaluations available. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Jamaica displays the highest level of UKAID expenditure for the period FY2019-2023 among the 15 country group and a high level of programmes (8 programmes) from the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio are operating in the country . In addition, there is medium data availability regarding programme effectiveness (only 4 out of the 8 programmes have Final Evaluations). There is also a high presence of donors in-country (Jamaica serves as a hub to coordinate regional action in

<p>level of progress in establishing a climate resilience framework and less dependency on tourism as compared to other Caribbean SIDS, despite prevalent social challenges (homicide rate).</p>	<p>very dependent on tourism. However, Belize may be a more suitable case study as the level of FCDO data availability in Guyana is higher as compared to Belize (3 out of 4 programmes have Final Evaluations available).</p>	<p>success story in resilience-building, which would be worthwhile to explore further and document.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exploring how a country with a small population is achieving transformational change. In addition to progress in establishing a resilience framework – and despite Dominica being in the middle income bracket – the country displays relatively good social metrics (medium economic reliance on tourism, medium homicide rate, medium corruption perception). 	<p>the Caribbean), which could help answer questions regarding FCDO synergy and approaches to regional resilience building processes.</p>
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Table 3. Summary of case study recommendations for the English-speaking non-ODA eligible countries, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Suriname

	Barbados	Haiti	St Kitts & Nevis	Trinidad & Tobago	Suriname	The Bahamas	Dominican Republic	Antigua & Barbuda
Case Study Recommendation (high, medium, low priority)	High priority (presence of donors coordinating regional action)	Low priority	Low priority	Low priority	Medium (or high) priority	Medium (or high) priority	Medium priority	High priority for case study
What is the relevance (or not) of going deeper into the evidence in the country?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> While there is a low level of UKAID expenditure in the country and just 1 programme from the FCDO Caribbean portfolio operates in Barbados, and the programme has a final evaluation, there is a high presence of donors in-country (Barbados serves as a hub to coordinate regional donor and FCDO action in the Caribbean). Interaction with donors in Barbados could help answer questions regarding FCDO synergy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Although the level of UKAID expenditure in Haiti is very high (4th highest level of expenditure among the 15 countries) and the country has salient economic and social resilience challenges, there is just 1 programme from the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio operating in country. The programme operating in country also has a Final Evaluation available. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The yearly UKAID average expenditure for the period FY 2019-2024 is among the lowest of the group of 15 countries. There is just 1 programme from the FCDO Caribbean portfolio operating in-country and the programme has a Final Evaluation available. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The yearly UKAID average expenditure for the period FY 2019-2024 is among the lowest of the group of 15 countries. There are also no programmes from the FCDO Caribbean portfolio operating in-country. While Trinidad and Tobago is a highly populated country in the Caribbean in the upper middle income bracket, the country displays medium progress in establishing a climate resilience framework and receives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UKAID expenditure in country is high and while there is just 1 programme from the Caribbean resilience portfolio operating in Suriname, the programme has no Final Evaluation available. Suriname also receives some attention from donors. A Suriname country case study could support geographic representation and diversity. Suriname is Caribbean mainland country with a high population and in the upper middle income bracket. The 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Although the level of UKAID expenditure is low and there is just 1 programme from the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio operating in country (and the programme has a final evaluation available), a Bahamas country case study could be justified on diversity grounds. The Bahamas is the only country in the 15 country group in the upper income status and the country displays strong progress in establishing a climate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Although UKAID expenditure in the country is medium (yearly average for the period FY 2019-2024: £200k), there are no programmes from the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio operating in the Dominican Republic. However, a Dominican Republic case study could be worthwhile to document progress achieved in the development of a climate resilience framework in a country where the Caribbean Development Team doesn't directly intervene. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Antigua & Barbuda is a former ODA eligible country. There is a legacy FCDO plan in the country and the UKAID expenditure is medium. A case study on Antigua and Barbuda could be interesting to illustrate how to enable effective support to countries that transition from ODA eligibility to non-ODA eligibility. The above point is all the more relevant as there is a medium level of programmes (3 programmes) from the FCDO Caribbean resilience portfolio

<p>to regional resilience building processes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessing Barbados as a success story in resilience building in the Caribbean appears less salient. 	<p>medium attention from donors.</p>	<p>country displays some good social and economic metrics (low homicide rate, low economic dependence on tourism), despite high levels of corruption perception and modest progress in establishing a climate resilience framework.</p>	<p>resilience framework.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A Bahamas country case study could shed light regarding how FCDO can support non-ODA eligible countries to progress in the development of climate resilience frameworks. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Dominican Republic is the only country in the 15 country group that has prepared or is preparing the 6 documents that track progress towards establishing an operational climate / disaster resilience framework. 	<p>operating in country and there are low levels of FCDO data availability (only 1 of the 3 programmes has a Final Evaluation).</p>
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